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 A photograph from a family holiday. Two boys in a campsite, sitting close 
together, but with their attention totally absorbed by the screens of the Nintendo 
DS consoles in their hands. Framed by trees, they are huddled close to a metre-
high post and its electrical sockets, their consoles plugged in via cables, plugs 
and adaptors, batteries charging aft er days of travelling without electrical hook-
up. Th ey are playing, no doubt, a  Pokémon game, lost in worlds that synthesize 
pastoral exploration and adventure that simulate a community of human and 
monstrous playmates and adversaries. For those anxious about the current state 
of childhood, this might seem a dark irony – an idealized childhood of open 
fi elds, woods and collective, imaginative play mocked in vivid colours, and an 
impossible ecology of Viridian Forest and Five Isle Meadow ( Figure I.1 ). 
 Introduction
 Figure I.1 Th e outdoor adventure of Pokémon 
2 Gameworlds
 I am reminded of a television natural history programme about barnacles 
living on thermal vents on the deep ocean fl oor. Th e hot, mineral-rich water 
builds up tower-like protuberances on which these molluscs survive – a few 
centimetres away from their tower they would perish in the deep cold. Th ey are 
among the very few species that do not rely on the sun’s energy for their life, as 
the other animals at these depths are sustained by debris drift ing down from the 
sunlit waters way above. Th e children in the photograph are clinging to their 
devices and their life-giving cables and plugs, drawing imaginative sustenance 
from an environment utterly alien to the sunlight, trees, breeze and grass that 
surrounds them. From the tiny screen fl ows a bright, but sunless, world of 
exploration, adventure, play and puzzles. 
 But it reminds me too of photographs, taken by Fr Damian Webb in the 1950s 
and Shirley Baker in the mid 1960s, of young girls playing in the forbidding 
streets of Salford and other northern English cities. An environment ostensibly 
as inhospitable to play as the icy waters are to barnacles, fi lled with back-to-
back terraced houses opening straight onto the pavement. No grass, trees, no 
space other than pavement and cobbled street. 1  Th ese generations of girls, 
though, have transformed lamp posts into unlikely play equipment. Skipping 
ropes looped around the posts fashion a rudimentary swing. Th e mechanics 
of this improvized apparatus do not allow the free backwards and forwards 
motion of a conventional park swing, rather the girls swing out and round, in 
tight ellipses, brief fl ights and a vertiginous thrill. Like life itself, play will fi nd 
a way. 
 Even in these two small examples there are numerous worlds in play. We 
cannot know, just from looking at the photograph, whether the girls’ game is 
simply one of kinaesthetic exertion, or whether they have their own imaginative 
setting – such as magical fl ight – for their swinging. Th ey may well have a rhyme 
or song, learnt from others via the oral folklore of childhood, or improvized in 
the moment. Th is may be a competition, a sport, the time of each leap and swing 
counted out and compared. Th e boys, though quiet and still, are playing – each 
in his own world, but perhaps comfortable in the presence of the other, perhaps 
aware of the sunlight and fresh air at some level. Meanwhile, the videogame 
soft ware is generating its own dynamic microcosm: stories unfold, battles are 
fought and monsters collected as the boys click their way through the synthetic 
environment. Th e Pokémon universe extends beyond the console, across media 
platforms from comics to television, cards to toys and permeating everyday 
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thoughts and conversations; this holiday was characterized by long journeys 
in which elaborate scenarios and dramas were spoken into existence. Pikachu, 
Charmander and others by the dozen evoked, summoned, intangible yet present 
between the children in the car. 
 Space and time of play
 Children’s games and imaginations in particular, but play in its broader 
and adult contexts too, are broadly understood in terms of space and time. 
Historians and anthropologists of play describe the ambiguous apartness of 
games in time and space: the marking out of the sports pitch or the microcosm 
of the game board, the marking out of time by the referee’s whistle or the 
playtime interludes in the work or school day ( Huizinga 1986 ,  Caillois 1962 ). It 
is also fully part of everyday life, enacted by bodies and technologies, in physical 
environments and hemmed in by the constraints of more instrumental and 
practical activities. Playing takes place in the interior spaces and temporalities 
of the mind as well: 
 All play presupposes the temporary acceptance, if not of an illusion (indeed 
this last word means nothing less than beginning a game:  in-lusio ), then at 
least of a closed, conventional, and, in certain respects, imaginary universe. 
( Caillois 1962 , 19) 
 Games and play are at once material and imaginary. Th ey are real – but 
they trouble commonsense notions of reality; they off er multiple realities 
of fantasy, performance and intense experience. Th e ‘gameworlds’ of this 
book’s title open up in fi elds, parks, streets, at home indoors, as well as in 
computer-generated space. Th e digital does not mark an absolute redirection 
of the history of children’s play in space: play has always been characterized 
by some kind of virtuality. Moreover, even the modern virtual forms driven 
by sophisticated technology are not a clear break. Pre-digital electronic media 
such as television and video, and pre-electronic media such as cinema and 
literature have always been understood as worlds within worlds, thresholds 
to be crossed. Media worlds are playworlds, and these playworlds may appear 
in the gameworld as I describe it here, or follow their own orbits ( Figure I.2 ). 
4 Gameworlds
 Figure I.2 Mapping a gameworld 
 Media worlds
 All entertainment media, from books and comics to fi lms and television, 
whilst not necessarily games,  are playful. Viewers and readers cross a border 
into a fi ctional world and in so doing adopt a playful willingness to accept the 
characters, action and events as a kind of reality, and similarly to regard the 
evident artifi ce of genre conventions, narrative structure, spatial and temporal 
ellipses, etc., as real, or as  real enough to warrant imaginative engagement and 
sustained attention: 
 Th e media have the capacity, indeed they entirely depend upon that capacity, 
to engage an audience within spaces and times that are distinguished – marked 
off  – from the otherwise relentless confusions of everyday life. Th ere is a 
threshold to be crossed each time we participate in the process of mediation. 
( Silverstone 1999 , 61) 
 Th eatre and comedy are among the popular media forms that most clearly 
acknowledge – and play with – their own compelling fantasies. As Shakespeare’s 
Th eseus puts it, 
 Th e poet’s eye, in a fi ne frenzy rolling,
 Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
 And as imagination bodies forth
 Th e forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
 Turns them into shapes, and gives to airy nothing
 A local habitation and a name. 2  
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 Th e media spectator’s imaginative and embodied engagement with the 
fantastical realities – the off ending shadows – of play, fi lm or sporting event is 
for Caillois one of the four main categories of play, mimicry or simulation: 
 Mimicry is incessant invention. Th e rule of the game is unique: it consists in 
the actor’s fascinating the spectator, while avoiding an error that might lead 
the spectator to break the spell. Th e spectator must lend himself to the illusion 
without fi rst challenging the décor, mask, or artifi ce which for a given time he is 
asked to believe in as more real than reality itself. ( Caillois 1962 , 23) 
 For Caillois, simulation is the way spectators are placed in relation to 
entertainment performances, in other words, the playful way they engage with 
the images and dramas before them. Th e term also encompasses children’s 
imaginative play with both media and toys, and without. Any imaginative play 
entails role play or the meta-roleplay of the director of the drama, its staging, 
props and costumes. But sometimes the playworld is etheric, built on the spoken 
word, conversation or just thought, with no props, board or cards: airy nothing. 
Daydreams are perhaps the most ubiquitous moments of simulation, fl eeting yet 
capable of briefl y transforming the everyday: 
 Never shall I, Charlotte Brontë forget what a voice of wild & wailing music 
now came thrillingly to my mind’s-almost to my body’s-ear nor how distinctly 
I, sitting in the school room at Roe Head, saw the Duke of Zamorna leaning 
against that obelisk with the mute marble Victory above him […] I was quite 
gone. I had really utterly forgot where I was and all the gloom & cheerlessness of 
my situation. I felt myself breathing quick and short as I beheld the Duke lift ing 
up his sable crest, which undulated as the plume of a hearse waves to the wind 
[ … ] ‘Miss Brontë, what are you thinking about?’, said a voice that dissipated 
all the charm, & Miss Lister thrust her little rough black head into my face! ‘Sic 
transit’ &c. (Th e Brontës [1835]  2010 , 156–157) 
 Children’s literature and other media have oft en been characterized by a 
‘worldness’, shaped as much by the topographical impetus of a plot as by 
its temporality, prefaced with maps and with narratives following through 
landscapes, architectures, mythic structures and polities designed for the quest 
itself (e.g. J.R.R. Tolkein’s Middle Earth, Tove Jansson’s Moomin Valley or J.K. 
Rowling’s Hogwarts and alternative London), through magical or nonsensical 
spaces that resist conventional cartography but sustain a powerful sense of place 
and other-worldness (Lewis Carroll’s Wonderland and Looking Glass world, 
Norton Juster’s Dictionopolis and Doldrums in  Th e Phantom Tollbooth , Swift ’s 
Lilliput and Brobdingnag in  Gulliver’s Travels , the multiple dimensions of both 
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Phillip Pullman’s  His Dark Materials and Enid Blyton’s  Far Away Tree ) or more 
everyday environments and adventures (the fi elds and gardens of the small 
adventures of William Brown or Milly Molly Mandy, the lakes and islands of 
 Swallows and Amazons and the challenging and varied environments of Michael 
Rosen’s  Bear Hunt ). 
 Such worlds open up as virtual environments for play beyond the page, 
along with television, comic and fi lm stories and characters, as resources for 
play in the playground, the park or the bedroom. Th ey are to be lived in and 
played out beyond the act of reading or being read to – a stage and a dramatis 
personae ready for toys and dolls, Lego bricks and everyday objects, more or 
less faithfully replicated, hybridized with other storyworlds from media and 
literature or of the child’s own construction. An example of this forms a central 
case study for this book, though it is a replication of the world of a computer 
game rather than a book or fi lm. 
 It seems clear that the poeitic fl ow is not one-way as many writers, producers 
and game designers refl ect on their own childhood world-building as a source 
for their adult work. Fragments in poems and diaries document Emily and 
Anne Brontë’s elaborate and sustained game/worlds of Gondal, Angria and 
Glass Town (the wellspring for the daydream mentioned earlier), whilst Satoshi 
Tajiri – the creator of  Pokémon – cites his childhood fascination with collecting 
insects as his inspiration. As an adult, H.G. Wells revisited playful worlds by 
devising thorough rules for an intricate simulation of war with tin soldiers, set 
out in  Little Wars. 
 Gondal and Angria is a classic example of what David Cohen and Stephen 
MacKeith call paracosms, ‘spontaneously created imaginary private worlds, 
which for a considerable period recur in the child or young person, and 
therefore tend to become elaborate and systematised’ (Cohen and MacKeith 
 1991 , 109). Th ese worlds – sometimes constructed from toys and blocks, 
sometimes as much talked into existence by friends or siblings or told as 
bedtime stories –are related to literary fantasy worlds, they suggest, but in play 
it is the world itself that fascinates, not its character or plot. A paracosm could 
be logical, governed by rules and constitutions, bedecked with fl ags and coats 
of arms and provided with a political history. Or, it could be infused with the 
spontaneous surrealism of children’s play, where toys are animated and objects 
transformed. For example, the three cities of Petsland – the creation of a seven-
year-old girl and her ten-year-old brother – were organized according to the 
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size of the toys that lived there. Petsville was home to larger toys, Juville for 
medium-sized and Hamville for the smallest. 
 Petsland and its activities provided an inexhaustible source of interest for the 
children. It lift ed the restrictions of the ‘real’ world. ‘We were “in charge” of 
Petsland and could manipulate its destiny.’ Th ey had to care for twenty or thirty 
‘real entities (real to us, that is), that we could devote ourselves to’. (Cohen and 
MacKeith  1991 , 25) 
 So, for all their marvelousness, these cities and lands had their own reality. 
On the one hand, the worlds and their denizens had a real presence within 
the children’s lives, shaping their time, relationships and behaviour. On the 
other, events within them oft en had to correspond to a certain level of fantastic 
plausibility. For instance, the creators of Possumbul World, Dan and Peter, were 
monarchs, not gods: 
 Th ey could perform no miracles: Plausibility was all. Dan recalls a well-meaning 
adult moving some toy to what you thought was a ‘better’ place without 
appreciating that such a change in location could not be eff ected by hand 
stretched out from heaven. Moving a toy would call for a crane, a lorry, and 
some personnel. Similarly the boys were embarrassed by the gift  of a mounted 
toy soldier painted a uniform gold – until they hit upon the expedient of erecting 
it as a city statue! Realism was all. (Cohen and MacKeith  1991 , 373–374) 
 Th e ‘as if-ness’ or ‘sort of ’ reality of play is a theme throughout this book. Games 
and play generate their own versions of reality within the everyday, and players 
recognize (and play with) these rule-bound artifi ces. Th e rules of Bearland, 
for example, written up by two brothers along with its complex history and 
legends, scale maps and documents state (in ‘paragraph 0:11’) that ‘there is no 
blaming things on the Bears, they are only alive to a certain extent’ (Cohen and 
MacKeith  1991 , 62). 
 Cohen and MacKeith’s defi nition of paracosm is to some extent an artefact 
of both their research method and the nature of children’s imaginative play 
itself. Asking adults to recall their childhood worlds will largely return the 
more sustained world-building events, those archived in maps and documents 
or simply persistent enough over time to lodge in the memory. Looking back 
from the viewpoint of adulthood the traces and products of play are visible, 
but the moments and activities of world construction – their being played into 
existence – are less accessible. Th ese accounts of paracosms are memories, fi xed 
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and retold decades later. Th ey may hint at the processes of play, but do not 
capture its dynamism, the deployment of toys and drawings in the generation 
of worlds in the distinct temporality of play. Like dreams, most play events are 
vivid and all-encompassing in their time, but immediately forgotten. Moreover, 
if children are preoccupied with play they are nearly always left  to it by adults. 
School performances and competitive sport may be watched and photographed, 
but in their play with toys, words and worlds, children are generally left  to it. 
 Most of the main examples in this book have something of the  worldness of 
the paracosm but are more fl eeting and ad hoc, without constitutions or written 
records but still compelling and engrossing for the players in the moments of 
their existence, transformative of everyday objects, media sources, bodies and 
environments. In fact, they may be repeatedly remade, sometimes in diff erent 
contexts and with diff erent media, and oft en media sources provide a connecting 
thread, stitched through successive playtimes, reminding, seeding and mutating. 
 Gameworlds
 Play as an aspect of culture, popular media or mode of everyday lived 
experience is undertheorized in media studies, cultural studies in particular 3  
and the humanities and social sciences in general. It troubles previously reliable 
distinctions between, for instance, production and consumption, the everyday 
and the remarkable, the active and the passive, the obedient and the rebellious, 
the adult and the childish, leisure and work, even the human and the animal. 
Th e new interdisciplinary fi eld of game studies has begun the task of seeking out 
and articulating thinkers and concepts that have taken play and games seriously, 
from Jan Huizinga’s  Homo Ludens in the late 1930s to more recent scholarship 
in disciplines from anthropology and psychology ( Sutton-Smith 1997 ) to 
performance studies ( Turner 1982 ). 
 Th ough infl uential theories of play, as we have seen, assert the apartness of 
play and games in time and space, this apartness is actually quite ambiguous. 
Whilst any particular imaginative children’s game is intense in its fabulation and 
in the attention and concentration of its players, it can at any moment spin into 
a diff erent game, or a player may leave, another be pulled in or it may fi zzle 
out altogether, perhaps re-emerging minutes or days later. Video game play in 
particular is characterized by its immersive hold on the attention of rapt and near-
motioness players. And yet, the case studies and examples in this book describe 
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a fl ow between these rapt and passional states and other playful activities. Th ere 
are no obvious boundaries in time or space, but the players know when they 
are in the middle of a gameworld – there is a centripetal force that both draws 
in, but can then spin out, and ejects as well. (Th is dynamic is discussed further 
in  Chapter 6 , ‘Playgrounds’.) Gameworlds, virtual and actual, overlap and nest 
within one another, or butt up against others, allowing or inviting transition and 
transformation. 
 Th is book is not a comprehensive study of play then, but an articulation of 
notions and descriptions of ‘free’ imaginative or fantasy play, with the rule-
bound, mediating structures of digital media. Rather than classifying games, 
it pays attention to the transitions between games and transductions between 
the virtual and actual domains of play. Th is fl ow and these transductions are 
as characteristic and constitutive of play, as discrete rule sets, winning states or 
world boundaries. 
 Whilst all media engagement has a playful aspect, historically – as now – 
children’s media have also taken specifically ludic forms – the rule driven, 
abstract structures of board games and puzzles – as opposed to the narrative 
form of books, comics and moving images. Video games are a hybrid of 
playground and tabletop games, pinball machines and card games, along with 
the narrative or symbolic traces of books, films and comics. ‘Gameworld’ 
is a term common in the description of video games, particularly those 
games that involve exploration of, or orientation in, a simulated topography 
(adventure games, first-person shooters, platform games, ‘sandbox’ and 
simulation games). 
 What kind of gameworlds are built in the current era of digital media though? 
Video games at fi rst glance collapse the media/literary world with the paracosm 
and other modes of imaginative play. Th e Harry Potter games, for example, 
not only provide, like the books and fi lms, a fully realized environment with 
characters, histories, laws and rules, but they then furnish the player/reader with 
visually and audially immersive, navigable, virtual instantiation of that world. 
Play is directed, it seems, in this imaginary world by the logical and coded spaces, 
behaviours and algorithms of computer soft ware ( Figure I.2 ). A sense of horror 
at this mediatization – or even industrialization – of imaginative play permeates 
parental concerns and journalistic and academic responses to children’s video 
game and digital media culture. Th e compelling, ‘addictive’ pull of video 
game worlds, it is feared, shift s play indoors and away from the physical and 
mental health giving activities of outdoor play. Play at computers and consoles 
10 Gameworlds
is presented as solitary, anti-social, engineering a perverse intimacy with the 
synthetic and machinic at the expense of the natural and sociable realms of an 
ideal childhood. 
 Th e direst claims and predictions for the current and near future state of 
childhood are predicated on a misrecognition of the peculiar reworkings of 
reality that have  always characterized play. Children’s generation of imaginary 
and imaginative new worlds within the everyday is now valorized as natural, 
healthy and developmental, providing a pyschic foundation for adult life. 
It is worth noting that this view of play is a relatively recent historical one – 
educators and moralists have also regarded play as something frivolous, wasteful 
and morally suspect to be tamed and channelled into edifying and educational 
activities (and echoes of this are evident in some contemporary work on play 
and education). But, by and large, imaginative, preferably outdoor and/or social, 
play is today seen as central to a healthy childhood. However, when uploaded 
or augmented through the artifi cial intelligences and virtual spaces of digital 
media, the ‘healthy’ play between fantasy and reality seems threatened. Th e 
photorealistic imagery and intense interaction not only outsource imagination, 
it is assumed, they so fully capture children’s attention, for such long periods of 
time, that the ‘more real than real’ nature of play replaces any understanding of 
a world – natural or social – beyond the screen and controller (see  Lister et al. 
2009 , 286–289). 
 Most of the dire claims made for children’s game and Internet culture are 
founded on assumption and not on research. 4  A key principle and motive force 
of this book is that we can only learn about play (about technology and culture) 
through observing and describing it. Th e meanings or eff ects of digital media 
forms such as video games cannot be read off  from their images and scenarios, 
from the quality of their images and sounds, nor from assumptions about how 
they are played. Th is said, description and observation, whether scientifi c 
or anthropological, are not straightforward, unmotivated or unmediated 
activities (see  Haraway 2004 or  Latour 1987 on the former, and  Cliff ord 1988 
for the latter). Th e book is driven by descriptions and analyses of children’s 
play with and around virtual media – and the creative and critical processes 
of description as an empirical approach.  Chapter 3 (‘Microethology’) explains 
the concepts and methods I deploy in this ethnographic – or ethological – 
research. 
 To talk of digital gameworlds in the same breath as the imaginary spaces 
of children’s literature and the everyday fabrication of paracosms is to assert 
a strong continuity of this worldness through children’s imaginative play and 
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media culture and across centuries. It is to see video games – and play with and 
around video games – as a particularly vivid and relatively new instantiation 
of this continuity. However, as I will argue throughout this book, there are 
signifi cant diff erences too. I want to complicate any straightforward cultural-
historical dialectic of continuity and change. Attention to children’s literature 
and classic studies of everyday play help us to think about the  newness of video 
games and virtual media, but the newness of video games and virtual media 
culture off ers – I will argue – new ways of thinking about play and everyday 
reality before and aft er digital media. 
 Sim you later
 Th e video recording captures a close-up of computer monitor screen. An alien 
arthropod, something like a short-bodied stick insect, but with four legs and a 
jointed tail, writhes in the centre of the screen, and at the centre of a nearly empty 
world consisting only of a chequered fl oor that stretches to a near horizon, and 
a small red bump that seems to be exerting a directional pull on the creature. 
Th e grey and white squares evoke both the rigid Euclidean geometry and visual 
aesthetic of early 3D computer-generated imagery, and the sequence in  Alice 
Th rough the Looking Glass where the world is transformed into a giant chess 
board ( Figure I.3 ). Th e monster’s fl ailing limbs and bouncing gait ineffi  ciently 
 Figure I.3 Constructing a Zook 
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but doggedly fi nd traction with the virtual physics; it is – slowly – making its 
way through the abstract world. Th e video’s audio track captures children’s 
voices: two boys, one clearly at the keyboard of this computer application, 
the other – a younger, higher pitched voice – observing, commenting, on the 
creature’s progress, and then riffi  ng on the terminology of the application and 
other playful virtual worlds it brings to his mind. 
 Th e screen displays the name of the application,  Bamzooki , along with the 
logo of the BBC. Th e soft ware encourages children to construct sophisticated 
virtual animals from a set of malleable virtual shapes and forces. Once adept, 
children can work out which relationships of body parts, shapes, joints and 
behaviours can be assembled into an entity that can eff ectively race or fi ght those 
of other players ( Figure I.3 ). Th ese competitions could be conducted online, 
but also featured in a television series in which children could showcase and 
compete with their creations. 
 Th e older child has just exited from the ‘Sumo’ feature of the application. Th e 
name is apt as the ritual combat of these Zooks is won by one creature ousting the 
other from a small demarcated arena in combat characterized by momentum, 
timing and leverage rather than straightforward violence. 
 J:  Th at makes him go faster doesn’t it? 
 A:  Yeah 
 J:  It gives him more balance 
 A:  Let’s keep the Push! 
 J:  See, he’s going towards that red thing … pretty fast! 
 J:  Do you know what Follow means? Th at means we follow it … it follows … we 
follow it … it’s going quite fast isn’t it? 
 Th e Zook reaches the red marker 
 J:  … he just hops right over it. Th at’s a good thing about it … that it can hop over 
things 
 A:  Look at its legs! Look how long its legs are 
 J:  So it gives it a bit of an advantage … if it’s Sumo … if it’s Zook Sumo, doesn’t 
it? 
 Th e boys seem to have collaborated on the design of their Zook and share their 
admiration for its capabilities. Push and Follow are key variables, determining 
the forward momentum of the Zook and the behaviour of the application’s 
virtual camera, respectively. Jo has a moment of confusion over whether ‘Follow’ 
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determines the virtual movement of the players as instantiated by the virtual 
camera (‘we follow it’) or whether it is the creature’s instruction/instinct to 
follow the red marker. 
 J:  Let’s quit, exit from this one 
 Th e screen goes blank for a second, then a Windows desktop appears, cluttered 
with fi le icons and folders against a Pokémon wallpaper. Th e cursor clicks on an 
icon. 
 J:  Right, Simulator … 
 Th e screen goes blank again, then a loading screen appears, with the CBBC 
(Children’s BBC) logo, the title Bamzooki in capitals with the subtitle ‘Simulator’. 
 A:  (yawns) What’s this one called? 
 J:  Bamzooki Simulator 
 Alex begins to play with the word: 
 A:  I thought it said … ‘Bamzooki Sumo-lator’ 
 J:  (laughs) No (enunciating clearly and slowly) Sim-u-lat-or 
 A:  See … Sim … (sing-song voice) Sim-U-Lator! 
 A:  Hey, that’s good, that’s Th e Sims, when they say goodbye … 
 A:  Sim You Later! 
 Th is tiny event, taking up around one minute and forty-fi ve seconds of video, 
encapsulates many of the themes, objects and behaviours that will be explored 
in this book. Numerous worlds overlap, encircle or nest within each other. Th e 
Zook writhes through its ‘micro-world’ ( Sudnow 2011 [1979]), immaterial yet 
real in its eff ects both within its synthetic environment and in the excitement and 
behaviours of the children. Th e boys have built it, and along with the soft ware 
breathed sort-of life into it – it is, like the Bears, alive to a certain extent. It is 
certainly real, it is experienced, it aff ects the virtual and actual space and bodies 
within and without its own geometric landscape. Th e language and media form 
of simulation itself (here in its contemporary sense of computer modelling as 
well as in Caillois’ categories) is adapted, translated and played with. It looks 
very diff erent to the humanoid Sims but is for Alex of the same species. Like the 
Sims it is a kind of toy, but also like the Sims it is a kind of robot, its movement set 
in train by the players in their tweaking of the soft ware variables, but conducted 
with a range of non-linear and autonomous behaviours that hint at an emergent 
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 sort-of life. Whilst we might study the game within the bounds of the screen, 
it loops out from the screen and through the eyes, nerves and fi ngers of the 
players, a cybernetic circuit of information feedback. Th ese are media worlds 
too, designed and produced by media corporations, for non-profi t edutainment 
(BBC) and for commercial ends (Maxis/ Th e Sims ), one sector of a sophisticated 
and global media culture for children. 
 Th ey are  games , for all their vivid imagery they are fundamentally abstract, 
structured by rules, motivated by ritual confl ict ( Bamzooki ) or a more complex 
and open-ended set of goals and winning-states ( Th e Sims ,  Pokémon ). As  media 
games, they operate or unfold less through the broadcasting or communication 
of messages from media producers – distant in time and space, and much more 
through the immediate and contingent instantiation of images, sounds and 
behaviours in intense events more akin to profane ritual or communion. 
 Th ese worlds are nested within the everyday time and space of domestic life, 
and through the imaginative and personable cooperation of two siblings, but they 
also open up to each other (‘ Sim U Later!’) and to other contiguous domains (the 
 Pokémon universe). Later that day, Alex will draw a series of colourful monsters, 
a bestiary of his own design – a practice continuous with children’s playful 
mark-making presumably since the origin of our species – but inspired by the 
artifi cial/natural forms, fi ctional and ludic attributes and algorithmic behaviours 
of Zooks and Pokémon. 
 Th e book is concerned with describing and conceptualizing play in the 
contemporary moment, a moment in which children’s culture in the developed 
world is thoroughly suff used with the patterns and practices of digital media. 
It tracks the transduction of images and forms from the virtual gameworlds of 
video games across actual spaces of the home and playground, and their shaping 
of new games. Th e gameworlds in the central case studies discussed in this book 
cannot be separated into video game and actual play, rather they loop around and 
through both the virtual and actual domains. Th ese gameworlds have a sense of 
their own universe but are not bounded by the edges of the virtual environment 
or TV screen. Obversely, the actual worlds of play with toys and in playgrounds, 
whilst ostensibly continuous with pre-digital games, are also unbounded – and 
must be understood as extensions of, and/or precursors to, play in computer and 
video game worlds. 
 Th is book, in part, explores the passage of long-established worlds of 
play and games into the digital age – the heterogeneous, yet completely 
continuous worlds of play: the body, toy worlds, physical environments and 
imaginative or psychic realities, out to the macrocosms of collective play, 
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playgrounds and media environments and newer material and intangible 
spheres of virtual media and video games. As I will explain in  Chapter 7 
(‘Real Worlds’), virtual media now suggest to us that play has always been 
something like virtual reality. 5  Th us, a clear conceptual distinction between 
transformation and continuity can’t capture the dynamic of contemporary 
children’s technoculture. Rather, this book will attempt to rethink children’s 
play and media cultures from the perspective of virtual media. I will begin 
with two sets of questions: 
 1. What is the nature of play today in an environment saturated with digital 
media devices, networks and applications? In what ways are longer-
established games and play patterns erased, sustained or transformed by 
newer computer-based media? 
 2. How might the virtual worlds and characters of the video game suggest 
new ways of thinking about earlier or longer-established patterns of play, 
for example, imaginary, literary and collective gameworlds with toys, 
books and outdoor spaces? Play has always inspired refl ections on the 
membrane between fantasy and reality, imagination and the everyday, the 
material and the immaterial. In recent decades, technologies of virtual 
reality and the new communications and entertainment media of the 
Internet and the video game have posed similar questions. What is the 
relationship between the fantasmic images, characters and dramas of 
video game worlds – conjured from intangible fl ows of data and shaped 
by algorithms and feedback – and the vivid, immersive, oft en visceral, 
experiences they generate in players’ bodies and minds? 
 A central concern throughout the book is to track play between and across 
the virtual and actual domains in everyday life, accepting Shanly Dixon and 
Sandra Weber’s assertion that contemporary play is characterized by a ‘fl owing 
exploration through the permeable boundaries of the digital and the analog’ 
( Dixon and Weber 2011 , 487). Th e next chapter, ‘Virtual and Actual Worlds’, will 
begin this exploration. 
 Notes
 1  Th ere is, however, one characteristic of this forbidding environment that is more 
conducive to play than streets today: the absence of motor vehicles. 
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 2  A Midsummer Night’s Dream , Act V, Scene 1. 
 3  Th ere are a few notable and useful exceptions in media studies, for example,  Fiske 
and Watts 1985 ,  Silverstone 1999 . 
 4  See, for example, Ben Goldacre on Professor Susan Greenfi eld’s assertion that games 
and social media can be linked to autism and dementia ( Goldacre 2011 ). 
 5  Or perhaps that ideas about play (and related biocultural phenomena such as dreams 
and language) have proved a resource in the construction of the technological 
imaginary of virtual reality itself, and its popular descendants the video game ( Lister 
et al. 2009 , 275). 
 Th e video captures a blurred, frenetic scene, children swooping through a small 
living room, with bright vehicles made of Lego bricks clutched in their hands. 
Th e soundtrack is a cacophony of voices making car noises and exhortations 
to ‘come on!’ and ‘drive faster!’ Th e two boys and cars, followed by the camera, 
trace a circuit or two of the room before arriving at a tall construction of larger 
plastic Mega Bloks. Th e race apparently over, the cars now trace a more leisurely 
route, up and over the Mega Bloks mountains and down to the beach and 
sea – expanses of yellow and blue crayoned onto sheets of A4 paper laid on the 
fl oor at the foot of the mountains. Th e video image is sharper now, the camera 
steady, and it closes in on the vehicles. Each is a fantastical machine, ornamental 
complexity at odds with the modernist geometries and colours of Lego, but still 
recognizable – and playable – as a car by sets of wheels and by a Lego mini-
fi gure (‘man’) as driver. Th ey drive up and down over the mountains, along the 
coast, exploring the boundary between beach and sea ( Figure 1.1 ). 
 1
 Virtual and Actual Worlds 
 Figure 1.1 Th e transduction of Lego Racers 
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 At fi rst glance, this home movie seems to document a familiar and 
unsurprising activity: small children in comfortable homes have played with 
commercially produced building blocks and toy cars for generations. And 
whilst audio-visual documentation of everyday play has only been possible 
with the availability of domestic video cameras, it is not hard to imagine similar 
dramas of engine noises, races and crashes echoing through living rooms and 
playgrounds for over a century. Yet there are distinctly new aspects to this playful 
event, aspects that prompted me to pick up the video camera and document it 
in the fi rst place. 
 Th e fabrication of these plastic mountains and paper coastline was inspired 
by the playing of a computer game,  Lego Racers 2 . Th e elder child had played this 
game avidly for a few days on a PC in the shared family space of the living room. 
Th e game’s appeal was obvious – simulated Lego cars and drivers, familiar from 
his experience of playing with actual Lego were constructed on-screen from a 
set of options, then raced around an island circuit. At age four, the competitive 
racing element of the game was beyond him – he did not have the hand–eye 
coordination required to keep pace with the computer-driven racers – but the 
game off ered instead a set of alternative playful possibilities from the construction 
of virtual cars to the engineering of accidents and crashes. In particular, and 
unlike most racing games, it allowed players to leave the race track and explore 
the virtual world beyond it. Th e Sandy Bay track loops around a fully explorable 
island with a beach, a Lego town and mountains with no marked distinction in 
virtual friction between track and other surfaces. 1  
 So, whilst the computer-controlled competitor cars blithely completed 
their laps, the player and his car set off  across ‘Sandy Bay’, a grassy island with 
steep hills surrounded by beaches, and dotted with a few Lego buildings and 
structures. With this realization, the game changed. It fi rst shift ed to a game of 
exploration. Jo adopted a free-roaming, exploratory approach, fi nding tunnels 
and tumbling down cliff s. 
 It was this expansive and explorable topography that captured the 
children’s imaginations (the elder child joined by his younger brother for the 
Mega Bloks construction and drawing) and which was  actualized : mountains, 
beach and sea, as a stage within which to perform the actions and sounds of 
motor racing. 
 My own interest, by now as much as a games researcher as a parent, was 
attracted by this ‘translation’ of the spatial dimensions of a virtual world into 
actual materials and experience. It hinted at a sophisticated engagement with 
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aspects of popular media quite new to the form of the video game. Whilst, 
as discussed in the introduction, the narratives of children’s media culture, 
from books and comics to fi lms, cartoons and television, have oft en unfolded 
through the navigation of, or quest through, a fi ctional space, the virtual 
world of a video game demands a diff erent kind of cognitive and imaginative 
engagement. 
 Translations
 Th e actual race was performative, dramatic, in Caillois’ terms simulational 
not agonistic, driven by a kinaesthetic enthusiasm for the dynamics and noise 
of speeding virtual cars, not by game rules or competitive structures. To best 
understand these translations, it is necessary to think through how virtual and 
actual playspaces and their players constitute each other, to describe something 
of the structure, operations and eff ects of the video game as virtual space and 
popular media soft ware. Th e video game as hardware and soft ware is an agent or 
set of agents in this event alongside the children. 
 Jo (whilst building Lego cars):  We’re going to Legoland, aren’t we? And 
Disneyland … 
 Th e commercial strategy of cross-media licensing is well established in children’s 
culture ( Kinder 1991 ,  Kline et al. 2003 ), and this game is not unique in making 
links between media forms and genres and toys; other successful recent examples 
include, of course,  Pokémon and games based on the fi lms of Harry Potter,  Star 
Wars , and James Bond. Th e nesting of video game worlds, as moments of play and 
as media objects, within the commercial spheres of children’s media culture will 
be addressed in  Chapter 4 (‘Media Worlds’). However,  Lego Racers 2 also makes 
direct and witty links between the gameworld and its objects, and the physicality 
of Lego as a  toy . For example, the player at the start of the game is given the 
option of building his or her own car and driver. A menu system off ers ranges of 
virtual bricks from which fi gures and vehicles can be built. In the game proper, 
crashes result in bricks breaking off  from the cars. Whilst the cars in the game 
are controlled in ways familiar from other racing games, they are represented 
explicitly as Lego cars, built from bricks and implicitly – acknowledging the 
pleasures of play that constitute the fl ip side to Lego’s promotion of its toys as for 
construction – destructible back into bricks. 
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 [C]hildren’s play fl ows easily on and off  line, in and out of roles, weaving 
back and forth from the imaginative to the actual. It is in this blurring of 
boundaries between physical and cyberspaces, between the virtual and the 
actual that children create playspaces for themselves … . ( Dixon and Weber 
2011 , 488–489) 
 Ethnographic research by Shanly Dixon and Sandra Weber suggests a number 
of ways that virtual and actual playworlds coexist and fl ow into one another. 
Rejecting nostalgic discourses that assume the loss of ‘traditional’ types of 
play in digital culture, they fi nd instead strong continuities between longer-
established outdoor play and the domestic, indoor and virtual activities of video 
game play. Th e latter, they argue, share with the former creative and imaginative 
possibilities and are not separated off  from each other: the boundary between 
digital and analogue is thoroughly permeable. A ‘game’ might fl ow between 
a backyard and a video game world, drawing on all manner of material and 
symbolic resources at hand and from popular culture. For example, they study 
the play preferences of two young friends in a game of  Pikmin . Th e players 
explain the game’s premise to the researcher thus: 
 Tucker:  Th ere’s this guy from a planet and his name is Omar. Before he left  on this 
journey he went to his wife who made him this soup with these carrots and 
when he left  there was this asteroid who hit his ship and lands down on this 
toxic planet and he fi nds a carrot and it’s red and it’s a carrot. He has oxygen for 
thirty days and so he has thirty days to recover all the parts of his ship so that he 
can return back home and so every day you fi nish you get time to picnic so you 
bring him to these onions and they have feet and there are these fl owers and the 
Pikmin will destroy the fl ower so you actually have thirty days … 
 Rowan (Impatiently):  ‘So we play now?’ 
 Th en, as they play the game, they too adopt an exploratory approach to the 
gameworld, not initially at least, following the actions that will facilitate the 
optimum progression through the game. Th e researchers link these exploratory, 
spatial pleasures directly to the boys’ play outside, their dens and hideout in 
an alleyway (‘an ostensibly classic childhood playspace’) that runs behind their 
apartment block: 
 Shanly:  ‘What do you like about the game?’ 
 Rowan:  ‘It’s an adventure but there is action too.’ 
 Tucker:  ‘We like to search for the parts of the ship.’ 
 (485) 
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 Th e planet in the game  Pikmin acts as a playspace for the boys when they are 
unable to play outside. Th eir interaction on the virtual planet appears to be 
similar to their play in their secret hideout. In fact, at times they imagine the 
secret place as a spaceship, perhaps inspired from their play in the videogame 
[ … ] Our interpretation is that both spaces serve to characterize the appeal 
of secret childhood spaces [ … ]: they both feel concealed and secret; they are 
spaces where a child might slip off  alone escaping from daily demands; and they 
are places in which to fantasize and dream. ( Dixon and Weber 2011 , 486) 
 Children’s imaginative play has a powerful gravitational pull, dragging all 
manner of physical objects and symbolic material into the orbit of any particular 
game or event of play. As well as the interconnected playspaces of the virtual 
and actual, videogame characters and actions join other media images, everyday 
and familiar scenarios and stories and songs from the oral folklore of childhood 
itself. All of these are gathered together, broken up, reassembled and synthesized 
in sustained collective performances, or in fl eeting moments of chat, song or 
gesture. Andrew Burn describes the semiotic maelstrom of the primary school 
playtime: 
 Both boys and girls [ … ] make ambiguous or general references to elements of 
action, imaginary worlds, objects or weapons, and character types which might 
be associated with computer games. For boys, these include avatars, wizards, 
ninjas, pistols, bazookas, war, the SAS, and zombies; while for girls they include 
avatars, wizards, fi ghting guns, princesses, witches, fairies, monsters, robots, 
ghosts, superheroes and fairytale characters. [ … ] Th ese represent hybrid 
infl uences which might include computer games, but might also include fi lm, 
fairytale and folktale. ( Burn 2013 , 127) 
 At times, moments of play will crystallize as a direct instantiation of a video 
game world, with its specifi c interactive conventions or media-technological 
form. Burn gives an example of the infl ection of a timeless play mechanic, hiding 
and chasing, with a very new one, the ‘stealth mode’, 
 one of the boys mentions looking down, for example, referring to the 
shadowed face of the cowled player-character in  Assassin’s Creed ‘ … if you 
don’t want to be seen in the playground you just sort of blend in … stealth 
mode. Look up, then look down – like  Assassin’s Creed ’. ( Burn 2013 , 133) 
 Girls’ play in this particular study, Burn notes, tends not to be so closely based 
on specifi c named games or characters as that of boys, but it was still clearly 
shaped by videogame forms. Whereas the boys would re-enact the action of  Call 
of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 , complete with named characters (‘Soap’ MacTavish, 
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for instance), girls conjured up more generic ‘ghosts’ within ‘levels’. He gives an 
account from another game observed as part of the same research project. A 
group of fi ve-year-old girls in a London playground were stepping in and out 
of plastic hoops lying on the ground. Two of the girls were interviewed in brief 
moments between the game sessions: 
 Rebekah:  What are the rules of the game you’re playing? 
 Lily:  Th e rules are, the gaps in between, you have to go through them, and it’s a 
maze where you have to go through. If you go in a hoop, then you’re out for fi ve 
minutes. 
 [ … ] 
 Sophia:  But fi rst we were allowed to step in the hoops, and now we’re not. 
 Lily:  And in Level Two, we have to go through a sort of maze, you see (points over 
wall at players). 
 Rebekah:  Oh, there are diff erent levels of the game! 
 Sophia:  Aft er you have to go in the gaps, then you have to go in the hoops, then 
gaps, then hoops again – 
 Rebekah:  Oh, ok. 
 ( Burn 2013 , 137) 
 For Burn, these girls are ‘constructing a ludic system by defi ning rules, and then 
adapting them. Th ey are also aware of specifi c game structures such as the maze, 
a structure common to ancient forms of play and to certain genres of computer 
games’ ( Burn 2013 , 138). 2  
 Mr Happy and the  Age of Mythology 
 A sunny aft ernoon some fi ve years aft er the  Lego Racers 2 game, the boys were 
playing around a paddling pool in our backyard. Rather than paddling in the 
water, they crouched beside it and played with toy boats and a large collection 
of Gogo’s Crazy Bones, small collectable fi gures that were a craze at the time. 3  
My impetus for documenting their play this time was primarily aesthetic – the 
bright sunshine refl ecting from the rippling water over the bright blue plastic of 
the pool, the vivid toys and soft  skin of the children. Th e gameworld seemed as 
fl uid as its watery medium. Much of it appeared to be delirious nonsense, a more 
or less inchoate succession of dramatic exclamations, snatches of improvized 
song, but some themes drift ed through with the fl otsam: pirates and vikings, 
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an ambiguous character called ‘Mr Happy’ and numerous micro-dramas of 
drownings, hostage-taking and treachery. I left  a digital voice recorder running 
to capture an hour or so of the sounds of play (see  Giddings 2011 ). Studied 
later, the compiled audio track and photographic sequence identifi ed some 
signifi cant lines of imagery and action, including clear connections with the 
boys’ recent video game play. A Playmobil pirate ship with its striped sail seems 
to have been the conduit for a summoning of  Age of Mythology – a favourite 
PC game of Alex’s at the time – connecting with both the Norse and the Greek 
worlds of the game and its soft ware mechanics (game levels, mini-games, ‘god 
powers’). As I edited the images and overlaid them with footage from the game 
itself, other visual and thematic resonances became obvious, from the intense 
blue of both the paddling pool and the digital sea to a striking realization that 
the crayfi sh, deployed as a giant monster to capsize the toy boats, looked – with 
its extensive antennae – and behaved – gigantic in its relative scale – remarkably 
like the krakens that Alex would gleefully unleash to wreck his virtual Greek 
ships (see  Figure 1.2 ). 
 J:  No, it’s not like a computer game 
 J:  Everybody’s back to normal, everybody’s back in their boats 
 A:  Apart from the little boats have been totally destroyed 
 J:  Th ose were mini-games, just mini-people …  
 J:  Th ey’re just fun to kill 
 A:  You and me don’t try to kill each other, we just kill the little boats 
 J:  Yep, with people on 
 A:  Don’t let them aboard you because they’re really good at fi ghting 
 J:  But some people survived, they’re the shipwrecked guys … it’s a new … like … level, 
level-like thing …  
 A:  Look at my ship! Raah! Raah! 
 J:  Look, they’re all dead 
 Th e play continues for ten minutes or so, with plenty of drownings and 
lifeboat rescues. Mr Happy makes his fi rst appearance: he seems to be a 
multiple entity formed from two or three of the submerged Crazy Bones 
fi gures (each with an exaggerated grimace printed onto his plastic head) and 
a sing-song refrain: 
 A:  Mr Happy … . 
 A:  Happy, so happy 
 A:  Even when he dies …  
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 Figure 1.2 Virtual and actual krakens 
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 Figure 1.3 Tidal wave 
 Later: 
 A:  Look at Mr Happy! One of your guys survives so it’s not Game Over. We’ve gone 
to the next level – everybody’s on lifeboats! 
 Jo indicates a submerged Lego mini-fi gure, a black skeleton missing its skull: 
 J:  We have sunk the traitor – apart from his head 
 J (traitor):  ‘I’ll get you for this!’ 
 J (traitor):  ‘Sorry, I didn’t mean to be a traitor’ 
 Jo grabs a large bucket, fi lls it with water and fl ings the water across the pool and 
the boats ( Figure 1.3 ): 
 J:  Tidal wave! 
 And again 
 J:  Tidal wave! 
 J:  Th is is the tidal wave 
 A:  No, no, that’s on bonus level 
 A:  But guess what we do, we use god powers 
 A:  Woo-argh Woo woo, we live! We live! 
 J:  Th ey just used a god power 
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 It isn’t possible to transcribe the action and noise of the crayfi sh–kraken 
attack, but  Figure 1.2 gives a sense of its momentary collision of virtual and 
actual worlds. Th ere are varying homologies through which these virtual/
actual translations are inspired: water for water (both virtual and actual water 
a synthetically vivid blue), toy Viking longboat for virtual longboat and Greek 
galley, crayfi sh for kraken, bucket for divine power, to a plethora of characters 
and events that were spun into existence in these material-semiotic vortices, 
perfectly at home in this delirium of myth and disaster, but which seem to have 
no origin. 
 Th e peculiarly phantasmagorical character of much imaginative play will 
be described throughout this book, and addressed in detail in Chapter 7 (‘Real 
Worlds’). 
 Back to Sandy Bay
 Th e players of the virtual gameworlds of  Lego Racers 2 ,  Pikmin ,  Assassin’s Creed 
and video games in general loop out of them and back into their pre- or non-
digital culture: to other media forms (books, TV, fi lm) and to physical play 
(at home, in playgrounds, with or without toys or play objects), taking with them 
both narrative and formal elements. 
 As noted in the introduction, the improvized replication or performance of 
settings and environments from literature and media in children’s play is hardly 
new. Spatial elements such as topographies, maps and architectures also shape 
games and play – from Lego and dolls houses to board games and theme parks. 
However, it was apparent that the Lego Racers reinvention was a response to the 
specifi city of computer-generated gameworlds as simulations of space. Th e boys 
were not merely constructing a backdrop for a performance of computer game 
play, they were constructing it  as space, and as an actualization of a dynamic 
virtual space with its own topography and simulated physics (friction, gravity, 
acceleration). 
 Transduction
 But what is the nature of this fl ow of objects, images and forces across media and 
into everyday space? So far I have been calling it a ‘translation’, but this linguistic 
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analogy does not capture the fundamental metamorphoses that must occur as 
an object – a Lego car, say – appears as at once a computer simulation, a screen 
animation and a physical object in a child’s hand. Nor does it adequately account 
for the actualization of virtual/ludic forms and conventions such as game levels 
or virtual friction in play beyond the screen. 
 What is the nature of this movement across domains then? In educational 
psychology, the movement of ideas and images from media domains (literature, 
television) to children’s behaviour is called  transfer ( Stevens et al. 2008 ). My 
use of  translation was infl uenced by Bruno Latour’s tracing of chains of agency 
through sociotechnical assemblages, the everyday operations and eff ects of 
power or agency as it is shift ed or delegated from humans to a machine, or 
machines to machines ( Latour 1992 ). Latour’s conceptualization of these 
distributions of agency will be returned to later. Th e  trans- prefi x speaks of this 
crossing of domains, but neither ‘transfer’ nor ‘translation’ seem adequate to the 
transformation of entities as they perform these crossings. For all its semiotic 
and aff ectual connections, the virtual Lego car is a quite diff erent entity from 
an actual Lego car. And an actual Lego car built as an instantiation of the video 
game car is quite diff erent again. In its passage through the virtual world of the 
game and out again it has become a new entity – in the playful events described 
in this chapter it is a material-semiotic hybrid: no longer a toy animated by a 
child’s imagination of the dynamism of driving, now a toy and child hybrid 
animated together in a simulation of the video game world. Whatever changes 
and transmissions are taking place they are non-linear and metamorphic. I 
have adopted instead the notion of  transduction . Appropriately, it is used within 
cybernetics to denote 
 A process embodied in an input-output device for converting or coding 
without memory one type of signal, motion, wave or sequence of characters 
into another. E.g. a loudspeaker produces sound waves from oscillations, the 
human eye converts patterns of light into nerve impulses. Such devices are called 
transducers and are describable by a transformation or function. 4  
 Th is sense of the transduction of information and patterns across machine and 
animal bodies or systems has been picked up by technocultural theorists and 
geographers to capture the contemporary movements, particularly of computer 
code: ‘the constant making anew of a domain in reiterative and transformative 
practices’ ( Dodge and Kitchin 2005 , 162). Adrian Mackenzie’s development 
and application of the term resonates with the processes and phenomena I am 
concerned with here. Transduction tracks processes 
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 that come into being at the intersection of diverse realities. Th ese diverse realities 
include corporeal, geographical, economic, conceptual, biopolitical, geopolitical 
and aff ective dimensions. Th ey entail a knotting together of commodities, signs, 
diagrams, stories, practices, concepts, human and nonhuman bodies, images 
and places. Th ey entail new capacities, relations and practices whose advent is 
not always easy to recognize. 
 A transductive approach promises a more nuanced grasp of how living and 
non-living processes diff erentiate and develop [ … ] To think transductively is 
to mediate between diff erent orders, to place heterogeneous realities in contact, 
and to become something diff erent. ( Mackenzie 2002 , 18) 
 Again we see resonances between concepts of worlds, dimensions and newness, 
arising from digital technologies and media on the one hand and play on the 
other. 
 I will return to these theories of the fl ow and transformation of agency in 
 Chapter 3 (‘Microethology’). For now, I will focus on their operation through 
the playful circuits of computer games – by simulated space and physical forces 
in particular. Th e vertiginous manoeuvres up and down the mountains generally 
had little eff ect on the car/avatar, beyond a few bricks shed on particularly 
spectacular impacts. However, it soon became apparent that the car/avatar could 
be destroyed if driven or dropped into the sea. Usually ‘death’ in a video game 
marks failure – temporary or terminal – and results in frustration for the player. 
However, given that Jo’s exploration had no set goal and the fact that the game 
was confi gured to allow infi nite numbers of lives, this repeated death became a 
simple game in itself, one in which he delighted. Jo would begin with the car/
avatar at the race start, then deliberately veer it off  the track to pursue the shortest 
route into the sea and hence into momentary death. Th e car/avatar would then 
reappear instantly, in a swirl of stars reminiscent of graphic conventions from 
comics and cartoons of minor head injury. 
 A new variation emerged. Jo found that driving the car slowly and carefully 
into the sea allowed a more nuanced experience of drowning than that off ered 
by plunging off  a cliff . Th e car could be directed into the water and gently 
nudged deeper, until, just before its uppermost point (usually the top of the 
driver’s head) was submerged, it ‘drowned’. Th e motive of this new game, then, 
was the identifi cation of, and the edging around, the precise point at which the 
game switched between life and death. Th e cars lurched up the cliff s, teetered at 
a vertex where dwindling virtual momentum succumbs to the faint but insistent 
pull of virtual gravity, and fell back, slowly, bouncing down to the beach. Down 
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here the drowning game was re-enacted, the car and driver held over the 
drawn sea, hovering, descending, then emerging again. Th e video game world’s 
liminal state between land/life and sea/death was, therefore, replayed out in 
an actual game environment, where the point of death (like the momentum/
gravity vertex) was determined by an embodied articulation of video game 
kinaesthetics. 
 On watching the video footage of Jo playing (oft en attended and encouraged 
by his younger brother), it became clear that these improvized games were 
constituted by the complex interactions among the gameworld’s physics; the 
aff ordances of soft ware elements (notably those of the car/avatar); the transmedial 
suggestions and humour of this particular game (linking it to prior knowledge 
of the Lego franchise in its actual instantiations); and the characteristics of more 
traditional children’s play with toys, notably the pleasures of exploration and 
creative destruction. For example, one of the game’s funniest features is that if 
a car suff ers a particularly powerful collision then virtual bricks will fall off  it. 
Enough collisions and the car will eventually be stripped down to a chassis (with 
no apparent eff ect on its capabilities as a vehicle). One more crash, however, 
and the player is left  with the ‘man’ on his own to steer around the gameworld 
running delightfully on stiff  little legs. We were all disappointed to fi nd out, aft er 
much eff ort and experimentation with collisions and suicidal leaps into the path 
of non-player cars, that the game does not allow the man, as Jo put it, to further 
‘break into two legs’. 
 Th is feature off ers visual pleasures (the familiar form of knee-less Lego legs 
are now more hilarious in their frantic animation) but it also highlights the 
operations of vehicular aff ordance in the game. It is an unusual and perhaps 
unique device. Games such as the  Tomb Raider and  Grand Th eft  Auto series 
periodically encourage or require players to guide humanoid avatars into 
vehicles, shift ing control from the manipulation of human-shaped capabilities to 
motor-vehicle-shaped capabilities. In these other games, there are instrumental 
reasons for this (shape) shift ing between diff erent kinds of control/movement, 
and specifi c aff ordances are granted or denied as part of the design of the 
gameplay. 
 Th e transduction of the video game world and its conventions into off -screen 
play was varied and extensive. Alex, for example, adapted characteristics from 
the video game world into his own well-established micro-worlds of swimming 
creatures and dramas in the bath and bathroom sink. In particular, he developed 
the dramatic possibilities of immersion: he had found another way to ‘drown’ 
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the car driver, fusing his ongoing fascination with toys and water with the video 
game-suggested event-horizon of life/death ( Figure 1.4 ). 
 Not only were the  images and  dramas of the computer game being played out 
with real toys, but the  physical and  kinaesthetic ways the boys played with their 
actual Lego blocks were now quite diff erent. Th ey were not only continuing the 
game of racing Lego cars begun on the computer screen (its characters, scenarios 
and dramas), but were also playing with actual Lego  as if it were a video game. 
Th ey were, on one level, playing at playing a video game. For instance, the actual 
Lego cars and drivers were constructed through an enactment of the video 
game’s menu-driven start-up processes: invited by the boys, not least because 
of the attention I was giving them, to join in their play (or rather, take direction 
from them), I was instructed to choose the cars and fi gures to be played with 
from a range they had built. Initially this choice was made as they were creating 
 Figure 1.4 Death games in Sandy Bay 
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the vehicles, but later the process was repeated more formally, with cars and 
drivers neatly laid out on the table. Th e process of selection was incorporated 
into well-established patterns of their off -screen play: on-screen, no qualitative 
or quantitative value is placed on any selection, whilst in our living room the 
boys off ered me a choice of two menus, each comprised of vehicles they had 
built individually. A familiar sibling–parent politics of attention-seeking and 
turn-taking was brought to bear: the eldest boy was most insistent, so his car 
was chosen fi rst; his younger brother was keen to keep his menu in play, though, 
asking, ‘later, can you choose this one?’ 
 Initially I was able to observe these transductions of agency and soft ware 
structures because of the way I was positioned by the boys in relation to their 
actual game: I was not off ered the chance to give any input into the design or 
construction of the actual cars (even for the one decision I was allowed – whether 
one driver should wear his baseball cap forward or backward – it was made clear 
to me that ‘backward’ was a preferable choice). Clearly I was not the empowered 
agent, or so it seemed. However, from studying the video record it appears that 
my role in these games did prove instrumental to opening a whole complex of 
actions, choices and translations arising from the peculiarities of the videogame 
medium and its articulations or channelling of agencies. It became clear that an 
entirely unexpected set of shift ing identifi cations and transformations were at 
play in these shift s from screen to living room and back. 
 As the boys careened across the fl oor, racing each other, crashing into and 
leaping over the mountains, I was instructed to ‘use the keyboard’. I was expected 
to play the role of the ‘player’, ‘clicking’ (with my fi ngers on the arm of a chair or 
on a book) imaginary keys to make the Lego Racers go ‘forward!’ and ‘faster and 
faster!’. Of course my role was in some senses redundant – my fi nger movements 
had no infl uence on the direction or velocity of the Lego Racers (human or 
plastic) – yet the passion with which I was remonstrated when I stopped my 
performance indicated that this participation was, in some way, signifi cant to 
them. 
 My role, then, was an apparently contradictory passive performance of 
interactivity. Th e videogame dyad, the circuit between player and avatar, was 
simultaneously collapsed and expanded: the boys and their cars were the 
avatars ‘in the game’, the agency of the player assimilated into the new boy/car/
avatar and the residue (the empty performance of key pressing and looking on) 
displaced to another, ‘interpassive’ body. Th e sheer complexity of these circuits, 
translations and feedback loops was brought home to me with the following 
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sequence of events: at the start of the actual game, once cars and drivers had 
been selected, Jo asked me to write my name (‘D.A.D.D.Y.’) on a piece of paper, a 
translation of the familiar entering of the player’s name or nickname at the start 
of the video game. 
 Th is activity was consistent with my passive player role, but when I asked Jo 
why he wasn’t writing his own name, he replied, hesitantly, ‘I don’t have to – I’m 
the one who makes the Lego Racers go’. I tried to draw him on this, excited at 
the implications of this for theories of identifi cation in video games. Th at is, 
Jo might be identifying himself (through role play) directly with the computer 
or computer game rather than the characters, the Lego car or man. He was 
not the player and so he didn’t ‘sign in’ but neither was he simply the ‘avatar’. 
It is, then, the game itself, perhaps thought of as the game soft ware or engine, 
that actually ‘makes the Lego Racers go’. I asked Jo if he was the game, and he 
hesitantly answered ‘yes’. I realized, though, that I was pushing him and that if 
he was ‘playing as the game’ in the sense I suspected, he wasn’t aware of it or 
refl ecting on it – at least not in the terms I was using. I stopped asking questions 
in this way. 
 Th e relationship, then, between virtual bodies and worlds and (playing) physical 
bodies and worlds is far from simple. Both are a kind of virtual world; both 
have their restrictions and aff ordances; both can be imaginatively inhabited by 
the children, animated by their actions (whether physical or console-mediated); 
both are capable of loose, improvisatory, paideic play or tight, rule-governed 
ludic play (Caillois 2001). ( Burn 2013 , 142) 
 Andrew Burn’s theorization of the interpenetration of virtual and actual 
gameworlds supports my understanding of the Lego Racers worlds described 
earlier. I would suggest, though, that we are seeing also a set of more complex 
relationships or circuits. Th ere are continuities in play and games here that resist 
claims that play with virtual media spells the end of ‘traditional’ forms of play, 
but there are also signifi cantly new play environments and playmates emerging 
in virtual worlds, actual worlds and the transductive spaces between them. Th e 
challenge, therefore, is not to separate out the continuities and ruptures in the 
cultural history of children’s play; it is to question how play can be rethought 
in the light of popular digital technoculture. Play manages to loop through and 
across these ostensibly incompatible domains. We need to look, then, at the 
connections, the fl ows, the circuits: what is transmitted, what is transformed, 
what is lost and what is made? 
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 Notes
 1  Th is simulation of friction is eff ected through the game program slowing any 
vehicle that leaves the track for the ground surface that borders it – usually grass. 
It is a common device in racing games for guiding players on the game’s preferred 
trajectory and rewarding accurate steering and cornering. 
 2  Even the most minute everyday activity can become charged with the ludic 
possibilities of videogame structures. I remember trying to get Jo ready as we were 
running late for school – he was around fi ve years old. Sitting on the stairs, he waved 
his foot around in the air as I tried to get a sock onto it: ‘Look! You’re doing it on 
hard level!’ 
 3  Th ough in their bright colours and diff erentiated forms (for collecting), Crazy Bones 
are very much a product of contemporary children’s culture, in their name, shape 
and game mechanic (like Pokémon cards they function as both collectable object 
and game element) they are actually directly related to some of the most archaic play 
objects: the knuckle bones used for gambling since Antiquity. 




 Th e subtitle of this book is ‘Virtual Media and Children’s Everyday Play’. None of 
these words has a simple, single defi nition, and they could be swapped around 
and still do some descriptive work for the book’s themes: for example, ‘children’s 
everyday media and virtual play’, or even ‘everyday media play and virtual 
children’. Th e unstable core of my enquiry is not ‘children’, ‘video games’ or ‘play’. 
For example, the Lego Racers account (see  Chapter 1 ) cannot be reduced to a 
study of a particular computer game, to an example of a child’s use of popular 
media or to an enquiry into the impacts of digital technology on everyday life. 
It cannot be disaggregated into a media cultural practice, a subject position, a 
set of technologies or even any straightforward relationship between the three. 
 Th e object of the descriptive studies that form the case studies in this book is 
not ‘children’ or ‘video games’, then, but the playful  events in which these various 
entities come together. To talk of events is to foreground the temporal unfolding 
of video game play on- and off -screen, as well as the spatial dimensions of its 
overlapping gameworlds, and to establish the dynamic between the elements in 
play: a sense of entities coming together, material chains of cause and eff ect or 
feedback. Dan Fleming’s consideration of the eff ects of diverse contexts for (in 
this case) toys in play is relevant here: 
 … the eff ects we are going to be interested in are simultaneously in the formation 
of an object and in that object’s consequences within the processes that formed 
it. In a way, therefore, it might be better to talk about ‘events’ rather than ‘objects’. 
( Fleming 1996 , 10–11) 
 Th is chapter will fi rst set out the key terms in the book’s subtitle, questioning their 
conceptual and descriptive stability, before sketching some broader research 
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contexts and infl uences, then fi nally explaining the conceptual and practical 
characteristics of the empirical approaches I have developed in this research. 
 Anti-glossary: Virtual; media; children; the every day; play 
 Glossaries off er concise, coherent defi nitions of key terms and concepts. As I 
have indicated, the key terms of this book’s subtitle are unstable, ambiguous and 
multifaceted. I will use another small event of children, play and digital media to 
open up these terms to suggest how they might be deployed and studied. 
 Th e twins were bored. Th eir father had called round on their way home 
and was now engrossed in conversation with my wife, Penny. To keep the girls 
occupied we showed them the Photo Booth application on my laptop. Th e 
application uses the laptop’s built-in webcam to capture still images and video 
and off ers a wide range of fi lters, image manipulation settings and animated 
backgrounds for users to play with their own image. Th e girls, Lily and Josie, fi rst 
fi lmed themselves dancing in a multi-screen posterized set of images suggestive 
of an Andy Warhol painting. Demonstrating the ability of some sets of twins 
to pick up on or fi nish each other’s sentences, they quickly and spontaneously 
slipped into a brief synchronized song and dance: 
 L:  I’m a good dancer, dancer, dancer, I’m a good dancer, dancer, dancer 
 L and J:  I’m a good dancer, dancer, dancer …  
 L:  And I’m strong, strong, strong 
 J:  And I’m the main character, character, character 
 L:  No you’re not, I am! 
 Th is was followed by a series of video self-portraits that grew steadily more 
monstrous, fi rst through the time-honoured game of face-pulling for the 
camera and then, using the distorting fi lters provided by the soft ware itself, 
pinching, elongating and swirling their faces into delightful disfi gurements – an 
augmented gurning ( Figure 2.1 ): 
 L:  Oi look really ugloi don’t oi? 
 J:  Yes, you dooo. 
 J:  Do your face like this (she pushes up close to the camera) and you look like a 
giant! 
 L:  Oooaargh … are you a giant? 
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 Figure 2.1 Ugly giants, electric eels and shark-human-cats 
 Children
 Th e word ‘children’ in this book’s subtitle would seem at fi rst glance to be the least 
ambiguous, the most self-evident. However, the notion of the child as a distinct 
entity both biologically and socially is historically recent and culturally varied. For 
Ancient Greece, and the European cultures it infl uenced, ‘distinguished children 
socially from babies and adults if only as objects of aesthetic appreciation’, and 
‘children did not emerge as social entities’ in the West until the early seventeenth 
century ( Stone 1971 , 5). And, 
 across diff erent cultures children are looked aft er in periods of dependency in 
a variety of social arrangements, are cultural participants in varying degrees of 
inter- and intragenerational segregation and integration, and occupy the status 
of ‘child’ for varying lengths of time. ( Hutchby and Moran-Ellis 2001 , 1) 
 Before the seventeenth century, it seems, there were only babies and adults. Once 
babies were out of their swaddling clothes they were dressed in small versions 
of adult clothing, and play and festivals were not diff erentiated by age groups. 
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No doubt children played together, but there was no ‘children’s culture’ as such. 
Gregory Stone notes that the invention of childhood as a time characterized 
by play (and by implication, the child a being primarily characterized  by play) 
was established with the rise of entrepreneurial capitalism in Europe and its 
attendant moralism, ‘and pari passim, children were established as identifi able 
social beings’ ( Stone 1971 , 6). 
 Th rough the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, children in the 
industrial world were incrementally removed from the (now) adult worlds of 
work: fi rst the off spring of the bourgeoisie, then – with new legal frameworks 
and the introduction of universal education – working-class children too. 
Diff erentiated from adults socially and discursively as ‘school children’, they also 
became positioned, before long, as  consumers of a commercial children’s culture 
of books, toys and games (see  Chapter 4 , ‘Media Worlds’). 
 To oversimplify, by the twentieth century, children in the developed world 
were constituted by four overlapping worlds: as school pupils they were to be 
defi ned now not simply as juvenile, immature or ‘not-adults’, but increasingly 
as works in progress – always at a certain stage of learning and development 
and always short of the next stage or level. Play has shift ed from by and large 
ignored behaviour that took place when adults were not placing demands on 
children’s time to an ambiguous process that might hinder intellectual and moral 
development with its trivialities and animal passions, or support and edify it 
through imagination, cooperation, rules and the disciplines of training and 
practice. Th is ambivalence remains evident today. Another eff ect of school is to 
establish clear distinctions – through organization of school years, classes and 
shared playtimes – between children according to the year in which they were 
born. 1  
 Secondly, the child has become a more domesticated being – as social 
and cultural life became increasingly oriented towards the family and home 
through the gradual ‘mobile privatization’ of everyday life in the twentieth 
century ( Williams 1974 ). Th irdly, and closely bound up with the domestication 
of childhood, children have become consumers in a new commercial toy and 
media culture, with its ever more nuanced rendering of demographic categories 
from the ‘pre-school’ to the ‘tween’. 
 Fourth, children are sometimes boys and girls. In Bruegel’s paintings of street 
play in the sixteenth century boys and girls are barely distinguishable, whereas 
in contemporary representations in television advertising they appear to be 
diff erent species – they are certainly rigidly colour-coded as blue or pink from 
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before birth. Some observational studies of young children’s play note minor 
diff erences in play tastes between boys and girls as well as overlaps in preferences 
for certain types of toy or make-believe scenarios (e.g.  Herron and Sutton-Smith 
1971 , 79), whereas much recent work on children’s culture has focused on the 
construction and reconstruction of gender through toys, games and video game 
culture ( Alloway and Gilbert 1998 ,  Cassell and Jenkins 1998 ,  Walkerdine 2007 ). 
Children’s access to computers and video game consoles, and the kinds of play 
they conduct, is framed and shaped by the cultural and discursive frames of 
the family, school and commercial culture. However, boys and girls also play 
together, and alongside each other in the playground or with siblings at home. In 
the small studies of moments of the fl ow of gestures and images in performative 
or imaginary play, gender roles are sometimes less clearly drawn than in children’s 
material and media. Moreover, as I will argue in  Chapter 7 (‘Real Worlds’), the 
semiotic and behavioural materials of play are rarely straightforwardly imitative 
or representational. Play inverts, turns the world upside down. Media identities 
and roles can turn out to be not only constraints but an armature or scaff olding 
for new hybrid or emergent performances. 
 All this said – and lastly – children always did, and still do, play beyond the 
scrutiny and structure of well-meaning adults, inside and outside, oft en with 
siblings and friends of diff erent ages, in a world both spun out of nothing in the 
moment and also shot through with jokes, games and songs that can be traced 
back over decades and centuries: an oral and gestural repertoire documented 
across generations by Iona Opie (Opie 1993). 
 Th e division of children into levels or age groups by educational and 
psychological theories establishes a temporal taxonomy of development. Th is 
book is not concerned with development in these terms, and it refers to play 
events involving children from infanthood up to the mid-teens. Th is is in part 
a function of pragmatics or personal history, in particular the various points 
and trajectories of coincidence of the ages of my own family with my own 
research contexts. Alex and Jo were aged three and four when I began, and they 
are fourteen and sixteen as I write this book. In part, though, it is a function 
of the particular aspects of play that seem most appropriate for engaging with 
playful digital media culture: the imaginative, make-believe, performative and 
transformative play that characterizes children’s behaviour from infanthood to 
the approach of adolescence. Moreover, whilst it is concerned with moments 
of play – not its ‘development’ nor that of its players – the book is interested in 
the temporality of play. Gameworlds extend in time as well as space, and even 
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ostensibly fragmentary or discrete moments of play can prove to be simply one 
surfacing of a twisting, changing thread of images or behaviours, whether the 
evolving playground song that Iona Opie hears in the same playground but 
decades apart, or the repetitions of a particular child or group of children over 
days and across space – sustained by imaginative investment (the reiteration 
of favourite characters or animals in performance or drawing, for instance) or 
through the mnemonic augmentations of media technologies (repeated DVD 
or YouTube viewings, progression through the levels of video game). To use 
a concept from philosophy, the book is more concerned with children and 
media in their ‘becoming’ than in their ‘development’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1997). Reading Iona Opie’s funny and astute accounts of playground activity, 
I was struck by one small boy who pops up by Iona Opie’s elbow over several 
weeks. With his obsessive imagination and his intense desire to know about, 
and evangalize for, gorillas, he is not  developing into an adult, but rather 
 becoming-gorilla : 
 Th ursday 7th September 
 [ … ] Th e gorilla boy was still there. ‘Elephants are not very strong’, he said. 
‘D’you know how a gorilla walks?  Stamp ’; and then, wistfully, ‘I wish gorillas 
could talk’. [ … ] 
 Monday 25th September 
 [ … ] ‘Who’s supposed to be on it now?’ they called to each other, 
giggling. ‘I think it’s Nicky’. It seems that the basic games, though not ‘special’, 
are as good fun as ever. 
 Th e gorilla boy put his arm in mine and assured me that ‘Gorillas can lift  
you up’. It is as if he is in love with gorillas; their name must always be on his lips. 
 Th e craze for miniature cars is still going on [ … ]. (Opie 1983, 80, 85) 
 It is worth noting here that the gorilla boy isn’t becoming a single gorilla with 
a name or gaining individual features from, say, a cartoon or natural history 
documentary. He is becoming  gorillas , and this multiplicity across species and 
beyond individuals, ‘interkingdoms’, is of particular interest to Deleuze and 
Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari 1998, 266–267). It is a distinctive aspect of 
imaginative play too, and I’ll return to it in  Chapter 7 . 
 Finally, the theoretical concerns with which I approach the observation 
and description of video game play events are concerned with undermining 
ostensibly fi xed distinctions between the human and the non-human in 
contemporary technoculture. Th e collaged human/synthetic images on the 
laptop screen as the computer fi sh, camera and girls play together are a visual 
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metonym of the hybrid state of everyday life in digital culture. Children are 
born into an environment replete with digital media technologies, play 
with computers and tablets before they can talk, are looped into cybernetic 
circuits of play and communication at home and at school. Th ese conceptual 
frameworks are sketched out in the next chapter and underpin the descriptive 
work throughout the book. For now, I will note that children are no less 
monstrous than all the cyborgs and posthumans that populate contemporary 
technoculture ( Davis-Floyd and Dumit 1998 ). 
 Play
 Playfulness is a volatile, sometimes dangerously explosive essence, which 
cultural institutions seek to bottle or contain in the vials of games of competition, 
chance, and strength, in modes of simulation such as theater, and in controlled 
disorientation, from roller coasters to dervish dancing … . Most defi nitions 
of play involve notions of disengagement, of free-wheeling, of being out of 
mesh with the serious ‘bread-and-butter’, let alone ‘life-and-death’ processes 
of production, social control, ‘getting and spending’, and raising the next 
generation … . ( Turner 1982 , quoted in Schechner 1998, 4) 
 Th ere is no agreed defi nition of the word ‘play’. As well as referring to the 
pleasurable activities of children and adults when not constrained by work it 
can also denote any free movement or latitude in human, animal, mechanical 
and natural bodies, from the play of light to the play of gears in an engine. It 
seems easier to list and categorize play rather than defi ne it. For instance, 
Gordon Burghardt cites a recent study of US kindergarten play that categorizes 
types of play: ‘large-motor play, small-motor play, mastery play, rule-based play, 
construction play, make-believe play, symbolic play, language play, and risk-
taking play’ ( Burghardt 2011 , 10). Th ese are not mutually exclusive, and I would 
suggest that any particular moment of play would involve a number of these so 
the whole taxonomic exercise is largely unhelpful. Indeed, as I suggested in the 
introduction, it is equally important to explore and trace the movements of play 
within and between games, to note the productive tension between fl uidity and 
fl exibility and rules and structure: 
 Th e game consists of the need to fi nd or continue at once a response  which 
is free within the limits set by the rules . Th is latitude of the player, this margin 
accorded to his action is essential to the game and partly explains the pleasure 
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which it excites. It is equally accountable for the remarkable and meaningful 
uses of the term ‘play’, such as are refl ected in such expressions as the  playing of 
a performer or the  play of a gear …  ( Caillois 1962 , 8). 
 I have touched on some signifi cant concepts and thinkers for the study of play 
and games, and they will be developed throughout the book. I have found it 
useful to develop an approach to play and games from an ethnographic tradition 
of cultural enquiry and not through any attempt to establish formalist defi nitions 
or taxonomies of types of play, players and games. 
 Th e emphasis in both Huizinga and Caillois’ thought is on play as a voluntary 
activity, separate from work and mundane life, materially unproductive, an 
activity of ‘pure waste’, but characterized by intense absorption on the part of 
the player: 
 … the domain of play aft er all constitutes a kind of islet, artifi cially dedicated 
to calculated competition, limited risks, inconsequential make-believe, and 
meaningless panic. ( Caillois 1962 , 85–86) 
 Th is conceptualization works better for adults than children. Most of the 
waking life of an infant or young child is concerned with playing: playing with 
sound and language, the child’s own body, food and any object within reach 
becomes a toy. Important theories of child psychology are predicated on the 
fundamentally playful way that the infant negotiates his or her emergence as 
an individual in the world ( Winnicott 1974 ). Th e more enlightened approaches 
to education over the past century or two are underpinned by the belief that 
learning is most eff ective through play, whereas bored children (and adults) play 
 during work, undermining the work in hand through whispered jokes, written 
notes (via paper or SMS), surreptitious missiles and so on. All of these everyday 
events are brought about by the tensions between play and more instrumental 
activities and behaviours, but in none can play and work be clearly mapped as 
separate domains. 
 Even the voluntary nature of games and play for older children is open to 
question. Involvement in sport organized by adults can be more or less coerced, 
as can involvement or exclusion from games by groups of children. Play can 
be cruel and bullying. Moreover, if, as many studies in psychology and animal 
behaviour assume, play is a fundamentally  natural phenomenon, shared by many 
other species from the higher primates, other mammals such as otters, dolphins 
and domestic pets to some birds, then it must be driven at some level by instinct, 
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before its instantiation in any particular voluntary game (see, e.g.,  Bruner 
et al. 1976 ,  Pellegrini 2011 ). Th eorists of animal play argue over whether young 
animals are training themselves for essential adult behaviour, such as predation 
or the ritual combat of mating, whether play is the expenditure of redundant 
energy when the animal is well-fed and not facing imminent threat or whether 
it serves a primarily social function – building and sustaining relationships and 
hierarchies. Herron and Sutton-Smith are suspicious of the application of this 
fi rst theory, ‘adaptive behaviour’, to human children’s play: 
 We are accustomed to viewing adaptive behaviour within a utilitarian ‘survival-’ 
or ‘achievement-’ oriented context. Whereas it may be that the intrinsic 
function of play is only very indirectly related to any of these things, it would 
appear to have more to do with whatever satisfaction comes from making one’s 
own unique expressive response to one’s own experience. ( Herron and Sutton-
Smith 1971 , 2) 
 Th ough games are a more bounded category than the play that brings them into 
being, they too are an ambiguous and undertheorized phenomenon, particularly 
within the study of media cultures. Games are at once cultural practices (even 
rituals), media/aesthetic objects, toys and social (or solitary) events. Again, game 
studies is developing rich conceptual and analytical resources for identifying the 
particular forms and codes of games, from taxonomies of types of games and 
play to the analysis of rule sets in video and computer games (e.g.  Walther 2003 ). 
 For Avedon and Sutton-Smith, games are 
 an exercise of voluntary control systems in which there is an opposition between 
forces, confi ned by a procedure and rules in order to produce a disequilibrial 
outcome. ( Avedon and Sutton-Smith 1971 , 7) 
 Th is defi nition probably applies to most playful events called games, from 
cards to football, and its identifi cation of  control as a salient characteristic will 
be explored later in the book. Its emphasis on a clear end – both temporal 
and agonistic – is shared in infl uential defi nitions in game studies, notably 
Jesper Juul’s analysis of winning states, or ‘variable and valorized outcomes’ 
( Juul 2003 ). However, whilst many games have defi nite winning states, there 
are many structured events of play which do not yet are called games by their 
players: young children might call any more or less sustained and coherent 
engagement with characters, actions or environments a game. Th ese imaginative 
collaborations may well not have a competitive element nor a clear end point, 
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but they have enough of a symbolic theme or complex for the children to 
feel they are generating a gameworld. Moreover, if a descriptive rather than 
taxonomic approach is taken to the study of games in everyday life, even games 
with clear rules and agonistic motives may still not – in particular events of their 
playing – ultimately generate a competitive relationship between their player, 
nor a fi xed winning state. For example, a ‘game’ of badminton or tennis can 
easily be adapted to a pattern in which the players are concerned to keep the 
shuttlecock or ball in play rather than trying to score points by hitting it out of 
play – we might wonder what the ratio is between games of Monopoly begun, 
over a Christmas holiday for instance, and games of Monopoly actually  fi nished 
and won. For adults or children, or adults  and children, formal games are oft en 
used as structure or scaff olding for social activity, rather than as an agonistic 
end in themselves. 
 Th e structuring and directing of playful behaviour through rules is a key 
factor in analyzing games. Within psychological research on children’s play, 
games and playful behaviour are categorized by the relative rigidity, fl exibility 
or negotiability of rules: 
 A main characteristic particular to games is that they involve rules and roles 
that have previously been established by others, are probably codifi ed in some 
way, and thus can be explicitly communicated. Th e existence of rules and roles 
places constraints on children’s behaviour within the game. Th ese rules are 
much less fl exible than the implicit rules and roles evident in peek-a-boo, rough 
and tumble (R&T) play, and those negotiated in fantasy play … . ( Baines and 
Blatchford 2011 , 262) 
 Games, then, are ‘social objects’ that can be planned with appeals to tradition and 
precedence with new forms emerging through negotiation or experimentation. 
‘Cops and robbers’ might simply take the form of a chase, or it might be shaped 
by fantasy and role play. 
 It is oft en assumed that a game must be social, a defi nition that rules out 
games with non-human players (i.e. video games), but also earlier single-
player games (notably card games in the solitaire family), or – less obviously – 
games in which the ‘rules’ are not so much rules as laws embedded in the play 
environment, for example gravity, the arrangement of wall and playground 
for marbles and balls and the dynamic geometries of rope in skipping games 
( Opie and Opie 1997 ). As we’ll see later in  Chapter 5 (‘Soft  Worlds’), the ‘rules’ 
of a video game might be more usefully thought of as gameworld ‘laws’, built 
into the virtual environment. 
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 Virtual
 Let’s return to the fi shy world of the twins and Photo Booth, with a continuation 
of the passage by Victor Turner quoted above: 
 Play can be everywhere and nowhere, imitate anything, yet be identifi ed with 
nothing … . Play is the supreme  bricoleur of frail transient constructions, like a 
caddis worm’s case or a magpie’s nest … . Its metamessages are composed of a 
potpourri of apparently incongruous elements … . Passages of seemingly wholly 
rational thought jostle in a Joycean or surrealist manner with passages fi lleted of 
all syntactical connectedness. (Turner 1983, quoted in Schechner 1988, 4) 
 Th e girls found a feature that adds a photographic or video backdrop to the 
self-portraits. Lily improvized a rap-like performance about the Eiff el Tower 
against a Parisian scene, and then, joined by Josie, settled on an animated 
scene of tropical waters and fi sh. Th ey soon found that the soft ware assumed or 
required – in an echo of the very early days of portrait photography – a static 
subject. Otherwise, it could not adequately trace the edges of the human head 
and body and accurately map the pre-rendered background as if behind them. 
With their movement the real-time video image of the twins was broken up, 
mixed up and overlaid with the bright tropical waters in an animated collage. 
Th is virtual immersion inspired the girls to sing ( Figure2.1 ): 
 J and L (with swimming actions):  We’re swimming in the fi shtank (they push each 
other and giggle) … We’re in Penny’s house, and we are in the kitchen, and we 
are swimming even though we’re on the ground! 
 J:  And I might swallow you, fi shy! 
 J and L:  Because I’m half shark (Lily lunges towards the webcam with exaggerated 
biting gestures and noises) 
 (Th ey sway from side to side together gracefully) 
 J:  We are a shark and human put-together-to-make-a-cat (these last words spoken 
quickly as the rhythm of the song is dropped) 
 (Th e song picks up again) 
 J (with Lily picking up on the last drawn out word of each line):  We’re happy to 
be eating f-i-i-i-i-sh (they make smiling faces by pulling up the corners of their 
mouth with their fi ngers), even if, they’re electric e-e-e-e-ls. 
 J:  I’m gonna electrocute them! 
 (Th e song degenerates again into pushing, swaying, biting motions and snatches of 
singsong references to fi sh.) 
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 Th e term ‘virtual’ is particularly ambiguous, but it is crucial for addressing the 
behaviours and bodies described in this book, and will be discussed in more depth 
in  Chapter 7 . In the context of digital media, it can function as a loose shorthand 
for anything to do with the intangible operations of computer technology, 
and particularly for the immaterial spaces of communication and play these 
operations generate. I have already used it as such to describe the computer-
generated simulation of Lego vehicles. It generated excitement around actual 
and predicted technologies of virtual reality (VR) in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
promising to realize what the VR enthusiasts saw as an essential trajectory of the 
history of media technologies from cave paintings to Renaissance perspective, 
photography to cinema: an arc of technical evolution towards ever-greater 
immersion, a paradoxical disappearance of the mediating technology through 
its own sophistication: 
 Virtual reality is immersive, which means that it is a medium whose purpose 
is to disappear [ … ] transparent, perceptual immediacy, experience without 
mediation. ( Bolter and Grusin 1999 , 22) 
 Th e term ‘virtual’, then, suggests a phenomenon or entity that is not quite real. Th is 
‘not quite’ could indicate something that has the potential to be real or will soon 
be real, in the sense of a task that is  virtually complete; or it could be something 
that  seems real, but may never  become so, the worlds of VR applications, for 
instance. Lister et al. point out that for all its ontological instability, a VR world 
or other computer simulation is quite defi nitely real in a dual sense: 
 Without these machines, there would be no simulation. Th erefore, simulations 
are importantly real by virtue of the technologies necessary to producing them, 
and the eff ect they have upon us. ( Lister et al. 2009 , 389) 
 Th e nature of the virtual reality of a video game world as computer simulation, 
and the nature of the eff ects this virtuality has on players, will be examined 
throughout this book, particularly in  Chapter 5 . As the initial hype around 
VR faded, it became apparent that for all the new possibilities for VR as an 
immersive media form (recently revived in video games with devices such as 
Oculus Rift ), predictions of  immediacy – in Bolter and Grusin’s sense of the 
dissolving of the mediating apparatus – did not stand up to users’ experiences 
of cumbersome headsets, motion sickness and lag between their movement and 
the virtual world’s response. Th e ‘virtual’ persists as an adjective for a range of 
everyday digital media, however, from the numerous ‘virtual communities’ of 
47Virtual Media and Children’s Everyday Play
Internet media to online 3D worlds, and it overlaps with concepts of cyberspace 
and simulation. William Gibson’s ‘cyberspace’ – a fi ctional future of immersive 
datascapes – was regarded as the prescient template for VR, but is now more 
commonly applied to the communicative networks of the Internet, particularly 
email, social media networks and forums. ‘Simulation’ is a key term for both 
theories of play and computer media worlds, and it will be addressed in detail 
in  Chapter 5 . 
 Additionally, using the concept of the virtual in this sense familiar from 
popular digital culture and technological research, Lister et al. articulate it with 
an older sense of the virtual from philosophy. Drawing on Gilles Deleuze, this 
virtuality insists on the temporal dimension of reality: there is a reality to things 
that do not (yet) exist. Like the task that is virtually completed, 
 [t]he reference to time is clear: the task’s completion is just about  upon us, but 
is not yet. In this sense, a reference to the virtual includes future states as part 
of the real; the future has a kind of reality which is virtual, but not  actual . Th is 
is the sense of the ‘virtual’ that Gilles Deleuze maintains: the virtual is real, but 
inactual. Th at is, it has real existence but not in the same way as the things that 
are  actually around us. ( Lister et al. 2009 , 389) 
 A proper examination of this sense of the virtual is not within the scope of this 
book, but I would highlight three aspects that might usefully inform the study 
of everyday play. Firstly, it draws attention to the media technological platforms 
that occupy so much of children’s time and attention today – VR as an everyday, 
here and now, reality. Secondly, it emphasizes the real operations and eff ects of 
phenomena that are inactual. Together with the processes and confi gurations 
of soft ware in digital play and communication, we might also include the 
intangible and immaterial – but still real – aff ectual realms of media images 
and dramas, and the building of imaginative worlds across individuals, groups 
and environments in playful events (see  Chapter 6 , ‘Playgrounds’). Th irdly, 
it highlights the temporal and emergent dimension of play events – both the 
virtual time of video game worlds and the micro-evolutionary becomings of 
imaginative play. Rob Shields’ explanation of the philosophical virtual evokes 
something of the fl uid and creative dynamic of playful events: 
 Th e Virtual itself can be said to be a capacity to be actualized as a singular, 
concrete object. Actualization is performative – the Virtual itself is a multiplicity 
which can be actualized in diff erent ways. If it is known by its eff ects, then it 
is known through a specifi c instantiation, not as a whole. It thus retains its 
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creative character as an ontological category pertinent to discussions of change, 
becoming, genesis, development, emergence, autopoiesis, the genetic power of 
codes as well as of codings themselves. ( Shields 2006 , 285) 
 Brian Sutton-Smith frequently refers to the imaginary dimensions of (non-
digital) games and playing as ‘virtual’: 
 In solitary or private play children create cultures of play that are virtual worlds 
not mundane worlds, and oft en with not much obligation to the latter. ( Sutton-
Smith 1997 , 155) 
 Again there is the sense of an aff ective reality that sits within, or opens up from, 
everyday reality, but that is of a diff erent order in its microcosmic vividness. 
Like the simulated world of the video game it is a fabrication, but synthesized 
from diff erent materials. All these senses of the virtual overlap and it is not my 
concern here to clearly defi ne and delineate them. One important point to note 
is that in all these senses of the term, the virtual and the actual are both real. 
 Media
 Th e words ‘medium’ and ‘media’, are also polysemic and unstable, even when 
we are only referring to the technologies, practices, aesthetics and meanings 
of information and entertainment media. In his book  Understanding Media , 
Marshall McLuhan provocatively included chapters on cars and weapons 
alongside those on television and typewriters ( McLuhan 1964 ). When used 
in general conversation, ‘the media’ tend to refer to professionally produced 
and distributed information, news and entertainment channels (TV, radio, 
newspapers, cinema). Media studies has generally focused its critical and 
analytical attention on these media’s transmission of messages or ideological 
shaping of public and private discourse via a circuit from producer to consumer 
through the economies and technologies of distribution, the ideological interests 
of dominant class and gender formations. Th e emphasis on the message, 
whether news item or cinematic representation, assumes both a fundamental 
distance in time and space (and social position and power) between producer 
and consumer, and that the salient operations and eff ects of the message are 
mimetic or representational. Th e task of media criticism, then, is to point out the 
discursive mechanisms through which encoding takes place, and to decode the 
meanings of a message (or to observe people in their everyday media cultures 
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decoding, accepting or negotiating these meanings) ( Hall 1997 ). Th ese circuits 
of signifi cation are complex, shift ing and entail various channels via which 
media consumers work with or feed back on their mediated lives. 
 Roger Silverstone suggested it might be more useful to think in terms of 
mediation as a dynamic process rather than media as discrete platforms and 
channels: 
 Mediation involves the movement of meaning from one text to another, from 
one discourse to another, from one event to another. It involves the constant 
transformation of meanings, both large scale and small, signifi cant and 
insignifi cant, as media texts and texts about media circulate in writing, in speech 
and audiovisual forms, and as we, individually and collectively, directly and 
indirectly, contribute to their production. ( Silverstone 1999 , 13) 
 What help does this central concern with meaning off er to the study of the oft en 
nonsensical and meaningless worlds of children’s play, now so tangled up with 
the images and technologies of popular media? We can, of course, look for the 
meanings and the representations in commercial children’s culture, in Disney for 
instance (discussed further in  Chapter 4 ), but this would be to ignore perhaps 
the most extensive and intensive of children’s media experience. For example, I 
will later refer to a study of primary school girls singing and dancing to Beyoncé’s 
‘Single Ladies’. We might analyse the song’s lyrics and its representation of gender 
relations, or the song’s video with its assertive sexuality. But how do we describe 
the music as a media form through its rhythm, harmonies, tone, etc., and 
particularly important for the study of play, how its aesthetic form acts on the 
players’ bodies, how it suggests or compels dancing, singing and performance 
by individuals and groups? Girls’ playground singing games pick up and shred 
media ‘messages’ such as pop songs, recompiling them into nonsensical rhythms 
and rhymes: aff ectual devices for establishing and synchronizing moments of 
collective pleasure. Meaningless but deeply signifi cant in children’s everyday 
lives, closer perhaps to McLuhan’s assertion that the medium is the massage, the 
signifi cance of media technologies or technics (including bodily techniques of 
rhythm and dance) exercised through the orienting and pressing in on bodies 
rather than communicating any particular story or theme. 
 Against the notion of mediation as the transmission of messages over 
distances of time and space we can posit other models of communication. 
Jackie Marsh suggests that in its performativity, use of props or artefacts and 
its repetitions, children’s media play can be seen as akin to ritual, with children 
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creating ‘social performances in which they are the pivotal character’ ( Marsh 
2005 , 42). Ritual and play unfold in an intense, proximate space and time, they 
are of the moment and their eff ects localized, generated in and through the 
participants. Th is expansive defi nition of ritual reaches from the formality of 
religion and the sacred to the minutiae of everyday life, ‘ritual can be recognized 
as performance which is habitual’ ( Marsh 2005 , 41). For James Carey, the ritual 
view of communication is no less important than transmission. As ritual, 
communication is ‘a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, 
repaired and transformed’ ( Carey 1992 , 23). 
 If the sacred nature of ritual seems too formal, and possibly culturally 
conservative, to fully account for the fl uid and improvisatory nature of children’s 
play, it can be linked to contiguous and overlapping profane cultural formations 
such as carnivals and festivals. Huizinga sees play itself exercised through ritual 
up into the structure of civilization, but also as a productive degeneration of 
ritual forms and practices; for example, the labyrinth of the monk’s symbolic 
pilgrimage has become the child’s hopscotch matrix. Anthropologist Victor 
Turner makes a key distinction within ritual cultures of performance. Play, 
religion and ritual all occupy liminal zones within cultures (oft en mapped onto 
or enacted within liminal space as well), but whereas liminal practices such as 
initiation rites reinforce and reproduce a social order, there are also liminoid 
zones within the developed world that have more potential for disruption and 
the generations of new cultural forms and behaviours. Th is model of play and 
cultural production has been usefully applied to video game culture by Jon 
Dovey and Helen W. Kennedy: 
 Th e player returns from the liminal ritual space with a renewed sense of his 
or her place in the established social order. Liminoid phenomena, on the 
other hand, are much more individualized and commodifi ed. Th ey develop 
‘apart from the central economic and political processes, along the margins, 
in the interfaces and interstices of central and servicing institutions – they 
are plural, fragmentary and experimental in their character’. ( Dovey and 
Kennedy 2006 , 34–35) 
 In the next chapter, I will open up this question of the relationship between 
the micro-world of the ritual or play event and the material and symbolic 
environments within which they form. A theory of communication as ritual 
captures something of the distinctive space-time and character of games, but 
these gameworlds are not closed systems. 
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 Virtual media
 For all the ambiguity and openness of the terms ‘virtual’ and ‘media’ as set out 
earlier, I use the term ‘virtual media’ rather straightforwardly to refer to popular 
entertainment and communication media on digital platforms and which 
generate their own time and space for engagement, interchange or play. My main 
interest is in video and computer games, but these extend into other playful 
digital formats such as social media networks, mobile phone play and apps 
for mobile and location-aware devices, and are oft en found within the broad 
mediascapes of commercial transmedia systems (see  Chapter 4 ), or accessed 
through managed network services such as Xbox Live. Th ere is no longer a clear 
distinction between the terms ‘computer game’ and ‘video game’. Until the early 
1990s (with the dissemination of the personal computer as a consumer product), 
‘video games’ were produced for a video game console or dedicated device whilst 
‘computer games’ were produced for home computers. Th e latter were oft en less 
sophisticated graphically but aff orded the player the opportunity to intervene in 
the game soft ware and make changes to the appearance or structure of the game. 
Over the past few decades, the popularity of personal computers in the home 
has led to the rise of PC gaming and a marked overlap in the games available for 
consoles and PCs. 
 Th e everyday
 Th e concept of everyday life is central to work on the social and cultural locations 
and operations of technology, media and children’s culture ( Highmore 2002 ). 
Media studies, cultural studies, sociologies and anthropologies of technology all 
address the public, work or domestic relationships, routines, cultural practices 
and spaces through which people, including children, make, and make sense 
(or nonsense) of, the world (e.g.  Akrich 1992 ,  Mackay 1997 ,  Mackenzie and 
Wajcman 1999 ,  Holloway and Valentine 2000 ,  Hutchby and Moran-Ellis 2001 , 
 Facer et al. 2003 ,  Flynn 2003 ,  Michael 2006 ,  Weber and Dixon 2007 ). Everyday 
life is the site in which the popular instrumental and ludic uses of digital media 
are negotiated, played out and invented, and it is in the realm of the everyday 
that spatio-temporal limits, restrictions and power relationships are reinforced 
or opened up through technologies. Th e home and households are a primary 
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target for the producers and marketers of media objects and platforms and hence 
the lived practices, experiences and techniques within which these artefacts are 
engaged with and consumed. 
 I will return briefl y to the Photo Booth performance to set some of these 
terms into play. It was a tiny event, the girls played with the laptop for around ten 
minutes, with the fi shy theme lasting less than two. Th e space of the gameworld 
extended in to the laptop itself, its camera, soft ware, RAM and storage, and 
out to little more than a square metre of bodily movement. However, I could 
have described it in much more detail than I have discussed here. It was not a 
complicated game, but it was complex –  a complex: it brought together patterns 
and themes, it organized diverse physical, virtual and semiotic material into an 
event that was nonsensical yet with its own patterns, rhythms and playful logic. 
Th ere was no centre as such to the event, it couldn’t be said that the PhotoBooth 
soft ware generated the game, nor the camera, the animated fi sh, the computer 
or even the children. Th ey brought themselves together, images, sounds and 
actions, human and non-human, familiar routines of singing and performance 
and new routines of video feedback, collapsed space and visual artefacts. 
 As already noted, the place or space in which this game event takes place is 
ambivalent. Th e girls are dancing in front of the screen and camera, so we might 
draw a map shaped something like a beam of light fanning out from the plane of 
the laptop screen. Th e fi eld of vision of the camera marks the edge of the playing 
fi eld so the spatial boundary is not drawn in actual space but is enforced by 
visual feedback: simply, a girl knows she is out of the game when she moves off  
the edge of the image on the screen. Th e webcam, a barely visible 3 mm diameter 
disc above the computer screen, defi nes the possible actual space, whereas the 
feedback of the video signal, looping through the human lenses and motor 
systems, regulates it. But the playspace is also  on the screen: a dynamic but 
fl at surface of computer animation and live video, torn up and overlaid. Th ese 
loops of information and feedback are processed invisibly as well, both in the 
hardware and soft ware of the laptop and through the imaginations and sensori-
motor systems of the children. And the familiar games of mediated domestic 
performance, established in the twentieth century with domestic photography 
and later home video, are newly mediated and concentrated by the webcam and 
real-time video feed. 
 Th e multiplication of space across the actual and virtual is felt and lived 
by the children, so much so that they can sing it: ‘We’re swimming in the 
fi shtank … We’re in Penny’s house, and we are in the kitchen, and we are 
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swimming even though we’re on the ground!’ Th e technological artifi ce of this 
simulated ocean environment is alluded to as well: these fi sh look and swim like 
ordinary tropical species, but they also electrifi ed, ‘electric e-e-e-ls’. Th is adds a 
new cyborgian dimension to the more familiar monstrous hybrids of nonsense 
play, here the half-human, half-shark that somehow adds up to become a cat. 
 Th ese little descriptions indicate much that will be explored throughout this 
book. A key concern is the role of digital technology and play in generating 
confusions or renegotiations between usually distinct concepts in our 
understanding of children, technology and media: in everyday life and media 
culture – the new with the old; in the use of computer media – virtual with actual 
space; in the moral critique of popular culture – passivity with agency. 
 Note
 1  Studies of child development establish broader developmental stages. For example, 
one possible structure of periodicity is that set out by Elizabeth B. Hurlock: 
babyhood 0–3 yrs; childhood 3–6 yrs; youth 6–11 yrs; adolescence 12–21 yrs 
(in  Herron and Sutton-Smith 1971 , 52). 

 Th is chapter will set out the methods I use in studying play, the conceptual 
enquiry that underpins these methods, the theoretical and empirical traditions 
that situate this work and some of the practical considerations it raises. It will 
address the methodological demands of studying the relationships between the 
virtual and the actual, cyberspace and domestic space, in everyday popular digital 
culture. Th e book as a whole attempts to identify and theorize both human and 
non-human agents in the moment or event of gameplay: so the object of study 
here is neither human players nor dynamic soft ware but what happens when 
they come together to generate an event of gameplay. 
 Ethnography
 My approach to empirical research is in some key respects part of an 
interdisciplinary tradition of small-scale ethnography, particularly studies 
that describe cultures or subcultures within the Western or developed 
world – that is participant observation not of exotic or pre-industrial others, 
but groups with which researchers have some familiarity. Media and cultural 
studies have their ethnographic strands, with attention to television audiences 
( Ang 1985 ,  Morley 1992 ) or to youth culture ( Willis 1978 ,  Hebdige 1979 ). To 
overgeneralize, these studies were primarily concerned with the discursive and 
identity-forming processes of media consumption or everyday performance. 
However, in this book I am less concerned with the  meanings constructed 
around children’s media culture and more concerned with the materiality of 
both new media and the lived experiences of their consumption or playing. Th e 
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media technologies themselves (both hardware and soft ware) and their agency 
as machines (or bodies in play) are of concern, not just their transmission of 
images and scenarios. 
 Th e case studies used in this book, those written by myself and those by 
others, are very much concerned with describing the experiences and texture 
of everyday culture; they are descriptive and interpretive and not scientifi c in 
their aims. Cliff ord Geertz has described the potential for ethnography not 
only to ‘reduce the puzzlement’ we face in encounters with diff erent cultures, 
but also in the study of more familiar worlds in which it can usefully  induce 
puzzlement: 
 [ ... ] displacing the dulling sense of familiarity with which the mysteriousness 
of our own ability to relate perceptively to one another is concealed from us. 
(Geertz 1993, in  Hine 2000 , 64) 
 I am personally interested in, and infl uenced by, a stream of empirical engagement 
with the everyday that can be traced back to the Surrealist movement of the 
1920s. Surrealist writers and photographers in particular regarded the mundane 
everyday world not as a static environment against which everyday life took 
place, but rather as a realm shot through with the marvellous, a strangeness that 
can be revealed through playful and poetic activities and attention: 
 Surrealism is not just a technique for making the ordinary extraordinary; the 
everyday in Surrealism is  already strange (it is collage-like). In Surrealism our 
drab habits of mind understand it in this way. Instead the everyday is where the 
marvellous exists. ( Highmore 2002 , 46) 
 Th us we could ‘read Surrealism as a form of social research into everyday life’ 
( Cliff ord 1988 ,  Highmore 2002 , 46). Th is Surrealist stream was fed by, and into, 
critical thought and anthropology in France that was concerned with social 
and cultural phenomena that can broadly be connected with play. Marcel 
Mauss’ work on pre-industrial gift  economies was infl uential on Georges 
Bataille, who worked with Roger Caillois on the study of sacred and ritual 
cultures (including aspects of everyday Parisian life), and on the Situationist 
International in the 1950s and 1960s, who were also avid readers of Huizinga 
and saw play as a transgressive revolutionary force ( Giddings 2007c ). Th e 
Surrealist ethnographic attention to the intangible forces of desires, dreams 
and the unconscious – as well as the ambiguous but powerful persistence of 
spaces of the sacred in the modern world – off ers aesthetic and conceptual 
resources for the operations of virtual media, imagination, play and non-
57Microethology: Methods for Studying Gameworlds
human agency in the every day. An ethnographic surrealist sensibility, then, 
can address not only the marvellousness of the adult, urban, environment, but 
also the inherent surrealism of children’s play. Consider this account from a 
book on child development, for instance: 
 Th e dolls seem to take our lives of their own as children create devices to create 
the illusion that the dolls are making decisions and reacting to events within 
their own autonomous story world. Furthermore, in speaking about for their 
dolls, children come to speak about things that are not visible, such as the 
thoughts and feelings of the dolls and the objects in the story world that are not 
part of the setting in which the story being told. By the end of the preschool 
years, children oft en can create entire autonomous story worlds, complete with 
characters facing problems and resolving them ‘on their own’ in scenes that are 
quite fantastic and distinct from the actual scene in which the play is taking 
place. (George et al. 2005, 62) 
 Children’s play brings the inanimate to life, collages together disparate material 
and semiotic fragments and eff ects all kinds of syntheses and transductions. It 
is utterly everyday, but marvellous and phantasmagorical (see  Chapter 7 , ‘Real 
Worlds’). 
 I draw also, therefore, on a range of theoretical and methodological 
resources that are critical of the humanist assumptions of the humanities 
and social sciences, and that suggest ways for studying the everyday world as 
technocultural, constituted by both human and non-human bodies and forces. 
Th ese include science and technology studies (STS), actor-network theory 
(ANT) (and the work of Bruno Latour in particular), Donna Haraway’s work 
on science and cyberculture and the realist philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari. Th is book isn’t the place to set out or synthesize these diverse 
bodies of thought and practice in any detail, 1  but I will pick up and use ideas 
and approaches from them when useful throughout. For the purposes of the 
book, underpinning them all is a fundamental questioning of fi xed discursive 
and methodological separations of, variously, the human and the technological, 
the natural and the cultural and the material, and the imaginary in culture. 
 Anthropology of technology
 Broadly, then, I have been infl uenced by a range of approaches that might be 
loosely bracketed together as an ‘anthropology of technology’: 
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 … technical objects and people are brought into being in a process of 
reciprocal defi nition in which objects are defi ned by subjects and subjects by 
objects. It is only aft er the event that causes are stabilized. And it is only aft er 
the event that we are able to say that objects do this, while human beings do 
that. It is in this sense, and only in this sense, that technical objects build our 
history for us and ‘impose’ certain frameworks. And it is for this reason that 
 an anthropology of technology is both possible and necessary . ( Akrich 1992 , 
222, my emphasis) 
 Th e problems and possibilities here are both terminological and actual: how to 
study the lived nature of humans and objects in digital culture? An emergent 
‘cyborg anthropology’ (Downey et al. 1995), or ‘cyborgology’ (Gray et al. 1995), 
would at least need to interrogate the humanist assumptions of both the 
cybernetic organism and the  anthropos . 
 Actor-network theory contributes to this anthropology, or sociology, of 
technology. Mackenzie and Wajcman introduce it as identifying ‘the reciprocal 
relationship between artefacts and social groups’ ( Mackenzie and Wajcman 
1999 , 22). However, ANT draws in a far more heterogeneous array of agents or 
actors as constituent of sociotechnical networks: 
 If human beings form a social network it is not because they interact with other 
human beings. It is because they interact with human beings and endless other 
materials too [ … ] Machines, architectures, clothes, texts – all contribute to the 
patterning of the social. ( Law 1992 ) 
 A study proceeding from an actor-network theory position, then, would assume 
no primacy of agency between humans and non-humans (whether artefactual, 
scientifi c or natural) in any network, phenomenon or system, implicitly or 
explicitly rejecting the humanist worldview of the humanities and social 
sciences. Th e implications of this are far-reaching and go beyond the nuances 
of the eff ects and determinations studied as SST (social shaping of technology). 
It questions engrained conceptual distinctions between nature and culture, 
humans and artefacts, subjects and objects: 
 Both society and technology, actor-network theory proposes, are made out 
of the same ‘stuff ’: networks linking human beings and non-human entities. 
( Mackenzie and Wajcman 1999 , 24) 
 For Bruno Latour, then, society has always been an indissoluble network of 
technological and human entities: society is (and always has been) constituted 
by humans, machines and tools. 
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 Th e technocultural circuits of the video game, then, are only one, particularly 
intense and intimate, network, but one that consists of material and technical, 
aesthetic and embodied connections: 
 Digital games are objects that exist in the world; however much their digital 
virtuality is celebrated they are enacted and produced in strikingly visceral – 
ontologically virtual – ways. Th e noise that a PS3 game makes when it is pushed 
into the blu-ray drive, the cables over which Xbox LIVE arcade games are 
downloaded, and the wars and environmental depletion taking place to produce 
the coltan-based batteries in your wireless devices [ … ] all suggest a materiality 
to gaming that links digital games to the world and demands that they are also 
understood as objects in the world. ( Apperley and Jayemane 2012 , 15) 
 Th e intensity of the video game as event or network rests not only in digital 
components and virtual gameworlds, but also in the particular ways in which 
they are instantiated – the intimate and cybernetic circuit between the human 
and the non-human. Here I mean cybernetics not in its loose discursive sense 
of ‘something to do with computers’ but literally as the material feedback of 
information and control between machines and organisms ( Wiener 1961 ). 
Donna Haraway’s work is particularly infl uential here. For Haraway, ‘a cyborg 
is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social 
reality as well as a creature of fi ction’ (Haraway 1990, 191). Th is ambiguous status 
is bound up with the cyborg’s descriptive and utopian possibilities for Haraway, 
and it is refl ected in the diverse ways in which this fi gure has been discussed. 
For some it suggests that the posthuman is predicated on observations or 
warnings that the corporeal aspects of the human are, or will be, undergoing 
transformation. Others invoke the cyborg and the posthuman (following Latour, 
for example) to argue that humans and human societies have always been 
technosocial and hence never simply or exclusively ‘human’. Th e question of 
what kind of relationship between the human and the technological is brought 
into being in video game play runs through this book, and the ramifi cations of 
conceptualizing everyday media experience as cybernetic or cyborgian will be 
addressed specifi cally in  Chapter 5 (‘Soft  Worlds’). 2  
 For now, I will give one example of how everyday play with digital media 
constitutes bodies and networks between bodies in new and distributed ways. 
Knowing my research interests in children and technology, a colleague told me 
how she oft en talked to her young granddaughter, who lives in the United States, 
via FaceTime on their iPads. Th e possibility of cheap and easy video telephony 
is in itself new, but  skyping is becoming increasingly familiar and unremarkable. 
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Th e portability of the mobile device and its wireless network connection, 
however, meant that the child could walk around with the iPad chatting to her 
grandmother on the move. It appeared that the fact that her grandmother’s 
face could be seen on the device’s screen made her more ‘present’, or even that 
the device (with its face and voice) stood in for, or fused, grandparent and 
communication device in a way more profound than the disembodied voice of 
the telephone. Th is was borne out when the child began a game of hide and seek 
with her parents, taking the iPad/grandmother with her to hide in a cupboard, 
whispering together in the dark. 
 Ecology and ethos
 Th e notion that media are not discrete devices and channels, but are always 
already part of an ecology of other media, technologies, cultural patterns, 
technical practices and material substrates has proved productive in recent 
years ( Fuller 2005 ,  Parikka 2010 ,  Taff el 2013 ), and draws on the ecological or 
environmental ideas of Marshall McLuhan ( 1964 ). Th is book takes a broadly 
‘media ecological’ approach to everyday play with technology. On one level, an 
ecological perspective resists the tendency to see particular new technologies 
as having an ‘impact’ on the home, households, children and so on. Rather 
they must fi nd their place and time within the existing technical and domestic 
environments. Children today are born into digitally augmented environments, 
there is no unmediated, non-technological environment on which devices 
impact. On another level, this natural–artifi cial ecology resonates with the 
images of tangled technocultural networks sketched out above. Moreover, it 
echoes the terminology of childhood research, particularly the educational 
and psychological studies that observe and interact with children in ordinary 
environments rather than setting up lab experiments ( Avedon and Sutton-
Smith 1971 ). 
 Assemblage
 A useful concept that can be loosely connected to all of these bodies of work 
is  assemblage . T.L. Taylor explains how the term can help us to understand 
the complexity of technocultural phenomena, and contemporary videogame 
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cultures in particular. She lists some of the heterogeneous bodies and 
agencies that ‘make up the play moment’: 
 Games, and their play, are constituted by the interrelations between (to name 
just a few) technological systems and soft ware (including the imagined player 
embedded in them), the material world (including our bodies at the keyboard), 
the online space of the game (if any), game genre, and its histories, the social 
worlds that infuse the game and situate us outside of it, the emergent practices 
of communities, our interior lives, personal histories, and aesthetic experience, 
institutional structures that shape the game and our activity as players, legal 
structures, and indeed the broader culture around us with its conceptual frames 
and tropes. While looking at a game as it is presented as a boxed product may 
tell us something about the given structure of the artifact or its imagined player, 
understanding it as a living object – as a playful artifact – comes via an attention 
to the assemblage that constructs our actual games and play. ( Taylor 2009 , 332) 
 Th e events in and around Sandy Bay, on- and off -screen, cannot be described 
simply as children’s play with a new toy or medium, nor would a detailed 
analysis of either the screen images or the structure of the game, its rules, spatial 
dimensions and so on. Th ey were constituted by an assemblage, a set of tight 
loops through all of these entities, none of which could be said to be dominant, in 
control, or to have initiated the game event in the fi rst place. Th is raises questions 
about the terminology and conceptual underpinnings of empirical research in 
media and culture. My initial term for my approach in the Lego Racers research 
was ‘microethnography’, referring to the small scale and short duration of the 
technocultural event under scrutiny, but also – more playfully – alluding to 
the micro-circuits and micro-worlds of the video game and the digital video 
technologies used to record them. Th e term ‘ethnography’, however, is not 
adequate for the description of this intimate technoculture. Literally the ‘writing 
of people’, ethnography, like its parent discipline anthropology (the study of 
humankind), always already has the human – bodies, language and society – as 
its object of study and focus of its attention. 
 Ethology
 To examine how the game as soft ware and computer, console, peripherals as 
hardware are part of, or participants in, children’s lived media culture, I use a 
research approach that takes technologies (both hardware and soft ware) and 
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media images as its objects of study – or, more precisely, an approach that 
describes an event constituted by the circuits of agency, aff ect and play between 
human and technological participants. My term for it was initially temporary 
and playful: ‘microethology’. ‘Ethology’ was suggested by my colleague Iain 
Grant. Since the nineteenth century, the term has primarily been applied to the 
study of animal behaviour. Gilles  Deleuze (1992) gave it a diff erent application 
through his reading of the philosophy of Spinoza to denote an ontology of bodies 
and aff ects, natural and artifi cial, in which no prior assumptions are made about 
the nature or primacy of these bodies. Ethology is an approach that defi nes 
 bodies, animals or humans by the aff ects they are capable of. … Ethology is fi rst of 
all the study of the relations of speed and slowness, of the capacities for aff ecting 
and being aff ected that characterize each thing. For each thing these relations 
and capacities have an amplitude, thresholds (maximum and minimum) and 
variations or transformations that are peculiar to them. And they select, in the 
world or in Nature, that which corresponds to the thing; that is, they select what 
aff ects or is aff ected by the thing, what moves or is moved by it … an animal, 
a thing, is never separable from its relations with the world … Th e speed or 
slowness of metabolisms, perceptions, actions and reactions link together to 
constitute a particular individual in the world. (Deleuze 1992, pp. 627–628) 
 It should be noted that Deleuze’s use of the term ‘aff ect’ is not limited to its 
more usual sense in the humanities and social sciences as the experiential and 
emotional aspects of human embodiment and subjectivity, although the latter 
would be included within it, or, rather, constituted as particular products of it. 
‘Bodies’, for Deleuze (again following Spinoza), are not only human or animal 
bodies, but any material or immaterial entity in the world: microscopic particles, 
organs, machines, a body of literature and chemicals. As the quote indicates, 
bodies are defi ned in part by their aff ect on the bodies around and within them 
and by the aff ect these other bodies have on them. Ethology’s concern, then, 
is with behaviour, and should make no a priori assumptions about the most 
signifi cant bodies or agencies doing the behaving. 
 Gregory Bateson uses the term ‘ethology’ somewhat diff erently from Deleuze, 
but given that his use touches on anthropology, cybernetics and a broad 
ecological worldview, it is worth briefl y summarizing here. For Bateson, the 
ethos of a social group refers to the lived, felt and aff ectual dimensions of culture. 
Th ough intangible, it helps to perpetuate and reproduce culture; in cybernetic 
terms, it is a corrective mechanism to the runaway transformative impulses of 
schismogenesis, where the latter is the social tensions of diff erences in power 
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and hierarchy between individuals and groups ( Bateson 1972 , 126). Highmore 
describes the manifestations, the ‘real concrete elements’, of ethos in everyday 
communication and interaction: 
 [W]ays of greeting (hugs, handshakes, kisses, etc.); forms of perceiving (social 
recognition and misrecognition of class, caste, gender, sexuality and so on); 
aff ective intensity (the permission, or not, to be angry, the uses of humiliation, 
etc.); and so on. Ethos may well best be approached as something like a touching, 
or a feeling, but its polyphonic dimension, its complexity must be continually 
stressed. ( Highmore 2009 , 13) 
 Bateson’s notion of ethos, and the anthropological, cybernetic and ecological 
fi elds in which he developed it, resonates with the ethological and ecological 
approaches in media studies and philosophy briefl y noted earlier, as well 
as infl uencing his friend Edith Cobb’s work on the ecology of children’s 
imagination. 
 An ecological/ethological approach to contemporary children’s culture, then, 
would resist a priori conceptual distinctions between individuals (the child, 
machines), social groups (families, households, classmates), technologies 
(hardware, soft ware, toys, play equipment), physical environments (bedrooms, 
lounges, gardens, beaches) or symbolic environments (images and ideas from 
popular media, oral/practical traditions of play and games, etc.). So, in the 
Lego Racers event, cameras, domestic space, family relationships, screens, 
songs, movements, toys, and gestures, soft ware, boredom, video editing and 
compositing, media/animated images and environments, are all in play. Material 
bodies (human, technological) are looped together with intangible circuits of 
information (light emitted from the screen, captured by human eyes and the 
camera, processed and transmitted by nerves, muscles and microprocessors), 
aff ects (competitive and collaborative performance and humour, the imperative 
to play itself) and imagination (itself distributed between the boys and looped 
out through the media imagery). 
 Practical approaches
 Th e events I describe here are generally captured on video, though some were 
recorded mainly as written notes and some as photographic sequences edited to 
audio documentation. More oft en than not these microethologies are opportunistic 
and improvized. An interesting event seems to be unfolding so I pick up any 
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documentary resources to hand. 3  Th ere is a long history of fi lm and photography 
in anthropology, and digital media have made the visual documentation and 
dissemination of ethnographic studies inexpensive and accessible. In my own 
practice, I fi nd that much of the descriptive or analytical work takes place in 
the editing of the audio-visual material. Video and audio recording captures an 
event in more depth than written notes – one fi nds unnoticed activities in the 
background, innocuous spoken phrases reveal themselves to be full of inadvertent 
insight, and complex connections and relationships appear as video and audio 
tracks are cut and placed on the editing soft ware timeline. For example, I had 
made a video essay of the Lego Racers event ( Giddings 2003 ) initially to explore 
the transduction of virtual to actual space. Th rough a straightforward montage, 
I placed moments from each in sequence – the cars set off  from the start line/
the boys set off  on their own race around the room; a car ‘drowned’ in the virtual 
sea/an actual Lego car was driven gently across the crayoned paper; and so on. 
Th rough the repetitions of viewing, logging, editing, rendering and reviewing, 
I began to question why the boys’ actual movement of the cars over the plastic 
mountain was so graceful. So, though I had no intention of conducting a study of 
the transduction of virtual gravity, the process of media ethology proved a kind 
of extended and technically augmented deep description. Of course cameras 
can inhibit behaviour, though I have always found that children very quickly 
ignore their presence (and Alex and Jo are very used to being recorded anyway) – 
perhaps from time to time remembering and leaping up to perform, mess about 
or – inevitably – push an eye or nose right into the lens. 
 I make more conventional notes too as soon as possible, to record aspects of 
the event that are not visible or audible, perhaps emotional states or connections 
to other events. 
 Th ough not all these studies are of my children, or of my children alone, being 
a parent ethologist has a number of advantages. It allows this microethological 
attention to the momentary and the small scale within the context of what is in 
eff ect a life-long longitudinal study (see also  Seft on-Green 2004 ,  Briggs 2006 ). 
 Aesthetics, kinaesthetics and soft ware ethology
 What do we need to add, to factor in, to incorporate virtual media and 
video game culture into microethological description? Images, characters 
and narratives fl ow from the more expansive landscapes of children’s media 
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culture into gameworlds, both virtual and actual. Th e aesthetics of cartoons, 
action, romance and nonsense are all agents in play (see  Chapter 4 , ‘Media 
Worlds’). Both virtual and actual gameworlds are kinetic: video games are in 
eff ect interactive animation, and actual play is nothing if not embodied. From 
swinging to fi ghting, skipping to drawing, there is a technics and a kinaesthetics 
of physical play ( Chapter 6 , ‘Playgrounds’). Finally, whereas the bodies of 
technocultural and sociotechnical theories sketched out earlier all emphasize 
the agency of technologies and other non-human objects, the soft ware worlds 
of computer games have a particularly active mode of being. Th ey are dynamic, 
semi-autonomous environments that change over time, and are populated with 
soft ware robots and artifi cial intelligences. Th e ecology of these virtual worlds 
will be discussed in  Chapter 5 , but it is worth mentioning it now as it highlights 
the conceptual and methodological challenges of describing the virtual–actual 
worlds of contemporary life. As Jussi Parikka asks, 
 What defi nes soft ware but its capacities, its aff ects, its relationality? Soft ware 
is not immaterial but a body of code being executed, existing through that 
temporal unfolding in technological and other milieus that support (or aff ord) 
its existence. How diff erent would soft ware appear if we approached it as an 
ecological object that is capable of entering into specifi c relations (that are not 
only technical) and whose capacities for aff ect are due to certain internal and 
external milieus? ( Parikka 2010 , 165–166) 
 Any qualitative research method, of course, has its strengths and limitations; 
a very small scale and improvized microethology, such as the one presented 
earlier, can make only heavily qualifi ed claims to identify broad cultural trends 
or patterns of media consumption and play. However, it is important to note that 
whilst studies with much larger samples and extended longitudinal reach might 
give a statistical sense of scale, access, distribution, discourse and attitude, they 
are unlikely to be able to say much about emergent phenomena, practices and 
behaviours. By necessity, any study of the detail and texture of any specifi c cultural 
or media practice as experienced by individuals or small groups is small scale. 
Also, any identifi able deviation from and innovation in established practices of 
media consumption are signifi cant, but may initially be evident only at the local 
level of actual engagement. At the very least, a microethological approach can 
identify emergent behaviours that can then be looked for, and tested, in larger-
scale research. I am concerned throughout with the intimate and the complex, 
not with the general or the scientifi c, but I hope that these descriptions are rich 
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enough to off er models or patterns of relationships and behaviours that can be 
applied or compared with other children, other assemblages. 
 My reading of others’ research on children’s games and play, pre- and post-
digital, is presumptuous in its identifi cation and selection of descriptive material 
that most closely fi ts my own approach – the details, chance encounters and 
phantasmagorical moments, but not necessarily the conceptual or cultural-
political framing of the writings from which they are plundered. Th ough perhaps 
modest in its fi ndings, an ethological approach off ers a nuanced theorization 
of the relationships between the virtual and the actual, the technological and 
the social, and media images and imaginations in everyday play. Children’s play, 
a domestic environment, and a computer game are reciprocally transformed, 
the everyday lives of children and adults are permeated (as we’ll see in the next 
chapter) by colourless energy, by entities that are hybrids of computer code and 
symbolic fi gures and by hyper-real gravity. It is no accident that I have quoted 
the more exploratory, descriptive passages from these case studies as, I would 
argue, they demonstrate the necessity of description in teasing out and attending 
to the new and hybrid as well as the established and the familiar. 
 Notes
 1  See  Giddings 2006 for a brief sketch of their workings in relation to videogame 
culture. 
 2  Th ere are other rich methodological and conceptual approaches to the embodied 
relationships between computer technology and people within Human-Computer 
Interaction (HCI), for instance. See Paul Dourish’s study of embodied interaction 
and technomethodology ( Dourish 2004 ), Lucy Suchman’s anthropology of human–
machine interactions ( Suchman 2007 ) and Mark Hansen’s phenomenological 
exploration of virtuality ( Hansen 2006 ). 
 3  I have also conducted more organized and experimental video-ethological studies 
of gameplay, usually in collusion with members of the Play Research Group, and 
Helen W. Kennedy in particular ( Giddings and Kennedy 2008 ,  2010 ). 
 I use the term ‘worldly’ to indicate the of-the-world and participatory nature 
of contemporary children [ … Th is is] the childhood refl ected in the complex 
problem-solving, intertextuality and non-linear pathways of the  Rugrats 
computer game. Th ese texts, and others like them, situate contemporary 
children in global fl ows of consumption, identity and information in ways 
unheard of in earlier generations and contribute to the construction of new 
discourses around childhood. Where once children grew into literate habitus 
within a relatively confi ned, predictable and supervised fi eld of information 
and discourses, this is no longer the case. ( Carrington 2005 , 22) 
 Video games and other popular virtual media emerge from and intersect with 
the established forms and channels of children’s culture in a complicated media 
ecosystem. Th ey are in themselves popular entertainment media: animated 
characters and environments in vivid colours, sounds and music, played out 
on TV screens and monitors. Th e video game is a commercial media object, a 
commodity oft en fully part of a wider media symbolic universe – a game version 
of a fi lm or television programme or even a book. It might emerge itself from 
the cross-media commercial strategy of contemporary transmedia systems 
such as  Pokémon and Lego. Even video games with their own self-contained 
fi ctional world (the  Animal Crossing or  Grand Th eft  Auto series, for example) 
are fully part of the everyday media ecology, drawing semiotic nutrients from it, 
competing for the sunlight of players’ attention with other games, media objects 
and devices, sending shoots out through the Internet media of walk-through 
and cheats sites and fl owering other forms and moments of play. 
 Th ey are also, of course,  games , bringing the ludic structures and long 
histories of board, card and playground games to electronic and digital 
 4
 Media Worlds 
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media, challenging the dominance of narrative as a fundamental organizing 
principle or form whilst also eff ecting a confl uence with other streams of 
children’s media culture such as game shows, quizzes, competitions. Games in 
themselves, whether digital or not, are a medium. Marshall McLuhan devotes 
a chapter to them in  Understanding Media: Th e Extensions of Man . Th inking 
mainly of sporting events, he regards games as utopian performances, enacting 
a microcosmic model of a national cultural identity, but entwined with and 
transformed by television ( McLuhan 1964 , 254–266). Video game consoles, 
particularly handheld devices, might be shelved with other toys in the shops, 
and some virtual media objects, such as Tamagotchi, are a hybrid of toy and 
computational media. 
 Th e encroachment of popular media (oft en commercial) from comics 
to radio, cinema to television, in children’s culture, their hold on children’s 
attention, their structuring of daily lives and the messages they may channel 
have all contributed to a widespread sense of an incremental transformation of 
childhood. Th e precise nature of these perceived changes varies tremendously, 
but they tend to assume the worst. Th e dating or periodization of these changes 
is similarly varied yet oft en coincides with any particular commentator’s own 
life history – that is the most serious decline is perceived to have occurred 
since that individual’s own childhood. For generations now it appears that 
children have played traditional games with friends outdoors, then grown 
up to a world in which  their children seem to be fi xed indoors, in thrall to 
electronic media, solitary and inactive. Writing in the late 1970s, Iona Opie 
noted several generations of adults observing her research on playgrounds and 
remarking that games were more structured and sophisticated when  they were 
children (Opie 1983). Th is is not to argue that there have been no changes to 
children’s culture and everyday lives – and I will briefl y set out some of these 
changes below – it is instead again a call for a closer attention to what children 
are doing with their media and with their play, and a call for a trust in play 
itself in the face of, and as a mode of living with, change. Another deep source 
of anxiety concerns the representational operations of children’s media, the 
messages that have been sent from the  Penny Dreadful and the  fi rst-person 
shooter. In  Chapter 2 , I questioned the dominant critical assumptions that the 
signifi cance of media lies in their representational and ideological operations, 
so this chapter will address the question of what, if anything, games as media 
might communicate. 
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 Predictions and diagnoses of decline or catastrophe today are bound up 
in the new characteristics and operations of digital and communications 
technologies and networks, as well as the commercial targeting of children as 
consumers. Th e immersive virtual gameworlds, social media networks and 
commercial franchised transmedia systems of the past ten or twenty years all 
work on childhood, imagination, media infl uence and nature itself. Th ere are 
smaller, but still signifi cant, questions to be asked about the nature of children’s 
media when narrative forms are displaced or augmented with ludic forms. 
Th rough ethnographic and ethological case studies, this chapter will track some 
of the ways in which media worlds, rather than being necessarily bounded, self-
contained playgrounds for (or shackles on) imagination, are oft en used instead 
as material for extensions of games and play, generally referred to as meta-games. 
 Finally, an understanding of digital popular media must describe and theorize 
the collusion of computer technology and children’s media (and this issue will be 
explored further in the next chapter). 
 Media histories of decline
 Historical studies of play present a more complicated picture of the 
mediatization of children’s oral and game cultures than the narratives of 
homogenization and extinction. Howard P. Chudacoff ’s useful history of 
children’s play in the United States echoes the common view that there was 
a golden age of play in the fi rst half of the twentieth century – a historical 
moment begun with the removal of children from the workforce and the 
expansion of compulsory education and ending with the advent of television 
and its ‘appropriation of children’s culture’ in the mid 1950s. Yet he also traces 
adult intervention in play, and attempts to control play, back to the mid-
nineteenth century. Here, then, is a much longer trajectory of directing play 
into the worthy channels of education and learning, moving it into purpose-
built playgrounds and parks and away from the dangers of rivers, waste 
grounds and woodland. Th e intense urbanization saw the concentration of 
children in cities, adding to this shift  in the environments of play: 
 Play environments shift ed as the urban-built environment off ered new sites and 
material. Nature still gave youngsters sites for ‘roaming,’ and domestic spaces 
still could be appropriated for games and fantasies. But now, paved streets, better 
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lighting, telephone poles, fi re hydrants, and fences increased hazards but also 
provided opportunities for playful inventiveness. ( Chudacoff  2011 , 105) 
 Alongside, this period saw the rise of children’s consumer culture for middle-
class children, shift ing play into the home with a new commercial toy industry 
( Chudacoff  2011 , 105). Many of these toys and games facilitated solitary as 
well as social play. Th e ‘sheltered-child model’ has a longer history than the last 
couple of decades of ‘stranger danger’ and domestic children’s digital culture. 
 Whilst the move to domestic or structured playspaces and the increasing 
commercialization of play have a longer history than is oft en recognized, 
there are clearly subsequent moments at which play and children’s culture 
underwent signifi cant transformation. Television from the mid 1950s not 
only off ered children a media alternative to board and card games or books, 
but its commercial imperatives (in the United States at least) also drove an 
intensive targeting of children as the consumers of toys and merchandizing. 
Indeed, from  Th e Mickey Mouse Club in the 1950s to the new economic models 
of ‘limited’ animation and toy tie-ins of the 1980s ( Kline 1993 ), children’s 
play culture was increasingly intertwined with media and consumer culture. 
Th e Disney Corporation was at the heart of confl icting attitudes to children’s 
media culture in the twentieth century. Th e integrated marketing of characters 
and environments across fi lms and other media, licensed products and 
merchandizing and theme park rides and displays prefi gured the transmedia 
universes of contemporary commercial children’s culture ( Forgacs 1992 ). Th e 
imagineering (to use Disney’s own phrase) of physical and semiotic worlds for 
some critics was so sophisticated and all-encompassing in their manipulation of 
pleasure that it marked a total commodifi cation of not only play but children’s 
imaginative and fantasy lives: 
 we are faced with a growing commercial sphere that profoundly limits the 
vocabulary and imagery available to youth and others [ … ] What we do not 
need is a global culture industry in which Disney imagineers and executives 
turn children’s desires and dreams into fodder for advertisers and corporate-
controlled media. ( Giroux and Pollock 2010 , 15) 
 As a critique of the expansive cultural economic reach of corporations like 
Disney this is laudable, but the claims that ‘our most intimate perceptions and 
desires’ are being conditioned ( Giroux and Pollock 2010 , 2) are founded on 
sweeping assumptions about the nature of children’s everyday engagement with 
media. Th us, children are increasingly 
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 left  on their own to navigate the virtual and visual worlds created by U.S. media 
corporations. Even if many of these kids do not end up developing obesity, 
attention defi cit disorder, anxiety, and depression, to name just a few long-term 
eff ects of media consumption, they still lack the adequate nurturing, guidance, 
and support they need to feel secure and happy entering their adult lives. ( Giroux 
and Pollock 2010 , xvi) 
 Kieran, aged three years and seven months, loved to wear his grandmother’s 
high heel shoes as he watched  101 Dalmatians . Th e shoes were always kept next 
to the television. His mother stated, 
 He re-enacts it. Th at’s why we’ve got my mum’s shoes over there. [To child] 
Cruella Deville, aren’t you? You’re Cruella Deville, aren’t you? [To interviewer] 
And he re-enacts everything that he watches in  101 and  102 all the time … and 
then we’ll re-enact it but we’ll re-enact it for about two weeks. Honestly, if he’s 
really found it funny or something he can talk and talk and talk and talk. And he 
talks about the same thing over and over again. ( Marsh 2005 , 41) 
 And yet, studies of children’s play with media resources, including Disney, such 
as this indicate that children rarely, if ever, fully inhabit and act out a prescribed 
media world, whether that be a book, fi lm or TV programme. Th e passage of 
media images, narratives, worlds and action however well coordinated and 
systematized can never be simply adapted or translated from their particular 
‘platform’ to their performance in play. Th ey are transformed in the negotiations 
of collective play, or in performances and repetitions such as those of Kieran in 
the earlier example. Th e simple fact of transduction from one kind of gameworld 
(a Disney fi lm or transmedia storyworld) to another (a group of children in a 
specifi c environment) necessitates a more or less surreal actualization. As Gilles 
Brougère notes in a discussion of the circuits through the mediated and lived 
worlds of  Power Rangers , 
 even when the children try their hardest to match their own play behaviour 
to that modeled for them by television [ … ] they are forced by their need for 
cooperation to make all kinds of compromises, such as bargaining for who takes 
the negative roles, deciding how they can adapt their unique ‘power’ feelings to 
the scenario, devising costumes, weapons, gestures, and sequences. What they 
reproduce is a playful theatric adaptation. Th ere is no tabula rasa. Th e point is, 
no matter what the cultural stimuli might be (toys or television shows), they 
have to be mediated by children’s fantasy in order to be accepted, and adjusted 
to their play norms and social competence in order to be assimilated into the 
active theatric play forms of childhood. (Brougère, in  Sutton-Smith 1997 , 154) 
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 At the very least the constraints and aff ordances of the physical environment 
(available toys, space, play equipment, weather, interruptions of other children, 
adults, the temporal boundaries of school playtime, children’s bodies and their 
capabilities – see  Chapter 6 , ‘Playgrounds’) and of the imaginative environment 
(compliance of fellow players, depth of understanding or memory of the 
storyworld) mix up, distort, transduce the characters, narrative, magic powers, 
technologies and so on into a dream-like version. Shanly Dixon and Sandra 
Weber’s account of a group of six-year-old boys and girls playing a game of ‘Snow 
White’ illustrates this. To capture the construction of this collective gameworld, 
and its fl ow of embodied and symbolic behaviour through and beyond the 
narrative template provided by Disney, I’ll quote it at length. Th e game began 
with a cry of ‘let’s play Snow White’ and intense arguments over who would be 
Snow White herself: 
 One girl has dark hair and soon convinces people she should have the role 
because she looks like Snow White, although another girl claims that the fact 
she has a Snow White lunch box gives her an edge. An older boy suddenly 
announces that he wants to be the wicked Queen because he has a cape he could 
use as a costume. No one seems to want to be the prince. Th e children begin 
enacting the story, stopping and restarting, giving each other directions [ … ] 
and improvising many touches that bear little resemblance to the movie. Th e 
game stops and then starts up again as one child tickles another, or someone 
calls attention to the mushrooms growing on the damp ground. Hilarity breaks 
out when one boy decides he is a deer who discovers Snow White asleep in the 
woods and tries to wake her by licking her [ … ] Snow White is called home by 
her mother – and another girl suggests her Barbie doll could take the part of 
Snow White. She proceeds to use her Barbie as a puppet, acting as ventriloquist 
for ‘Snow White Barbie’. Another child goes along with this, but two others just 
sort of parallel play a diff erent version of Snow White. Th e play keeps falling 
apart (to my adult observer eyes at any rate) changing directions, as a couple of 
boys engage in rough and tumble play, one child bursts into tears saying ‘I don’t 
WANT to be Dopey’, and so forth. And then the dwarfs start singing a popular 
song, ‘I’m too sexy for my shirt’ and dancing around, while two girls decide 
the piece of cardboard they were using as the Mirror Mirror on the Wall is not 
very good, and announce they are going to make a ‘real one’. (Constructed from 
Weber’s fi eldnotes, August 1992). ( Dixon and Weber 2011 , 483–484) 
 Dixon and Weber suggest that far from being programmed by the Disney 
Corporation, this imaginative play realized (surrealized perhaps) a ‘cumulative 
popular cultural text’, not a slavish reconstruction of the fi lm, but ‘an evolving 
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script’ that swept up and fi ltered memories and materials from toys, lunch boxes, 
non-Disney storybook versions and so on. 
 Th rough the children’s active play, negotiations, and improvisations, the text 
was adapted, ignored, disrupted, and reconstructed. Th ere was a fl uidity to the 
play despite a series of abrupt halts and changes of directions as the children 
moved in and out of the various roles that they had assumed. ( Dixon and 
Weber 2011 , 484) 
 Th e Snow White game was observed in 1992, however, and the subsequent 
twenty years or so have seen further transformation of children’s media culture. 
Disney’s cross-media stories and characters could now be seen to prefi gure the 
convergence or dissolution of discrete media forms into the synthetic worlds of 
video games and the global information networks of Internet media. Over the 
decades since their arrival in living rooms, video games have not only drawn 
on media franchises and genres, and fed back into them, but also spawned 
new hybrids of games and programmes, merchandise, toys, websites and 
‘advergaming’. Th is hybridity is hypercharged by digitization and the networked 
distribution of all popular media along with the emergent participatory and 
fl edgeling co-creative practices of the web to form new media ecologies in which 
images and narratives are functions of the ludic mechanics of navigation and 
accumulation. Films, TV and toys have become subsumed into the ludic forms 
of games, social media and networks, from the carefully moderated virtual 
worlds of HabboHotel and Disney’s Club Penguin to services such as Facebook 
(offi  cially populated by an older age group, but which attract young children 
too): networks that are characterized by an aggressively commercial motive. 
 Neopets , for instance, is an online world, a vivarium of ‘virtual pets’, but one 
dominated by what the company calls ‘immersive advertising’, 
 defi ned more specifi cally as ‘creative programs that integrate the advertisers’ 
commercial products, services, brands and names into existing or customized 
activities and scenarios within the site, thereby making the product an important 
part of the activity or game’. ( Wasko 2010 , 118) 
 Th e site is a mix of product placement and advergames as well as banner ads and 
commercial sequences. Janet Wasko’s analysis of the site echoes earlier critiques 
of the  Pokémon universe of acquisition as a kindergarten for consumption (see 
 Lister et al. 2009 , 292–294): 
 Th e Neopets site is not just about adopting and caring for a pet – it can easily 
be interpreted as a training ground for capitalist consumer culture. While other 
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values or ideas are represented on the site, themes related to materialism and 
consumption are particularly overt. Neopia is organized as a capitalist society, 
as is apparent, for example, in its bank and stock market, as well as the game 
‘Plushie Tycoon’ where one can become a successful manufacturing tycoon. 
Th ere are lots of shops [ … ] players are encouraged to acquire (buy) items and 
sell them for Neopoints [ … ] A recent addition is the NeoCash Mall where items 
are available for ‘real world’ money. Customized clothes and decorations can 
also be purchased through Neocash cards, which can be purchased through 
PayPal or at participating stores. ( Wasko 2010 , 119–120) 
 Privatized gameworlds like  Neopets ‘naturalize the commercial process that is at 
the core of advanced capitalism’ ( Wasko 2010 , 127). 
 However, these critiques of entertainment supersystems and transmedia 
franchises read off  their eff ects and uses – the everyday cultures, it is assumed, 
they generate – from the imagery, investment and intentions of the corporations 
that produce them. Th ere is a grudging acceptance that the world of Disney has 
its pleasures, but this pleasure is utterly passive and no genuine play – semiotic 
or material – is possible. Janet Wasko asserts that Disney texts in particular are 
closed off  to play and imagination: 
 there is little room for active or alternative readings of texts, like Disney’s, which 
are carefully coded and controlled, and not polysemic and open. (Wasko, in 
 Giroux and Pollock 2010 , 11) 
 On one important level these worlds function as designed – they are successful 
because they capture children’s imagination and instigate a circuit of attention 
and a fl ow of money from advertisers and in-world purchases. Yet these critics 
off er no evidence for their claims of semiotic and playful closure, or for the 
notion that children’s imaginations are colonized or rewired by the ruthless logic 
of consumer capitalism. On the contrary, empirical and ethnographic research 
on everyday transmedia cultures suggests a more vibrant, participatory and 
creative engagement with media play. 
 Again  Pokémon is key here. A Japanese media world designed as transmedia 
system from the start, it revolved around the Nintendo GameBoy video games 
and collectable playing cards, and this dynamic of collecting both actual cards 
and virtual creatures (‘gotta catch ‘em all’) assumed its young players would 
read, watch, collect and play across comics, toys, television, cinema and 
merchandizing. Signifi cantly, game mechanics are central and generative to 
the transmedia system rather than being mere merchandizing spin-off s from 
the narrative media of television and cinema. Indeed, as Julian Seft on-Green 
75Media Worlds
observed in his son’s obsession with  Pokémon , enthusiasts needed to embrace 
transmediality to fully engage with, or even to progress through the games. 
Cheats and hints must be sift ed from magazines or online forums and walk-
throughs, or elicited from other players ( Seft on-Green 2004 ). Connecting 
GameBoys with a cable allows the trade of rare and desirable monsters. As a 
media storyworld, engagement with a  Pokémon game is just as ‘imaginative’ as 
other storyworlds, but it also investigative: a process of research, learning, trial 
and error, puzzle solving and deduction. Th ey are built for and anticipate player/
consumer activity, and are only fully realized within it. Th is activity includes not 
only purchasing the elements, but collecting them – which entails swapping with 
friends, developing specialist knowledge of rare items, of shops that may have 
new stock, and for the afi cianado, specialist events and forums: 
 new convergent media such as  Pokémon require a reconfi gured conceptual 
apparatus that takes productive and creative activity at the ‘consumer’ level as a 
given rather than as an addendum or an exception. ( Ito 2011 , 494) 
 As Mizuko Ito concludes from her ethnographic research on Japanese children 
and transmedia systems (she prefers the Japanese vernacular term ‘media mix’), 
along with convergence, these new cultures are characterized by 
 authoring through  personalization and remix , and  hypersociality as a genre 
of social participation [defining] a new media ecology keyed to a more 
activist mobilization of the imagination in the everyday life of young people. 
( Ito 2011 , 492) 
 Whilst the thousands of available cards, and the manipulation of rarity (tried 
and tested strategy from the era of collectable cards in bubblegum and boxes of 
tea in the mid twentieth century), are conducive to sustained consumption in 
particular (and perhaps a general orientation towards the accumulative pleasure 
of consumer capitalism more broadly), this array of characters and monsters 
also support players as: 
 a massive collectively shared imagination as source material for producing local 
identities and performances. Th e practices of talking about and exchanging 
cards are an example of hypersociality as a genre of participation: the merging 
of local social negotiations with the exchange of media-based knowledge and 
signifi ers. ( Ito 2011 , 500) 
 Video games and other playful digital media, then, mark a signifi cant 
transformation of children’s culture at the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century. 
Causal relationships between these new media and perceived new patterns of 
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consumer-driven, solitary, even morbid, play are not so easily established. Th e 
video game’s arrival in living rooms (at the end of the 1970s) coincided with an 
increased awareness of, or perception of, dangers of child abduction and abuse, a 
continued rise of traffi  c levels that rules out street play in large parts of the urban 
centres, a tendency in middle-class families in particular to structure children’s 
lives around developmental activities (music lessons, organized sport, etc.) for 
social status or to improve educational and career prospects. Parental attitudes 
to digital technology are oft en deeply ambivalent: computers are seen as essential 
for education, yet at best these educational aims are constantly diverted by the 
pleasures of gameplay, whilst at worst they threaten to inculcate isolation, screen 
fi xation and to allow in new predatory threats from cyberspace. Computer 
games and interactive toys exacerbate concerns that arose with broadcast media 
that children’s imaginations wouldn’t be given free rein but would be channelled 
by, or simply fi lled by, the spectacular images and dramas. Th e generic character 
of pre-electronic toys (dolls, cars, rattles, building blocks), it is oft en asserted, 
helped small children to be the ‘creators and controllers of their play’, whereas 
these ‘individualized and open-ended opportunities for play are greatly 
hampered by programmed responses and scripts’, limiting not only play, but also 
‘the child’s imagination and development’ (Levin and Rosenquist 2001, quoted 
by  Plowman 2007 , 210–211). 
 From gameworlds to playworlds: Material for other play
 As we have seen, critical work on children’s media culture is generally 
concerned with the representational operations of programmes, cartoons, 
toys, and fi lms and the messages conveyed to impressionable minds. Specifi c 
questions of identity (Disney princesses and gender for example) may be 
addressed, or broader concerns about the induction of children into the adult 
worlds of consumer capitalism. Th ese representational processes persist, or are 
accentuated, it is assumed, in the new structures of interactive games and toys. 
However, the ways in which these ‘messages’ are actually lived and played are 
oft en assumed and not examined. Put simply, how can we know what meanings 
children make of their media? Or even if ‘meaning’ is the most relevant mode 
of engagement with media in this context? Children  play with their media – 
TV programmes and fi lms as well as board games, videogames and toys. Play 
is rarely a process of unimpeded fl ow of ‘preferred’ meanings; it synthesizes 
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and condenses, it upturns the world as well as mirroring it. Secondly, video 
game culture brings the technological nature of media to our attention. Th e 
materiality and specifi city of computer/entertainment hardware and soft ware is 
a key concern of this book and must be central to any assessment or description 
of the processes of signifi cation and use. Again the medium is the message/
massage: whatever the symbolic or ideological content of children’s media, 
the modes of interaction, play, the arrangement of bodies as well as images, of 
performance as well as narrative are at least as important. Children  use digital 
media – and vice versa. 
 I’ll give further two examples of play events that are formed in large part 
by popular media and that, along with a playful manipulation of their visual 
and thematic material (like Snow White above), are characterized by a 
transduction of physical behaviour: the embodied and kinaesthetic pleasures 
of singing, dancing, drawing and role-playing. Firstly, through the historically 
well-established patterns of girls’ singing and dancing games, and, secondly, 
through the contemporary transmedia system of  Pokémon through which 
playful semiotic and material engagement in gameworlds including the virtual 
is assumed and scaff olded. 
 Singing games and the media
 Singing, skipping and clapping games are among the most thoroughly 
researched and documented aspects of children’s play. Studied by folklorists and 
musicologists, and more recently by researchers on media and education ( Opie 
and Opie 1985 ,  Marsh 2008 ,  Willett 2011 ,  Willett et al. 2013 ), their transmission 
across time (some songs can be traced back over a century) and space (by 
individual playground, city, region and internationally) can be followed, and their 
shift ing form and language analyzed in detail. As a living oral (and behavioural/
gestural) culture, they contain archaic rhythms and references and accrete new 
material as they are taught and performed. Current pop songs, dance moves and 
jokes are woven into persistent traces of older songs from music hall, cinema and 
radio, nursery rhymes and fairy tales, as this Hollywood-inspired song recorded 
by Iona Opie in various versions across the 1950s indicates: 
 I’m Shirley Temple, the girl with curly hair
 I’ve got two dimples and my skirts up there
 I’m not able to do the Betty Grable
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 I’m Shirly Temple, the girl with curly hair.
 I’ve got a leg like nobody’s business
 I’ve got a fi gure like Marilyn Monroe
 I’ve got hair like Ginger Rogers
 And a face like I don’t know
 Oh Salome, Salome
 You should see Salome
 Hands up there, skirts up there
 You should see Salome
 Swing it, swing it
 You should see her swing it
 Hands up there, skirts up there
 You should see her swing it
 Th e Opies recorded numerous other references to Shirley Temple in such songs, 
dating back to the 1920s. In some the star was interchangeable with Charlie 
Chaplin as their names provided the same rhythm of syllables. Like other 
forms of play (and dreams), singing and skipping games sometimes play on the 
boundaries of taboo material, particularly violence and sex. Opie notes that this 
iteration of Shirley Temple was seen as ‘a bit naughty’. 
 Outside the circle the boys take up vantage points, clambering on to 
windowsills or hanging on drainpipes like monkeys. ‘It’s because when we lift  
our skirts up the boys can see our knickers’, explained a nine-year-old. (Opie 
and Opie 1985, 419) 
 In a recent study of a London primary school’s playtime culture, Rebekah Willet 
watched the performances and play of a group of girls aged between fi ve and 
seven years. Th is included performances of the song ‘Breaking Free’ from  High 
School Musical with the girls ‘ “fl ying” around the playground in a “follow the 
leader” formation (repeating the lyrics “We’re soaring, fl ying” ’), whilst others 
lined up their My Little Pet Shop toys on an improvized stage and, hiding, 
pretended that the toys themselves are singing and performing. Th e girls took 
their performance of JLS’s ‘Everybody in Love’ and ‘embedded [it] in a game of 
kiss-chase. According to the girls, they were singing this “love song” (or more 
accurately, singing the line “if you’re in love, put your hands up”) in order to 
taunt the boys in their kiss-chase game’ ( Willett 2011 , 347). 
 In one sense, media images, songs, gestures, repertoires and themes become 
just more material to be stitched into play, and their performance seems to have 
little to do with identifi cation as a character or as a consumer. Rather, these 
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media resources have more to do with their rhythmic potential as the framing 
of skipping or dance sequences. As Willett notes, the girls select catchy chorus 
lines that are easy to learn and that ‘combine a variety of actions and modes of 
engagement’ ( Willett 2011 , 349). 
 Th ese children are ‘meme engineers … active agents in the process of cultural 
change as they select, reject, adapt, modify – in short “engineer” – their musical 
narratives’. (Barrett 2003, cited in  Willett 2011 , 342) 
 Th ey are also material for the ritual and collusional processes of initiating, 
sustaining and renewing social groups and friendships through play – in the 
metroptic sense of communication set out earlier. Dances and lyrics can be 
taught to new friends in processes of enculturation, signalling the group’s 
identity to the rest of the playground: 
 it is not only a visual display of their friendship (doing things together), the 
playground can hear the sign (particularly as they sing the songs in a high nasal 
tone), and it is a sign that they share the same interests and resources. ( Willett 
2011 , 350) 
 Transmedia systems: Drawing Pokémon
 As a transmedia system,  Pokémon is designed to open up numerous and varied 
platforms for play with its characters and world. Our house was for years a 
monument to its success in this regard. Bedroom walls were covered with posters 
detailing and categorizing the hundreds of creatures, each name known by heart. 
Every birthday and Christmas brought a fresh deluge of plastic and cuddly toys, 
T shirts, books, games and trading cards – endless piles of cards to be stacked, 
sorted, fi led, forgotten and refound. Th e detritus settled in corners and drawers, 
kicked around and un-noticed, until the demands of a game picked an object 
up and slotted it back into play. Th e boys talked about and enacted energies, 
evolutions and powers constantly, their parents learning enough about this 
artifi cial ecosphere to answer basic questions, particularly the frequent ‘What’s 
your favourite Pokémon?’ 
 Alex drew Pokémon and Pokémon-like creatures incessantly. Th e attraction 
of drawing for young children is not the completion and display of accomplished 
pictures. It is a process of imaginative play in itself, an unfolding of imagined 
creatures and action into the material world, stories, combat or characteristics 
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are distributed across the mind and the paper, oft en akin to a form of animation 
rather than a freeze-frame or map. Th e duration of the drawing is itself the game. 
Watching her son Douglas drawing vibrant battle scenes, Sylvia Feinburg’s noted 
that in this dramatic play 
 Specifi c subject matter was less a common denominator than the general 
orientation and disposition of the activity, i.e. the process, the purposes it seemed 
to serve, the inclusion of such elements as confrontation, danger, motion, power, 
and co-operative eff ort. ( Feinburg 1976 , 589) 
 Th e environment – land, sea, architectural complexes – would be set out, 
then the men and equipment and then ‘the encounter would begin’. Th e child 
would 
 enter the combat as a highly active participant, moving his body ferociously to 
simulate the destruction that might be imposed upon a single human being or 
piece of equipment, pounding with his fi sts ferociously … sometimes two or 
more crayons in each hand simultaneously … rocking and rolling, and emitting 
diverse, relevant accompanying sounds. ( Feinburg 1976 , 589–590) 
 Alex is drawing quietly, with rapt attention and precise marks. He holds pens 
and crayons very close to the tip so that fi ngers, mark-making point and paper 
all touch. I try to prompt him: ‘what are you drawing?’ 
 A:  A Pokémon 
 S:  What kind of Pokémon is that? 
 A:  Just a Pokémon. 
 Either he is so engrossed in the creation of the creature that he is simply defl ecting 
my question, or there is a creation happening here that is not to do with the 
specifi city of the media text and characters. I suspect the latter.  Pokémon is so 
integral to the ecology of the boys’ material and imaginary lives at this point 
that ‘Pokémon’ could simply function as the rationale for beginning to draw, a 
spell to invoke the gameworld into existence on the paper. Th e imaginary world, 
if that’s not putting it too strongly at this point, is vocalized through a loose 
repertoire of sing-song words and phrases. 
 A (quietly):  Who’s going to win the world? World champion … Whoa, it’s metal 
things. 
 At this point the drawing mode shift s up a gear. Th e ‘metal things’ appear as Alex 
has picked up a silver wax crayon. He draws more quickly, a spiralling scribble 
over an area of already intense overlaid scribbles of diff erent colours. 
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 A:  Look at these metal things. One of them’s destroying … (he traces a silver line 
carefully along a fi gure drawn earlier across the top of the paper – something 
like a worm or spine). 
 A:  They’re giving their attack to another one (fierce scribbling now). You 
know what, this one just went  skrwerch ! and scribbled everything! Even its 
attacks! 
 A:  Da-da-da-da 
 The plastic arts are always a coming together of ideas and aesthetic 
conventions with the material possibilities of the media: marks, colour, 
pattern, shape and so on. Felt-tipped pens set out clean, definite lines and 
edges, whilst wax crayons allow – and hence suggest – overlaying meshes of 
scribbles. The moment and action of drawing and the marks on the paper 
 become the action itself: the actualization of the creatures’ magical attacks 
like ectoplasm in a Victorian séance photograph ( Figure 4.1 ). Scribbles are at 
one moment the representation of an attack (attacks depicted in the  Pokémon 
games and comics as graphic lines of power, force and affect), and with a 
 skrwerch , a crayon counter-attack – a meta-attack. 
 Figure 4.1 Drawing Pokémon 
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 He turns the paper over, and – calm again – with a black pen traces large letter-
like shapes. Capital W, M, a mirrored N. Th en a jagged little fi gure with a dot in 
each spike on its body. 
 A (concentrating on the paper, but addressing me now, albeit absent-mindedly):  Do 
you know what has two eyes? Th ese are just lines. 
 He is conjuring up a fi sh-like creature, a large body – segmented, with a dot 
carefully placed in each segment. 
 A (pointing at a line he has just drawn):  Th at is not its mouth – that’s a line. Look 
at that whale one. 
 [ … ] 
 A:  If you see very carefully … Daddy, do you think this is Colourless or Water? 
(these, I know, are types of Pokémon) 
 S:  Errr … Water? 
 A:  Colourless! 
 A:  Th is one has a bandage on its tail (he scribbles over the tail with his silver crayon). 
Th at’s the bandage! 
 A (talking to his drawing):  You should do attacks what I do, what I say you should 
do. Th at Pokémon, that’s what they’re allowed to do. Th ey can do it their-selves. 
 Th at night Alex read his picture to me in bed as a bedtime story. I didn’t video 
record this, and don’t recall the details, but readings of this sort were generally a 
series of events and moments of action and combat traced with his fi nger across 
the paper as if pointing to comic book frames. Th e drawing provided a couple of 
characters, but a much broader and more fully populated world would have been 
improvized in the moment. He then stuck the picture to the wall with blu-tack. 
Jo came in and I read them both a story from a  Pokémon annual – Jo correcting 
my pronunciation of the creatures’ names. 
 Th e next day: 
 A:  (pointing at an intensely scribbled part of his drawing) if you look very carefully 
you can see his eye – look! 
 J:  It’s an orange dot! 
 A:  Yeah. 
 Jo is drawing too, off  camera, but the microphone picks up his chatting and 
rummaging through the box of pens and crayons. Alex fl ips his paper over. 
 A:  (indistinct) … use the other side of the paper … I bet it’s another Pokémon what 
it evolves into. 
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 Th is ‘evolution’ is an important aspect of the game and attendant stories as 
each creature is located within a short chain of transformation that is, strictly 
speaking, closer to the metamorphosis of insects and amphibians than the 
evolution of a species. For instance, every Pikachu evolves from a Pichu and 
into a Raichu. 
 Th e two stages of the transformation are being pictured on either sides of 
the paper. Alex draws a bold zigzag line across the page, then a straight line 
lengthways along the middle of the zigzag pattern. 
 A:  Look, his teeth has got a line across it. 
 He fl ips the paper again and counts the angles in his zigzags. 
 A:  Th is one has four teeth, but this one (he fl ips the paper and points as he counts) 
has 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 teeth! 
 [there is more discussion of teeth and the number of teeth he and I have] 
 Jo is in shot now, drawing what looks to me like a ghost. A plastic Pikachu toy 
looks on, smiling enigmatically as Jo sings quietly to himself. 
 A (off  camera):  And this is what it evolves into. It has teeth. All Pokémon have teeth 
don’t they. 
 J:  Not all Pokémon. 
 A:  Pikachu can bite, can’t he! 
 J (pointing at his drawing):  Look at that! It’s a jellyfi sh Pokémon! 
 A:  Wow, that’s a cool one. 
 J:  It’s Tentacool. 
 A:  Tentacool! 
 J:  Remember Tentacool? 
 A:  Oh, yeah. 
 Th e talk for the next couple of minutes ranges over a number of  Pokémon -related 
concerns, returning periodically to Tentacool and the nature of tentacles. 
 A (referring to his drawing):  It has bigger eyes too, than what it evolves into. It looks 
like a Tyrannosaurus Rex. 
 A:  Yeah, but it has tentacles. On its head it has tentacles! 
 A: …  is that really what tentacles look like? 
 In this sequence, the drawing is not driven by the dramatic generation of 
particular Pokémon and their world, but rather by an intense exploration of 
physical attributes – teeth, then tentacles. Th e tentacles are closer mimetically to 
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the images of Pokémon in the boys’ games and comics, whereas the huge teeth 
seem to emerge from Alex’s own immediate concerns, as – though technically 
monsters – Pokémon tend to be cute in appearance and not particularly 
fearsome. Th e drawing, then, is perhaps a touching or tracing of the contours 
and features of these compelling creatures, a summoning. Like Douglas’ battles, 
bringing together ‘a visible, concrete reality with a symbolically constructed 
reality’ ( Feinburg 1976 , 591). 
 A little later the drawing begins to spin out into gestures beyond the page. 
Alex has drawn a fi sh-shaped creature. 
 A:  It’s a Powerfi sh! (not an actual Pokémon). Because it’s got a … (he swirls his 
pencil around the fi sh’s tail) … because its tail spins around! So it swims! 
 J:  Like this? (he fl aps his hand) Up and down? 
 J:  Or twirling around? (twirling his hand) 
 A:  Twirling around! 
 J:  Or up and down? 
 A:  Twirling around. 
 A (sings):  Twirling around, twirling around, twirling, twirling, twirling around. 
 Th e boys themselves are twirling now, the drawing is more intermittent, 
punctuated by gestures, actions and movement away from the table. Before long 
the table is abandoned and Alex bounces round the fl oor repeatedly demanding 
that we ‘Guess what Pokémon I am!’ 
 Jo is holding a small bird Pokémon toy up for the camera – Pidgey I think. 
 A:  Guess what Pokémon I am! 
 A:  I’m small … and spiky. (He bounces up to me on all fours). 
 J:  Primape! 
 Alex bounces off  again, fi sts held up in a simian gesture. 
 A:  Primape! Primape! (It is a feature of Pokémon that their vocalizations are only 
their own names or abbreviations of them. Pikachu says ‘Pika! Pika!’ for instance). 
 A:  Primape does do this, doesn’t he. 
 Jo joins in the jumping and Pokémon-guessing game. 
 J:  Try this one: what is small and has a fl ower on top? 
 A:  Don’t know. 
 J:  An Ivysaur. 
 A:  Oh, yeah. 
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 Jo jumps on Alex and pins him to the fl oor, Primape and Ivysaur jumbled up in 
the rough and tumble, dissolving into an occasional shout or gesture. At some 
point it becomes apparent that Primape has been replaced by Pikachu and that 
the botanical Ivysaur must have evolved into its next stage: Bulbasaur. 
 (Fidelity to the Pokémon universe is lost in this rough and tumble play – 
Bulbasaur evolves into Ivysaur.) 
 J:  Bulby! Bulby! 
 A:  Pika! Pika! 
 Th irty seconds later the camera is switched off  as the rough and tumble turns 
into an actual fi ght. 
 Play with  Pokémon games continued intensely for some years, with the 
GameBoy and Nintendo DS games returned to occasionally even when the 
boys were teenagers. A set of drawings produced by Alex at around the age 
of eight demonstrate an imaginative and processual engagement with the 
gameness of the  Pokémon world, as well as its personalities and plots. Th e 
creatures are depicted, and new ones invented, as, at the same time, dramatic 
characters and as game elements. Th ey are given the numerically valued 
attributes and abilities of the card and computer games. At times he created 
full sets of tiny cards, complete with a uniform abstract design for the obverse 
sides ( Figure 4.2 ). Th ere are echoes here of other spontaneous moments of 
meta-play, a playing with and framing of games and performances that 
appears to be fundamental to play (see  Chapter 7 , ‘Real Worlds’), but which 
is particularly evident in play with the existing frames, screens and micro-
worlds of contemporary media. 
 Activity and passivity
 Our contemporary understandings of media and the childhood imagination are 
framed by a set of cultural distinctions between an active/creative or a passive/
derivative mode of engaging with imagination and fantasy. ( Ito 2011 , 493) 
 Th ese distinctions between active and passive media are mapped across particular 
media forms and cultural practices, Mimi Ito notes. Drawing, performance, 
writing and so on are ‘productive’ and hence are considered ‘creative, agentive, 
and imaginative’, particularly when set against those that involve the passivity of 
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the consumption of commercial media, specifi cally visual media, such as video 
game playing or TV watching ( Ito 2011 , 493). 
 Th e notion that children are passive consumers of media is familiar and 
has been thoroughly countered within media studies (e.g.  Bazalgette and 
Buckingham 1995 ). However, there are three points worth making here that 
will be returned to throughout this book. Firstly, children’s consumption of 
media across the digital (websites, video games), electronic media (TV, radio) 
and print media (books, comics) all requires the same imaginative and 
cognitive engagement to engage with stories, action, puzzles, jokes and so 
on. Secondly, though, there are material and mechanical diff erences too 
between media, notably between screen media, such as television and fi lm, 
and interactive digital media, such as video games. As Espen Aarseth puts 
it, the ‘cybertext’ requires ‘non-trivial eff ort’ to open up its narratives and 
worlds ( Aarseth 1997 ). Th e player of an adventure game must solve puzzles, 
make choices, fi ght enemies within the media text, not just watch or read 
these things happening. Th at is, there is another level or order of audience 
activity required with interactive media. Th irdly, and at the risk of sounding 
 Figure 4.2 Meta-cards 
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contradictory, interactive media also eff ect a distinct mode of passivity in 
their audience. Th ough the player engages with game as a semiotic machine, 
interacting with its world and characters, he or she is also in signifi cant 
ways  acted upon by the machine or system. In the circuits of input/output 
and stimulus/response, it is far from clear that the player is the initiator and 
controller of the gameworld, he or she is positioned and confi gured by the 
game’s cybernetic and passional circuits ( Lister et al. 2009 , 398). 
 Th ese circuitous questions of control will be answered in more detail in 
 Chapter 5 (‘Soft  Worlds’). For now, I want to raise a question that is rarely asked 
in relation to media: what is wrong with passivity anyway? Many of the pleasures 
of media aesthetics and aesthesis (their eff ects on our bodies) are predicated on 
them acting on us. Th e rhythms, harmonies, forms, the play of expectations and 
revelations of visual art or music all play us as much as we play them. To be ‘lost’ 
in a fi lm or book requires imaginative engagement but it also involves a delicious 
surrender or subjection to its structure, imagery, plot and character. Games are 
a key form here. By no means is all play phantasmagorical, straightforwardly 
imaginative, creative or poeitic. ‘Activity’ in media consumption for media 
studies generally means a more or less refl exive challenging or subverting of 
dominant meanings, but to play a card, board or computer game is to subject 
oneself and one’s fellow players to the rules and the game as a system. Play with 
toys, cards, media can be repetitive, unchallenging, distracting, lazy. And oft en 
this can be deeply satisfying. For playful media such as comedy, getting the 
joke and laughing along is key – not reading against the grain or subverting it. 
And whilst game structures from board game rules to missions in  GTA can be 
undermined, stretched, subject to parody and ludicrous performance, playing 
a game by its rules – accepting more or less the intentions of the designers 
and producers – is oft en, perhaps more oft en, more pleasurable, satisfying and 
sociable. Some games off er latitude for intellectual eff ort (chess), or individual 
style and fl air, but others – for example, games of chance such as Snakes and 
Ladders – simply off er a system, a mechanic, a confi guration of the players’ 
movements and actions for its duration. 1  
 Whilst much of this book is a celebration of imaginative agency within 
the rules or worlds of play, it also recognizes and explores the aesthetics of 
control and the circuits of action and passion. In not questioning the binary 
of activity and passivity, we can overlook signifi cant cultural, cognitive and 




 we see how children co-opt a variety of ideas and images to inform or guide 
their play, culled from various sources such as personal experiences, books, 
television, songs, and movies. Children adapt these images to the playspace and 
opportunities available to them – in this case, adapting the traditional story of 
Snow White to accommodate the roles the players wanted to adopt and making 
use of the props at hand. ( Dixon and Weber 2011 , 484) 
 Video games, virtual media and transmedia systems all off er resources for 
imaginative play or expect and demand a creative engagement. Th ese ecologies 
and their ludic forms allow a revisiting of the histories of children’s media 
culture that highlights games over stories, and metamorphosis and transduction 
in the spontaneous worlds generated by play. Th ey also require a rethinking of 
the nature of play in the contemporary media environment. Th ey raise questions 
of materiality in the transduction of semiotic stuff  into drawings, gestures, 
dance, objects and toys, and questions about the materiality of technologies in 
particular. Whilst the interactive consumption of digital media highlights their 
technological and  machinic nature – in that they must be operated as much as 
watched or read – this does not represent an absolute distinction from pre-
digital media. Rather it suggests that we relook at TV, fi lms, books as media 
technologies that are also  used , for play, for pleasure, for emotional or attentional 
modulation. Th e bedtime story is one familiar example of the book that can 
be rethought as a technology (linear narrative, illustrations, page-turning), with 
its associated technics of reading aloud and parenting (emotional reassurance, 
ritual marking of the transition to sleep, etc.). Th e advanced technologies of 
recent media forms invite us to rethink the operations of pre-digital media 
technologies and the events that realize them. 
 Finally, I have questions about the immaterial, but real, aspects of play, media 
and technologies, from the operations of game soft ware to the operations of 
imagination. Th ese will be addressed in the chapters that follow . 
 Note
 1  Roger Caillois’ spectrum of play is pertinent here: rule-bound games sit at the  ludus 
pole, the spontaneous and improvized  paidia at the other. It is important to note that 
Caillois does not privilege one over the other ( Caillois 1962 ). 
 I like my screwdrivers like I like my hedgehogs: sonic (computer-generated joke). 1  
 Alex watching Jo play the last boss battle in  Lego Star Wars (21 May 2005): 
 A:  It’s not fair … the computer never falls off  does it? 
 J:  Of course not – it’s the computer. 
 A:  Th e computer knows where it’s going! 
 Video games and virtual media are fully part of a popular children’s media 
culture generated by commercial and public sector broadcasters and producers. 
Th ey have found a place within domestic ecologies of media use, both displacing 
and merging with entertainment and communication media from television 
to telephony through mobile devices and Internet channels. Th ey resonate 
with, and amplify, previously peripheral media modes and genres: from board 
games to game shows, from playground jokes and games to collecting and 
swapping cards and toys, from the topographies and quests of children’s books 
to reality television. Imaginative and pleasurable engagement with characters, 
environments, stories, powers and abilities, confl icts and quests fl ows between 
the everyday consumption of books, television, fi lms, children’s play and toys 
and video games. Th ese fl ows are now solicited in the transmedial circuits 
laid down by popular media and toy producers and commercial playful media 
universes are generated from them. 
 But they are also quite diff erent. Th is chapter will concentrate on another 
tangled line of descent, that of computer technology and media. Th e analysis 
of the video game as a computer‐based medium demands the description of 
a distinctly new set of domains and agents. Th e focus will be on the  computer 
in computer games, on the nature and behaviours of soft ware, on real-time 
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procedural operation, on simulation, interactivity and virtual environments. 
Games scholars have argued that video games are characterized by an ‘aesthetics 
of control’ ( Murray 1997 ,  Klevjer 2001 ). Evidently video games are ‘interactive’ 
media objects and as such their players exercise some level of agency in the 
on-screen events. However, the soft ware that constitutes video games needs 
its own animate operations to be acknowledged in the dynamics of gameplay. 
Children and adults play with non-player characters (NPCs), artifi cial 
intelligence (AI), virtual physics and architecture, rules – but these artifi cial 
entities and processes are at play too. Th ey respond but they also initiate – 
they have their own coded and autonomous behaviours. To understand the 
gameworlds of video game play, we need an ethology of artifi cial as well as 
human players. 
 Play with technology
 Th e history of children’s play with technology is inseparable from the emergence 
of a commercial children’s culture, discussed in the last chapter. In the 
nineteenth century, both everyday and exciting new machines were scaled down 
to fi t children’s hands: toy cars and guns, mechanical dolls and the domestic 
fi ttings and architecture of dolls houses. Educational toys and devices were 
popular, particularly those of scientifi c wonder and experimentation (optical 
toys such as zoetropes and kaleidoscopes) and engineering and construction. 
Some of these were intended for educational use, some purely for pleasure and 
entertainment, while others, like the home computers that would eventually 
follow, were used for both. Th e early twentieth century saw the fi rst fantastical 
and modern machines of spacecraft  and future weaponry – particularly for 
boys ( Chudacoff  2011 ). 
 Th is overlapping of the functional and the symbolic, the mundane and 
the fantastical, the entertaining and the educational continues with everyday 
computer technology today, not least, of course, in the sophisticated toys that are 
the video game console and soft ware. Younger children in particular are targeted 
by the manufacturers of computerized toys and devices, some like simple laptops 
aim to educate, others like the basic responsive robots Furby and Tamagotchi 
of the mid to late 1990s take more traditional toys and add mechanical life to 
that imbued by the child. Smart phones and tablets may also be given to small 
children, and there is a growing market for visual and tactile apps for a pre-
school market. 2  
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 Th e line between (hard) toy and (soft ) digital game/character is not a clear 
one. Th e nurturing of a Tamagotchi was an ambiguous activity – was the egg-
shaped object itself the toy creature, or did the creature live inside it, looking out 
from its screen? Th ere have been many video games since that used a similar 
game mechanic of attentive and repetitive feeding, and exercising, for instance, 
 Pokémon ,  Nintendogs and  Moshi Monsters . Interestingly, the human characters 
in  Th e Sims are as much creatures to be nurtured in this regard as the cats and 
dogs of  Th e Sims Pets expansion packs. 
 To date, a few particularly intense crazes notwithstanding, the virtual 
toys of video games have proved more successful than their actual, physical 
cousins. A Furby was sold on its responsive AI, its ability to learn from and 
communicate with its owner, yet it and other ‘smart’ toys like it were oft en 
played with as more traditional inanimate cuddly toys – switched off  and 
incorporated into free play ( Goldstein 2011 , 325). Th e semi-autonomous 
nature of NPCs in many games, and the bots (soft ware robots) of massively 
multiplayer online games (MMOs) such as  World of Warcraft  , 3  is oft en at least 
as sophisticated as that of smart toys. Unlike smart toys whose behaviours 
and intelligence must stand up in comparison to the physical and social 
worlds in which they are situated, soft ware characters oft en suggest a dynamic 
complexity beyond their oft en simple AI and repetitive algorithmic actions. 
As artifi cial agents in the artifi cial and ludic environments of a video game 
world, they are fully at home and set the terms of interaction, the rules of a 
game. 
 So, the functioning of video games is at once symbolic and technical. On the 
one hand, video games are toys, popular media, performative events, animated 
with characters and scenarios derived from established popular screen media. 
On the other, the analysis of video games as a computer-based medium demands 
the description of a special category of non-humans, soft ware entities and agents 
depicted as individual characters, as collectives, or as aspects of the virtual 
environment itself, but all acting with a certain degree of autonomy. For instance, 
to play a video game is to play with, or against, artifi cial intelligence in the form 
of non-player characters and responsive simulated environments. Th is is a huge 
topic, so this chapter will identify and explore a few aspects and bodies that are 
most constructive in the gameworlds model. Th ese include those that contribute 
to a game’s ‘worldness’, its sense of a dynamic and responsive environment 
however abstract in appearance. Th ese are components that constitute the 
 newness of these new media for children, entities and operations that bring to 
children’s play quite distinct experiences and demand quite diff erent embodied 
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and imaginative behaviour within play. So, whilst a computer gameworld may 
overlap with or nest within a literary or cinematic world (e.g.  Harry Potter ,  Th e 
Lord of the Rings ), it and its players are quite diff erent entities to the reader-
player of the books or fi lms. Th ey are constituted by cybernetic feedback loops, 
have automata and non-human intelligent agents as playmates, all within 
and through synthetic and responsive playgrounds. Th ey are part of what I 
will call ‘distributed imagination’. Th ough the notion of ‘world’ evokes spatial 
dimensions, the computer gameworld may have as its underlying motive the 
simulation and manipulation of  time , and of  physical forces (friction, collision, 
gravity) for playful ends. 
 Video games as symbolic soft ware systems have tremendous variety, from 
the abstractions of scale, space and objects in early arcade games such as  Space 
Invaders , through side-scrolling platform games, top-down ‘gods’-eye’ strategy 
and simulation, to fi rst-person shooters and massively multiplayer online 
games and back to abstraction with mobile games and puzzles. Th is chapter 
will necessarily be highly selective, referring back to the Lego Racers events, 
but with other examples that will draw out through comparison something of 
the variety and continuity of contemporary video games as cybernetic and self-
acting systems. 
 Rules and laws
 A fundamental formal diff erence between video games and most other 
popular children’s screen media is that between rules and narrative. Whilst 
many games are framed by a dramatic scenario and enacted by fi ctional 
characters, the salient activities and pleasures of gameplay are driven by the 
abstractions of ludic conventions and systems engineered to sustain the fl ow 
of play or to facilitate competition and chance, puzzles and technical skill. In 
this regard, video games are more closely related to Snakes and Ladders than 
Snow White. Th e computerization of games changes the players’ relationships 
to rules, however. Rules in board and card games, however strictly applied in 
the event of a game, can be negotiated, adapted and agreed before the game 
starts. Th ey must also be learnt and understood. Th e game apparatus allows a 
variety of rule sets: limited perhaps on the Snakes and Ladders board, but with 
a deck of playing cards, infi nite. Video games oft en allow a certain amount 
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of adjustment to settings, diffi  culty levels and so on but in general players 
cannot adjust the underlying rules signifi cantly. In fact it is oft en diffi  cult to 
identify the rules as such. Th is is in part because the soft ware itself monitors 
and adjusts key variables (it keeps the score, calculates strength and health 
levels and so on), and in part because the ‘rules’ are oft en inseparable from 
the world itself: where the character can go, what powers and abilities it has, 
relative strengths against enemies and so on. Even physical laws, for example, 
gravity, collision, friction – which are non-negotiable in the actual world – are 
coded into virtual worlds. Th is diff erence between the player’s understanding 
and experience of a gameworld and its structure and rules, equating the latter 
to the ‘laws’ of the world, is explored by Michael Nitsche. He explains that 
through the design of the code, the programmer authors the rule-based space. 
Players may ‘generate unique permutations’ but only within the possibilities 
allowed by the code. 
 Players of a video game do not look at the underlying code but at dynamically 
generated visual and tactile results based upon it. Th ey look at the mediated 
plane and see the performance of the code. Th e code itself stays hidden behind 
elaborate virtual worlds and interfaces, and the only time one might encounter 
it is when an error crashes the program and a debug message points to certain 
lines of broken code. Players do not have to understand the logic of the code but 
of the mediated game world. ( Nitsche 2008 , 25) 
 Well, this depends on what we mean by ‘understanding’. Th e player does not 
need to self-consciously read the code  as code, to dig down into the layers of 
abstract algorithms below the elaborate audio-visual interface. But the mediated 
gameworld, the interface itself, is driven by the logic of the code and the player 
must also be driven by it. Helen W. Kennedy and I have explained something 
of the diff erences between popular narrative screen media and the processual 
worlds of games: 
 watch someone who is unfamiliar with simulation games playing  Th e Sims 
for the fi rst time. Building houses and naming characters is straightforward 
enough, but as the characters go about their daily artifi cial lives the tendency is 
to treat them as if they were real people, or at least as fi ctional characters who 
behave according to established conventions of narrative, and try to intervene 
accordingly. However the game’s dynamics are driven by algorithms which rarely 
map directly onto any sense of actual (or fi ctional) human behaviour. (Giddings 
and Kennedy 2003, 160) 
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 Th e gameworld’s laws and behaviours, the actions it allow, refuse, and insist on 
are all coded. Th ey require that the player grasp and enact their demands and 
possibilities via the mediated world. As we saw with the Lego Racers, the game 
encodes the players. 
 Interactivity and avatars
 Importantly, the […] relationship between player and system/gameworld is not 
one of clear subject and object. Rather, the interface is a continuous interactive 
feedback loop, where the player must be seen as both implied and implicated in 
the construction and composition of the experience. ( Newman 2002 , 410) 
 Th e language of cybernetics in the study of children’s popular media 
raises questions again of agency, activity and passivity. In contrast to the 
positive, active connotations of the term ‘interactivity’, it suggests instead a 
mechanization of play. If interactivity is regarded as an  ideal mode of media 
culture for children and adults – the triumph of human agency in technological 
and virtual environments – its dark fl ip side easily conjures up fears of everyday 
and psychological colonization, or even science fi ction nightmares of humans 
controlled by machines ( Stallabrass 1993 ). In gameplay, as James Newman 
notes, the player is integrated into the circuit such that media studies’ reassuring 
separation of the entities ‘viewer’ and ‘text,’ subject and object, is fundamentally 
compromised. In a similar vein, Lister et al. suggest that human movement in 
interactive media is prompted not by ‘free will’ but by the game-as-system; the 
player is not responsible for his or her own body, a body which is ‘determined 
to move by  being part of the circuit of the game ’. Th e player is acted on by the 
game – these are  passional circuits ( Lister et al. 2009 , 398).  Communication and 
 control are inseparable aspects of cybernetic systems (Wiener 1965). 
 So video games are machines that articulate the visual and auditory aesthetics 
of popular screen media with a new ‘cyborg aesthetics’ in which the salient term 
is ‘control’ ( Aarseth 1997 , 55). Th is cyborg aesthetics is oft en most evident in the 
relationships between players and avatars. Th e avatar, as Diane Carr explains 
through her experience of the  Tomb Raider games, is a machine through which 
the player enters into the game, and is thereby confi gured  by the game: 
 as a player, I can do, undo and redo until Lara has eff ectively performed the 
challenge presented to her by the game, but I can only proceed through the 
game, through the space itself, if I perform the task as the game demands [ … ] 
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A player will systematically experiment, and aft er trial, error and accidental 
death, correctly perform the intended and necessary response. Th e conditional 
terms of our motion through space are thus rendered explicit. We do not write 
our own narrative, we uncover a pre-existing text and conform to its injunctions’. 
( Carr 2002 , 174) 
 Game studies researchers with a background in media and fi lm studies have 
applied and adapted theories of the fi lm viewer’s identifi cation with key 
protagonists within a fi lm narrative to the consideration of the gameplayer’s 
identifi cation with the avatar. Th e starting point is oft en the argument that 
the player may identify more strongly with the avatar because the player’s 
control of the character’s movements and decisions determine (depending 
on skill and experience) that character’s ultimate fate (always within the strict 
limitations and possibilities structured by the game as soft ware). Whilst this 
has proved a productive theoretical approach, it is limited by some signifi cant 
misassumptions. One in particular is the assumption that ‘control’ is a linear 
connection, that the player has stepped through the fourth wall of the fi ctional/
media world to become at last the hero, the protoganist, the chief pleasure now 
one of control over the avatar and hence the imaginary world. As Diane Carr 
makes clear, control is key to videogame aesthetics but it functions at least as 
much through acting on the player as through players acting on the world, a 
reciprocal confi guration. 
 For example, it is oft en taken as given that psychic ‘identifi cation’ in 
both fi lm-viewing and gameplay is the most signifi cant mechanism in the 
engagement between technological/media artefact and human viewer or player. 
Whilst playing with or through a favourite character off ers new media pleasures, 
any sustained engagement with gameplay soon makes cognitive and technical 
demands on the player that go beyond any straightforward notion of deepened 
imaginative identifi cation with the character (again this was evident with the 
ambiguous drivers of Sandy Bay). On one level there is the simple fact that 
playing a video game is a complex technical, cognitive and embodied feat. Initial 
delight at ‘controlling’ the avatar soon comes up against the game’s demands for 
adequate action in steering, jumping, fi ghting, solving puzzles and so on. It has 
oft en been observed that players will slip between the fi rst and third person as 
they account for their virtual activities. Th ey demonstrate eloquently the shift ing 
or intermittent nature of attention to the avatar. At times Mario is a character 
in the sense of a cartoon character. Th e player may prefer to play as Mario for 
reasons bound up primarily with questions of taste, preference or aesthetics. 
But Mario is only occasionally the game’s protagonist as a fi lm scholar might 
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understand the term (a  character ), more oft en he is, as Fuller and Jenkins have 
suggested, eff ectively a cursor, a marker or tool with which a user intervenes in 
soft ware: 
 In Nintendo ® ’s narratives […] Th e character is little more than a cursor that 
mediates the player’s relationship to the story world. Activity drains away the 
characters’ strength, as measured by an ever shift ing graph at the top of the 
screen, but it cannot build character, since these fi gures lack even the most 
minimal interiority. ( Fuller and Jenkins 1995 , 61) 
 Since his early appearances in  Donkey Kong and  Super Mario World Mario has 
become a technically more complicated entity, but his nature retains something 
of the cursor in his mediation of player input and gameworld activity. In more 
recent games, like  Super Mario Galaxy , he collects items that augment him with 
new, temporary capabilities and attributes. Th ese power-ups might be fi gured 
as special costumes: a Bee Suit bestows the power to hover, a Spring Suit to 
jump particularly high and so on. In turn, these powers are carefully designed to 
allow access to new sections of the gameworld, as much a playful and temporally 
determined set of keys or codes as either a cursor or character. Characters 
rendered with the look and role of the cinematic protagonist (whether action 
hero or cartoon character) are, fundamentally, soft ware entities. Solid Snake, 
from the game  Metal Gear Solid , for instance, is 
 embodied by the player as a set of available techniques and capacities […] In 
fact, it does not make sense to even talk about ‘he’ on-line, because there is no 
‘he’ as distinct from the engaged player, like Lara Croft  or Sonic the Hedgehog 
[…] on-line, ‘Lara’ is the player’s ability to run, jump, shoot … while ‘Sonic’ is 
speed, looping-the-loop, collecting rings…. ( Newman 2002 , 413) 
 Here, then, avatars are not virtual puppets suspended before the player in the 
exploration of their worlds; they are semi-automata acting and performing 
beyond the direct control of the player (Sonic’s blistering turns of speed propel 
him beyond the control of the player, Lara’s elegant jumps and somersaults are 
merely suggested by the player with the press of a button). Th ey are parts or 
components of the game, hybrid media-automata, entities that at once off er 
visual/kinaesthetic pleasure and instrumental progress through the game system 
by means of their programmed capabilities and limitations: 
 the ludic and vehicular nature of avatars is articulated with their status as 
symbolic objects. Again the dynamics of eff ect and aff ect are inseparable […] 
much of our pleasure in the aff ordances of Yoda and Chewbacca in this game 
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[ Lego Star Wars ] lies in the articulation of the possibilities for movement and 
action they aff ord on the one hand and in the visual appeal and expectations that 
come with their status as both familiar media characters and Lego toys on the 
other. Th is articulation of course shift s through the rhythms of the gameplay. In 
the heat of a battle or the tangles of a puzzle the player may be less concerned 
with the appearance or intertextual connections of his or her avatar, but at other 
moments these factors may be primary, and at time the two will be inseparable. 
( Giddings and Kennedy 2008 , 25) 
 Diff erent games and game genres establish diff erent connections between 
the game’s processes and the possible actions of the player, eschewing the 
anthropoid avatar as mediating device. Th e player of  Th e Sims does not control 
their virtual family directly, but merely attempts to direct them. Some games, 
such as  SimCity or  Age of Mythology , present multiple characters and roles to 
the player. Th e virtual people of  SimCity are a central game element (they will 
riot if taxed too heavily, or if inadequately policed) yet are ‘invisible’. Th ey are 
an example of the profoundly algorithmic characteristics of all game entities in 
that they are only the interface’s presentation of the eff ects of the interactions 
between a set of variables over time, variables controlled by the computer, 
though allowing some intervention by the player ( Manovich 2001 ). 
 Gameworlds are computer systems some of which allow emergent behaviour, 
but only that facilitated by their always systemic, mathematical logic. Th e 
 Championship Manager series, for example, with its emphasis on the revenue, 
tactics and transfers of football as a business – over the playing of matches 
themselves – is oft en jokingly referred to as ‘playing a spreadsheet’. 4  If we think 
of game soft ware, then,  as soft ware, a set of tools or an environment of virtual 
tools and processes, rather than a fi ctional world, then player behaviour starts to 
look quite diff erent. 
 …while creating a zoo for diff erent type of  cats (e.g., tigers, lions, and leopards), 
Rachel learned of a new birth in her zoo and responded by selling the newborn 
animals immediately […] 
 1. Rachel: Yeah, because the baby – um because there was a birth of an 
endangered animal? <…> that’s really great. And it’s especially great for me 
because I can sell the little baby for $1000. [Clicks button to sell baby.] Th at’s a 
good deal. 
 2. [Rachel pauses, then explains herself.] 
 3. In real life? I would not own a zoo like – I would not, um, what would – 
what would you say, um, manage a zoo like this. I would be much more caring. 
But in this game, [smiles and nods her head] I’m more (.) greedy. But that’s okay. 
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Okay, so now that I have more money, I actually can (.) that’s really good. Except 
it will go very quickly. ( Stevens et al. 2008 , 59–60) 
 In a study of the entertainment and educational ecologies of children’s video 
game play, Reed Stevens, Tom Satwicz and Laura McCarthy followed two 
girls’ diff ering approaches to the simulation game  Zoo Tycoon . Th ey note a 
complex set of relationships between the girls’ cultural experiences and tastes, 
and the laws and dynamic structures of the game, resulting in distinct play 
events that cannot be reduced to either. One of the girls, Katarina, enjoyed 
decorating her bedroom, making lamps and designing websites for school 
projects. Rachel, on the other hand, led a very busy life that required an 
effi  cient organization of school, homework, church, sport, babysitting and 
social activities, all carefully set out on a calendar. Katarina’s enthusiasm 
for design, the researchers note, was clearly connected to her behaviour in 
the gameworld, as was Rachel’s ‘preference for effi  ciency’. Simulation games 
such as  Zoo Tycoon are oft en open enough to allow the development of a 
visually attractive virtual environment as a player’s main aim (Katarina), or 
conversely, the coordination of a well-organized world maximizing growth 
and other economic gains (Rachel). 
 Katarina and Rachel arrive at zoos that look and function diff erently […] 
 We found that Katarina played the game to ‘design’ and reported that she 
learned what she called ‘design methods’. Rachel played to effi  ciently beat 
scripted scenarios given by the game. Whereas Katarina sought to make her 
exhibits ‘pretty’, Rachel arranged her exhibits for best functionality rather than 
aesthetic appeal. ( Stevens et al. 2008 , 59) 
 Th ough oft en referred to as ‘sandbox’ games, these worlds do not have the 
freedom and plasticity this implies. Katarina’s aesthetic approach, if pursued 
without attention to her zoo’s business operations, risks economic failure. 
For instance, she spent her in-game funds on trees and rocks and only the 
minimum on feeding and caring for the animals. Th ese game systems are 
more virtual economies than a translation of an actual toy zoo. Unlike the 
more open construction possibilities of, say,  Minecraft  , most simulation games 
have a carefully balanced set of environmental and economic laws to constrain 
possible actions for ludic ends. Play in both  SimCity and  Zoo Tycoon is sustained 
by the need to gradually accumulate resources to expand, develop or ornament 
the gameworld. So, whatever aspects of the players’ taste, imagination, or sense 
of self and identity are mobilized in video game play, their behaviour in the 
gameworld is always transducted by the code. 
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 Th is inevitable process of transduction across actual and virtual play is neatly 
illustrated by the technologically mediated morality of the ‘cheat code’. Simulation 
games always contain these more or less hidden ‘cheats’, embedded codes that 
allow the player to generate infi nite funds bypassing the ‘preferred’ gameplay 
route of gradual and skillfull accumulation. 5  Rachel chose not to use cheats, a 
decision apparently driven by both virtual play preference and her actual world 
moral order. Th e rejection of cheats refl ected ‘her overall orientation to life and 
game play’, and once she had tested out the game as a system, she chose instead 
to abide by the rules and their implied morality and ‘clearly sanctioned modes of 
improvement’. As Rachel herself put it, 
 Before I did the scenarios I defi nitely used the cheats a lot … the money 
cheats … for the scenarios I feel like – I don’t know. When I was doing more free 
games … the thing that would get in your way of having a really nice zoo was not 
having enough money. So in the scenarios I try to – I don’t know, work harder at 
being better. ( Stevens et al. 2008 , 56) 
 Katarina on the other hand ‘was so unwavering in her focus on using the game as 
an aesthetic design medium that she actively occluded in-game instructions that 
recommended effi  ciency and point-maximizing behaviors’, and had no qualms 
about using cheats to ensure the survival of her zoo ( Stevens et al. 2008 , 55). 
 To reiterate, I would argue that what we are seeing here is not a straightforward 
playing out of children’s own personalities and fascinations as assumed in the 
therapeutic world-building of actual sand play ( Lowenfeld 2008 [1935]). Th ere 
are complex relationships between these girls’ senses of themselves and their 
behaviours in the game. Th e game is not a virtual tabula rasa on which to project 
an identity, rather a playing out of certain expectations and preferences through 
choices in the game, and the directing of those preferences into its algorithms and 
economies. Rather, these are loops through which the gameworld as a computer 
system modifi es and regulates cultural and subjective preferences, imagination 
and creativity according to the logic of an economic and behavioural simulation. 
Th e game event is a cybernetic system in which the actual, biological, lived-
cultural and the mathematical, artifi cial and ludic circulate and shape, govern 
and exercise varying degrees of control over each other. It works on, shapes and 
extends imagination and identity, distributes them around a network of human 
and non-human bodies and processes. 
 I’ll return to this notion of the cybernetic in particular as constitutive of 
everyday gameworlds later in this chapter. In the meantime, I will continue with 
related questions of agency and action within and around virtual worlds. 
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 Lively worlds
 Th e computer-generated environment of a video game in its entirety is an 
animated virtual playworld. By concentrating on the avatar we might miss 
the active, agential nature of the gameworld too, all generated by the same 
soft ware engines, rendered with the same polygons and texture maps, ascribed 
behaviours and aff ordances. Players can manipulate a game’s topography ( Super 
Monkey Ball ), or construct it ( Th e Sims ,  Little Big Planet ,  Minecraft  ). In more 
abstract games, there is no clear symbolic distinction between environment and 
characters ( Tetris ,  Minesweeper ). We have already explored something of the 
world of Sandy Bay, its ludically motivated landscape and physics. As I have 
hinted earlier, to play a video game is oft en to play with the whole gameworld 
as a system. 
 Gameworlds are virtual polities as well as virtual geographies: as Rachel 
and Katarina implicitly recognized, they simulate social and economic 
systems. Th e society and economy might be explicitly fi gured as a gameplay 
motive – in  Th e Sims ,  Zoo Tycoon ,  Animal Crossing – or they may be similarly 
integral to the game mechanic but adopt a diff erent frame of reference. To 
play any game that involves the accumulation of points, coins, rings and their 
expenditure for survival, items, power-ups and so on is to be subject to a virtual 
economy in all but name. 
 Perhaps the most signifi cant – but rarely studied – feature of video game 
worlds as virtual media is the strange socialities they generate between players 
and artifi cial intelligence and non-player characters. Artifi cial intelligence is 
perhaps the most commonly understood instance of simulation as autonomous 
agent in digital games. In a game AI generally refers to the components of the 
program that respond most sensitively to the actions of the player. Th e term 
covers both the coding of the behaviour and responses of NPCs and the overall 
sense of the gameworld as a system that is responding convincingly to the 
player’s engagement with it. Generations of children have grown up playing with 
automata, soft ware robots, whose behaviours are driven by the application of AI 
to entertainment. Th is ‘expressive AI’ is about 
 creating a sense of aliveness, the sense that there is an entity living within the 
computer that has its own life independently of the player and cares about how 
the player’s actions impact this life. ( Mateas 2003 ) 
 In some applications of AI to playful media, such as smart toys or chatbots, the 
artifi ce is unavoidable and prompts ontological refl ection on the nature of life 
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and reality. Sherry Turkle’s research with computer toys from the late 1970s 
illustrates this: she found that children playing with computers and interactive 
toys were also playing with their understanding of machines’ agency and 
intentionality. An interactive toy that seemed to anticipate the child’s moves or 
strategy would be angrily accused of cheating, for instance. A nine-year-old girl 
with some experience of programming compared the vitalism of television and 
computers: 
 ‘Th e television set isn’t alive. It doesn’t make up its picture. It only passes it on.’ 
A person, she explains, might have to tell a computer how to make a picture, 
but the picture doesn’t exist in the world before the machine gets involved: ‘Th e 
computer has to know how to do it. To make it up.’ Th is reasoning leads her to 
a special kind of verdict for the computer: ‘It’s sort of alive’. ( Turkle 1984 , 41) 
 Th is  sort-of life resonates with all the  sort-of realities of play, games and the 
virtual: in her instrumental engagement with heterogeneous entities in her 
world she has established a practical variegation of agency and autonomy, rather 
than the binary opposition of human subject and non-human objects (nature, 
technologies) that has structured Western thought since the Enlightenment (see 
 Lister et al. 2009 , 277–280). 
 Th e sense of aliveness or intelligence (or at least the sense of plausible 
behaviour and responses) of NPCs seems to require a much lower degree of 
sophistication or realism than that expected of chatbots, smart toys and other 
more serious AI applications. Within the stylized gameworld, and when put to 
playful ends, automata can seem perfectly acceptable in their animated artifi ce. 
An infl uential essay by the philosopher Daniel Dennett off ers productive ways 
of thinking about the imaginative/pragmatic relationships between human and 
non-human players. Taking a chess computer as his example, his argument runs 
as follows: the strategies of a sophisticated chess machine are so complex that 
they cannot be predicted by a human player. Even the programmer couldn’t say 
what sequences of moves it would make in a particular game. Hence, it is only 
possible to play chess with a chess computer by ascribing  intentionality to it, by 
reacting to it as if it were an intelligent player: 
 when one can no longer hope to beat the machine by utilizing one’s knowledge 
of physics or programming to anticipate its responses, one may still be able to 
avoid defeat by treating the machine rather like an intelligent human opponent. 
( Dennett 1971 , 89) 
 Th is is the ‘intentional stance’, and Dennett distinguishes it from the ‘design 
stance’ in which a detailed knowledge of how the computer or program is 
102 Gameworlds
designed would allow the designer (the user or player) to predict the system’s 
response to any input or operation. In the case of chess, the design stance 
would entail the player knowing enough about the instructions coded into the 
game-as-program to defi nitively predict every move the computer would make 
( Dennett 1971 , 87–88). Yet, 
 on occasion a purely physical system can be so complex, and yet so organized, 
that we fi nd it convenient, explanatory, pragmatically necessary for prediction, 
to treat it as if it had beliefs and desires and was rational. ( Dennett 1971 , 91–92) 
 Dennett off ers this concept as a practical, pragmatic way of understanding 
the operations and agency of complex systems that at once acknowledges the 
very palpable (and perhaps unavoidable) sense of engaging with a system as 
if it had desires and intentions, whilst rejecting naïve or idealist versions of 
anthropomorphism: 
 Th e concept of an Intentional system is a relatively uncluttered and 
unmetaphysical notion, abstracted as it is from questions of the composition, 
constitution, consciousness, morality, or divinity of the entities falling under it. 
Th us, for example, it is much easier to decide whether a machine can be an 
Intentional system than it is to decide whether a machine can  really think, or be 
conscious, or morally responsible. ( Dennett 1971 , 100) 
 So this intentionality does not assume that complex systems have beliefs and 
desires in the way humans do, but that their behaviour can, indeed oft en 
must, be responded to  as if they did. Or perhaps, and Dennett hints at this, 
their ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ are not so much metaphorical as analogical. Th e 
intentional stance usefully sidesteps the speculative cul-de-sacs of arguments 
over machine consciousness and allows an ethological attention to what 
complex systems, in this case soft ware, actually do: what behaviours they 
exhibit, what eff ects they have. 
 Th is ‘unmetaphysical’ notion of the intentional system both resonates with 
Latour’s non-human delegations and suggests ways in which we might theorize 
our material  and conceptual engagement with complex computer-based media. 
It might suggest why children interacting daily with artifi cial intelligences and 
autonomous agents in video games do not seem to refl ect so deeply on the 
ontology of their playmates as did the players with early computational toys 
observed by Sherry Turkle. 
 To give a simple example from a more recent computer game form, the player 
of a fi rst-person shooter (FPS), such as the  Call of Duty series, must respond to 
the behaviour of the enemy NPCs as intentional. Th ese automata ‘want’ to kill 
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the player’s avatar and avoid being killed themselves. Metaphysical refl ections 
on the nature of machine intelligence are neither here nor there: in the gameplay 
moment the enemies move, target or evade as intelligently as their limited but 
eff ective range of behaviours requires. 
 Mateas cites the behaviour of the ghosts in  Pac-Man as a foundational moment 
in the development of expressive AI. Th e ghosts do not simply hunt down the 
avatar as quickly as possible, which would be easy to program but would result 
in a very limited game. Rather, each ghost has its own simple coded behaviour. 
One chases Pac-Man directly, one is directed to a point immediately in front of 
Pac-Man and so on. In addition they attack in waves, gradually attacking more 
oft en. Individually none of them is a particular threat, but the combination of 
simple behaviours generates a non-linear and dynamic ludic environment. Th e 
ghosts’ AI must be both complex enough to deny the player a ‘design stance’ – 
the ability to predict their movement and so easily avoid them – and controlled 
enough to facilitate an exciting game: 
 Th is behavior must challenge the player without being impossibly diffi  cult, and 
be unpredictable enough to make the ghosts feel alive and responsive to the 
player’s activity. ( Mateas 2003 ) 
 It is not only individually fi gured characters that must be ascribed 
intentionality but also ‘intelligences operating behind the scenes’. For 
example, the player of a real-time strategy game (RTS) might ‘sense’ the 
presence of the enemy commander – or even the game as system itself – in 
the actions of computer-controlled troops. In this case we are closer again 
to Dennett’s chess machine; it is not the knights and pawns that are played 
against as an animate entity, but again the computer system itself as player, 
the one that makes the Lego Racers go. 
 From the uncomplicated but highly eff ective behaviours of Pac-Man’s ghosts, 
the tactical behaviours of military units in  Advance Wars , to the convoluted 
conversational exchanges of the citizens of  Animal Crossing , everyday play is 
now populated with simulacra. Th e initiation, prediction and anticipation of – 
and reaction to – the behaviour of soft ware entities (called ‘intelligent agents’ 
in less playful computer systems ( Wise 2011 )) are quasi-social and technical 
practices now are fully embodied by young children. 
 If contemporary video games appear to leave little space for immediate 
refl ection on the life or intelligence of the game characters, this is due in 
part, no doubt, to the intensity of attention and reaction demanded by action-
driven games – there simply isn’t the time. It may also be due in part, as 
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suggested earlier, to the mediation of the NPCs through their unnatural 
ecology – that is they are more at home in the  sort-of world of the game than 
entities such as Furby are in the actual world. 
 Regardless of whether children refl ect on the virtual life in their play or not, 
as players they must – to play the game at all – adopt the intentional stance and 
‘engage the machine intelligence as machine intelligence (rather than as a pretense 
to human intelligence signifi ed by the avatar simulacrum of a human…) ( Simon 
2007 , 168). Th e player must accept the automata as sort-of alive, credit their 
non-human behaviour with a level of logic or intentionality entirely appropriate 
for the task in hand. Oft en this is simple enough in principle, if trickier in 
action – avoiding, again, the FPS enemies for instance. Sometimes the player 
must try to work out in more detail what the enemy might do, what its encoded 
behaviours are. In the more strategic FPS  Call of Duty 2 , Bart Simon points out, 
survival on the cinematically rendered D-Day landings relies on understanding 
and working with the behaviour of the computer-controlled comrades: 
 It becomes clear aft er dying the umpteenth time that sussing out the mechanics 
of the coop AI is crucial; you must move as a group, you must wait for cover 
fi re, you must protect your mates, etc…. Th ere is almost no dialog here, your 
comrades do not pretend to be able to hold a conversation in the trenches, instead 
there is what I call a ‘conversation of actions’ and the increasing recognition that 
you must keep ‘face’ with the AI in order to eff ectively play and make meaning 
of the game. ( Simon 2007 , 168) 
 Simon’s account could be considered a playful, experimental ethnography of a 
synthetic society, a society that is uncomplex and singular in its relationships, 
behaviours and goals, but still dynamic and reactive. Detailed description of it 
as a social group or event highlights the profoundly machinic strangeness that 
underlies the photorealistic imagery: 
 In one epic scene you are a Russian private storming a German held railway 
station in Stalingrad. You begin the scene crawling through pipes on your own 
and drop down into a room full of comrades in a fi re fi ght. Th ere is a sense 
that they know what’s up and you take a moment to get your bearings then 
you move and a group breaks off  to follow you. Depending where and how fast 
you move your comrades will take up positions nearby. If you move too far too 
fast you are on your own. You cannot direct the troop with menu commands 
(you are not in control in that sense) rather you must in a sense spend some 
time learning the algorithms that govern the movements of your comrades. Th e 
action is meant to be cinematic and thus a re-mediated Spielberg experience 
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[clearly capitalising on recent popularity of  Saving Private Ryan and its visceral 
beach-landing scenes] passing itself off  as realistic but that feeling is mitigated 
by the strange inhumanity of your comrades … they don’t speak, they do not 
appear as individuals, there is an endless supply of them. And yet, they act. Th ey 
act on behalf of an AI module just as your avatar acts on behalf of you. Th e AI 
is tracking you and modifying its avatars’ actions and you must learn to track it. 
Th is mutual tuning is done through action in the game, a  conversation of actions ; 
and once you fi nd the rhythm combat is a cinch and the feeling when combined 
with uplift ing music is euphoric. ( Simon 2007 , 168) 
 Simon compares soft ware chatbots and their attempted simulation of human 
conversation – and the derision they receive – to the oft en very technically 
limited ‘AI’ of games (oft en simple dialogue trees). Th e game structure, 
trajectory and abstractions facilitate an ease and naturalization of conversation 
(and conversation of actions) – the non-human nature of these soft  playmates 
is accepted as part of the fl ow through the synthetic, conventional gameworld: 
 Coop AI opens up the fi eld of exploration in a way that Turing test driven 
competitive AI has all but shut down. ( Simon 2007 , 169) 
 Th e  Animal Crossing series of video games for various Nintendo consoles 
illustrates beautifully this opening up of cooperative AI for play. It also invites 
refl ections on the temporal or durational dimensions of virtual gameworlds. 
Th ough very diff erent in appearance, pace and gameplay from an FPS, like the 
FPS the ‘social’ world as a ludic event is entirely bound up with speed and rhythm. 
As a resident of a small village populated by animals, the player must, over days, 
months, even years, build and maintain relationships through conversation, 
buying and selling items and exchanging letters and gift s. Everyday interactions 
are rarely dramatic, oft en just a simple exchange of pleasantries. Th e player 
communicates through the selection of a question or response provided by the 
game as short lines of text. Th is minimal conversation may at times intervene 
in a signifi cant event in the game, or it may simply be – like so much actual 
everyday conversation – an aff ectual exchange, phatic communication to sustain 
relationships and ‘community.’ An example of the former is when an animal tells 
the player’s character that they are thinking of leaving the town. Th e player is 
given two or three options in a simple dialogue tree, generally a plea to stay and 
one or two degrees of indiff erence. Th e appeal to stay will generally result in 
the animal’s pleased surprise that the player’s character cares so much and an 
emphatic decision to remain in town. It is not clear whether the general ‘shooting 
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the breeze’ chat has any instrumental role in maintaining the general happiness 
of the animals, but the game strongly suggests that it does, and it seems to feel 
like it to the player. 6  
 Virtual time
 Late December 2008, between Christmas and New Year, a liminal hiatus in the 
hard work of festivities. I’m waiting for a knee operation and can’t walk far or 
drive so we are mainly stuck indoors. We spend much of our time in a series of 
virtual worlds. 
 Alex, Jo and I are in the lounge. Alex is playing his ‘fi le’ on Jo’s  Animal Crossing: 
Let’s Go to the City on the Wii, Jo is playing the latest  Pokémon game on his DS, 
but helping Alex when needed. I’m intermittently playing  Th e Legend of Zelda: 
Phantom Hourglass on my own DS. Th e boys go off  into the other room for their 
tea (I can’t help their mother much, so she is the only one not playing). Th e 
 Animal Crossing game is set to ‘pause’. Its background music tinkles away quietly, 
an animated sheet of house symbols scrolls endlessly and impossibly smoothly in 
the fl at background, whilst a ticker-tape message slides past horizontally, pointing 
out – to no-one – that connection with the wiimote has been lost. I’m stuck in 
a labyrinthine level of  Phantom Hourglass , and because of my knee, I cannot sit 
at a desk and check an online walkthrough on my laptop, so my gameworld too 
is paused, on ‘powersave’, animation suspended. Alex sticks his head round the 
door to check the clock on the mantelpiece. He has been invited to visit by Rod, 
one of the animals in his village, at 5.45. As the gameworld is synchronized with 
the actual time – virtual time ticks away even on pause – Alex doesn’t need to 
check the game itself. He has time to fi nish his tea before restarting. 
 Gameworlds unfold in virtual time as well as space, and their temporalities fi nd 
rhythms with those of the mundane world just as virtual space interpenetrates 
everyday space. Game systems manipulate time in diverse and exotic ways to 
fi t or drive gameplay. A game of football in FIFA 13 looks very much like the 
(televized) real thing but the 90 minutes of the actual game – displayed on the 
screen – fl ies by as players choose its duration (between two and ten minutes 
for each half). A turn-based strategy game, such as  Advance Wars , has infi nite 
patience when it is the human player’s turn to deploy military units, whereas 
a real-time strategy game has its impulsive temporality writ large in its name 
(see  Juul 2004 ). Sonic the Hedgehog famously faced the player and scowled, 
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tapping his feet, if not immediately driven through his loops and platforms; 
other games have time limits to levels, or NPCs that will act on the player’s avatar 
if it does not act itself. Whilst early adventure games would remain completely 
inactive between moments of human input, later games – particularly simulation 
games – once started will blithely play themselves until further human input is 
received. 7  Time in  SimCity or  Th e Sims can be set to fast-forward as decisions in 
the modelling of economies and behaviours are tested in imaginary time. Most 
games can be paused, or frozen at a save point, to be reanimated later. 
 Animal Crossing’s charm and gameplay are predicated on its simulation of 
real time. 
 Amelia (an eagle), asks Joey (Jo’s avatar in  Animal Crossing :  Let’s Go to the City ) to 
take a present to Aurora (a penguin) by 3pm. 
 S (checking my watch):  You’ve got 20 minutes then. 
 J:  No, here it’s 25 to… 
 Th e game is set to the internal clock of the video game console, so – if the console 
clock is set correctly – night, day, seasons, festivals and birthdays are marked 
throughout. Alex was allowed one year to stay up until midnight on New Year’s 
Eve to see the celebrations in his  Animal Crossing town. He was barely awake 
when the virtual townhall clock fi nally struck twelve (about fi ve minutes before 
the explosion of noise in the actual street outside, suggesting virtual and actual 
time were slightly out of sync). A small group of animals gathered before a 
‘Happy New Year’ banner, were addressed by the tortoise Mayor and watched a 
fi rework display. It looked anti-climactic to me, but Alex went to bed satisfi ed he 
had attended a real event. 
 Th e clock and the world’s temporality in  Animal Crossing are completely 
integral. Th e clock isn’t a measure of time, but virtual time’s arrow itself, driving 
forward the events, economies and relationships, not just ticking along beside 
them. Th e game has some elaborate measures built into its fi ction to avoid 
temporal paradox, manipulation or collapse. For example, in the 3DS version, 
 Animal Crossing: New Leaf , the player can buy turnips once a week from a 
boar called Joan. Th ese can then be sold at a profi t later in the week (the player 
must check the turnip prices each day – that is every actual day of the week – 
to determine the best time to sell). A player could quickly build up funds by 
repeatedly resetting the world’s clock to eff ectively ‘fast forward’ from Joan’s 
arrival to the optimum market conditions. However, the gameworld’s artifi cial–
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natural laws foreclose this market manipulation and, as Joan explains, if the 
clock is changed, the turnips immediately rot and cannot be sold. 
 Animal Crossing’s temporality is integral to its social and economic systems 
too, which are in turn the basis of its gameplay: 
 Th e game design intentionally draws on the passage of time to create 
both emotional resonance and economic value in the gameworld. 
( Kelley 2007 , 181–182) 
 Th e game is a virtual economy through which natural resources, commodities 
and aff ects fl ow. Th e player gathers natural resources for exchange for currency 
(‘bells’): fruit, shells, insects and fossils are shaken from trees, beach-combed, 
caught in a net or dug out of the ground. Th ough the buying and selling of 
furniture, ornaments and natural resources in a series of little shops gives the 
impression of an economy of mercantile capitalism, it is in eff ect a simulation 
of pre-capitalist  symbolic exchange in the anthropological sense. Rather than 
accumulation for its own sake, exchange here follows the logic of a gift  economy 
( Baudrillard 1993 ,  Mauss 2002 [1950]). Animals ask a favour (to supply an 
apple or a particular type of fi sh) and then reward the player with an object 
(an item of clothing, furniture or ornament), or they oft en respond to a visit 
or kind word from the player with a gift . Both pleasantries and objects fl ow 
between characters, cementing relationships and the virtual community. Th e 
bells accumulated by the player from these transactions are either fed back into 
the community through public works (park benches, bridges) or are spent on 
personal adornment or on enlarging and decorating the player’s house, in an 
odd mix of municipal socialism and potlatch performativity. 
 Th e circulation of aff ect is not constrained to the virtual world. Happy 
animals – who oft en sing and dance when especially pleased – delighted Jo and 
Alex, for example, when the boys had remembered a character’s birthday (again 
in actual time, once a year) and visited its house with a present. Conversely, 
Jo once inadvertently opened a present he had been asked by one character 
to deliver to another and was upset almost to tears by the donor’s angry 
disapproval. 
 Th is is an economy driven primarily by aff ectual circulation– gift -giving, 
deliveries, writing and posting letters, short pre-rendered and oft en surreal 
conversations with non-player characters – the collusional fl ow and circulation 
of virtual objects initiating and sustaining relationships (and actual-world 
emotions) through exchange and gift s, fl attery, the coining of new nicknames 
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or characteristic greetings, delivery of presents for others, the fi nding of lost 
items. And gift s are –as anthropologist Marcel Mauss would approve – always 
reciprocated. 
 Everyday cyberculture
 Th eoretical work on digital culture in the late 1980s and 1990s dramatized 
the future potential and import of emerging new technologies and media of 
VR and computer-mediated communication (email, bulletin boards, playful 
spaces such as Multi-User Domains) through a technological imaginary 
inspired by science fi ction, and in particular the subgenre of cyberpunk. My 
descriptions of contemporary digital culture as cybernetic, virtual, simulacral, 
as intense intimacies between the human and the machine, echo this rich body 
of ideas. However, my descriptions in this book are neither futurological nor 
of an imaginary order. Contemporary virtual and networked media events 
are cybernetic, simulational even if utterly mundane: to play in the whimsical 
cyberspace of  Animal Crossing or the persistent virtual server-worlds of  World 
of Warcraft  is to actualize William Gibson’s famous fi ctional dataspace. As 
the futurological frenzy that attended cybercultural studies evaporates, it is 
important to note that it is now quotidian reality. 
 Like the virtual, the ‘cybernetics’ of cyber-culture is oft en used in a vague 
way to denote media and behaviours in and through digital networks. Here I 
want to insist on the importance of its precise uses and history, particularly as 
conceptualized by Norbert Wiener as the circuits of feedback of information 
and control within systems, where systems might be within a machine 
(e.g. a steam engine or computer) or might consist of machines and humans 
or other animals (Wiener 1965 [1950]). I will also touch on Gregory Bateson’s 
subsequent synthesis of cybernetics, pyschology and anthropology for thinking 
about systems beyond those contained within the black or beige box of the game 
console ( Bateson 1972 ). 
 In their infl uential and encyclopaedic book on game design, Katie Salen and 
Eric Zimmerman devote a chapter to games as cybernetic systems. A cybernetic 
system, they explain, contains three elements: 
 a sensor, a comparator, and an activator. Th e sensor senses something about the 
environment or internal state of the system. Th e comparator decides whether or 
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not a change to system needs to be made as result of sensor’s reading, and the 
activator activates that change. ( Salen and Zimmerman 2003 , 218) 
 Th is simple model might be of a closed system, monitoring and modifying its 
own internal state, or it might be part of, and interacting with, a larger system. 
Th ermostats in a central heating system are a commonly used example. Th e 
thermostat senses a room’s temperature, compares it to its settings and activates 
a change when the settings are reached (i.e. it turns off  the heating when the 
preset temperature is reached). A computer gameworld is built from units of this 
simple triadic logic: 
 As a cybernetic system, the rules of a game defi ne the sensors, comparators, 
and activators of the game’s feedback loops. Within a game, there are many sub-
systems that regulate the fl ow of play, dynamically changing and transforming 
game elements. (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 218) 
 A gameworld can be thought of a system, but it is one itself made up of 
interrelated subsystems. Th ese subsystems might control a particular 
relationship or behaviour, but are always connected: 
 A cybernetic system within a game that directly aff ects just one component 
of a game will indirectly aff ect the game as a whole’. (Salen and Zimmerman 
2004, 218) 
 Th ey give the example of a cybernetic feedback subsystem engineering an 
optimum play-state in racing games. Th e futuristic racing game  WipEout tracks 
the speed and ability of the player through the behaviour of the virtual vehicle 
and adjusts the speed of the computer-controlled hovercars accordingly. A 
racing game where opponent cars disappear into the distance or where they 
are left  standing is no fun (unless of course, as we’ve seen, other games can be 
improvized), but a cybernetically modulated cluster of vehicles just fast enough 
to present a challenge is. In the  Mario Kart series of games (particularly popular 
in our house), this cybernetic levelling out of the diff erentials of skill and luck 
is eff ected through the targeting of power-up items according to the players’ 
(human and computer-controlled) position in the race. Th e leader will, as he 
or she bashes through a power-up box on the track, collect a green shell, a kind 
of unguided missile and the least powerful item in the game. Th ere is a range 
of devices and powers worthy of Acme Corp. in a Looney Tunes cartoon to be 
collected – according to the kart’s position in the race, down to the ‘Bullet Bill’ 
which the player in last place may, occasionally, receive. For ten seconds or so 
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the kart is transformed into a large, fast invincible missile with painted teeth like 
a Spitfi re. Acquiring one of these towards the end of a race can shift  the driver 
from last to near fi rst place. It is a colourful and witty animation of power and 
action, but serves an underlying cybernetic principle of system regulation put to 
ludic ends. As Grahame Weinbren puts it, 
 Th e point of the game […] is to keep the player between two frontier zones – 
on the verge of mastery, on the verge of losing control […] Th e pleasure is 
in overcoming what was just a few minutes ago insurmountable. ( Weinbren 
2002 , 183) 
 Th e gameplay experience is a carefully designed experience, one that is achieved 
only when the human player accepts, learns, trains for the machine’s demands. It 
is a tightly engineered circuit. 
 Computer and video games, then, are cybernetic systems for popular 
entertainment, ‘communication systems where the functional diff erences among 
the mechanical parts play a defi ning role in determining the aesthetic process’ 
( Aarseth 1997 , 22). For Aarseth, a cybertext 
 shift s the focus from the traditional [media/literary] threesome of author/
sender, text/message, and reader/receiver to the cybernetic intercourse between 
the various part(icipant)s in the textual machine. ( Aarseth 1997 , 22) 
 It also complicates any simple conception of interactivity as a two-way fl ow of 
action and reaction between a human and a computer application, a player and 
a game. It multiplies the agents at work in part by breaking these agents down 
into their components. 
 Th is control over gameworld information, reminiscent perhaps of the 
detective novel’s careful timing of revelation, is integral to many games, and 
hints at the autonomous ‘intelligence’ of the system as experienced in play. 
Th e player only sees or knows aspects of the gameworld, its algorithmic 
operations and coded totality are fully known only to the system itself, and 
revealed only partially. Sometimes this is ignorance of the precise systems 
of causality (as in  Animal Crossing’s relationships), in other more expansive 
games it is spatial, that is the player can only see and interact with the area 
of the gameworld they are currently in. In many games, from the early 
arcade game  Defender to real-time strategy games such as  Age of Mythology , 
adventure/RPG games like  Legend of Zelda and MMOs like  Guild Wars 2 , this 
lack of knowledge is integral to gameplay, requiring a restless exploration of 
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labyrinthine dungeons, or perpetual vigilance and reconnaissance as enemies 
spawn and gather strength in remote regions. 
 Th e video game (and to varying degrees other soft ware applications) not only 
confi gures its player through the technical possibilities and constraints inscribed 
during design and manufacture, but it is also designed precisely to confi gure 
its player continually during play itself. Gameworlds and temporalities, modes 
of presentation, puzzles and combat, engagement with computer-controlled 
characters are all constantly impinging on the player’s experience and 
responding to the player’s responses. Each diff erent game, and each diff erent 
playings of any particular game, rigs up diff erent connections and circuits and 
demands diff erent states and diff erent pleasures – visual and audio cues, spatial 
conventions, embodied memory, the cognitive intensity of puzzle solving and 
the interludes of visual pleasure or calm. And far from off ering the player a 
virtual world within which to exercise his or her interactive mastery, they invert 
this agential relationship: the game generates and navigates its world, the player 
is prompted to respond. Th e player’s sense of intense agency in the gameworld is 
not illusory, but it is circuitous rather than initiatory, exercised through simple 
signals to be processed in synthesis with other subsystems: a twitch of a thumb 
on a tiny button triggering dramatic screen action is, in cybernetic terms, an 
 amplifi cation by the circuit. 
 Control aesthetics: I’m the one who makes the Lego Racers go
 To tease this out a little further I will use it to revisit the Lego Racers events. 
Firstly, the interplay between the children’s pleasure in the animated mini-fi gures 
and the virtual building of cars demonstrate this assertion that a computer 
gameworld must be understood as a cybernetic system put to the service of 
playful media, processing and articulating both interactive control and popular 
media aesthetics. Secondly, I will suggest that this machinic play produces a 
distribution of imagination particular to computer play. 
 Video games confi gure their players, in real time, a moment by moment, 
movement by movement, response by response anticipation of behaviour. Ludic 
futures are built into the game, from simple forking paths of early text-based 
adventure games to the dialogue trees and AI of contemporary games. Th e 
videogame event is the relationship between its components (human and non-
human), its motive is the ludic ambiguity of its capacities and characters. Jo’s 
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exploration of the geography, physics and pathology of Sandy Bay, and the new 
little games that emerged, might seem to promise a victory of straightforward 
human and imaginative agency over the system. But this exploration only 
 stretched the logic of machinic confi guration of the player; it did not break it. 
Jo was testing the game’s systems (literally bouncing off  the gameworld’s limits), 
and all the while the game was patiently waiting for its prodigal to return to 
the preferred performance of successfully racing the computer-controlled cars. 
Emergent play could only open up so much of the gameworld, whereas the 
rewards – of progression through levels, of spectacular or narrative revelation, of 
new capabilities and aff ordances – are reserved by the game for such time as the 
player decides (or learns) to play  the game. Th at is, we never got beyond Sandy 
Bay – in the virtual world at least. 
 Some of the improvized mini-games emerged from a simple assemblage of 
animated image, and behaviours encoded into avatars and vehicles. Crashing 
the car and losing bricks repeatedly will eventually leave the player with just 
the Lego man. Th e boys found the sight of the Lego man hilarious, running 
up and down hills as fast as his barely jointed legs would carry him – a kind of 
real-time, interactive cartoon. 8  Later, Jo would test the water-death boundary 
again, nudging the mini-fi gure deeper and deeper until all but the very top of 
his baseball cap was below water and he ‘drowned’. Even just running the little 
car-less driver around seemed to resonate with the drowning games and other 
testing of limits between game life and death: 
 J:  It’s funny how he dies, isn’t it? 
 J:  I wonder how he dies? 
 If the concept of ‘identifi cation’ has any purchase in these boys’ imaginative 
engagement with the gameworld, at best they seemed to slip between a number 
of ‘identifi cations’: being the virtual Lego men whilst playing the computer 
game; but being the virtual Lego car itself (as we might imagine a child playing 
with a conventional toy vehicle to be); a hybrid of the two – a virtual car/driver; 
being the constructors of these men, cars and car‐men; being at once the child 
playing with the actual Lego car‐men and coextensive with the car or car‐men 
they are propelling around the room; being the player of a video game and being 
a meta‐player; then deferring the (ultimately passive) role of meta-player to 
the adult observer and his pretend keyboard. Rather than identifi cation, then, 
this is a mode of imaginative play that slides around momentary positions of 
agency, of control and being controlled: a circuitous becoming. When Jo refused 
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to write his name on the paper signing-in screen because he was ‘the one who 
makes the Lego Racers go’, he was not taking an imaginative position outside the 
gameworlds, god or king-like, not even the computer itself. He was positioned 
or disposed by the game event’s tranductions of agency of which he was an 
integral part. He had to be an agent, but not the player (delegated to another 
human component) or the avatar (he was still driving the car/driver avatar). 
Th e game system is the only agent left . An imaginative event was, therefore, 
confi gured by a real relationship between agencies and entities. In the virtual 
game, Jo was playing  with (and played  by ) the whole gameworld/system, in the 
actual game he was playing  as the gameworld system: not one character within 
a screen fi ction, but rather the whole universe that makes the Lego Racers go. 
He was in the circuit, was the circuit. Imagination was at work, but it is not the 
familiar imagination of ‘let’s pretend’. If we can talk of ecosystems of distributed 
cognition in psychology ( Hutchins 1995 ), then in this event, and in other events 
involving virtual media, we are seeing  distributed imagination . 
 Th e events in and around Sandy Bay are tiny instances of what is now a very 
ordinary and everyday cyberculture. All sorts of genres and imaginaries are 
built into and played out of video games: military, domestic, cute, fantastical, 
managerial and so on. Cyberpunk is now just one, and a relatively niche taste at 
that. Instead, we have the intense and intimate circuits of human and machine 
played out daily in bedrooms, on mobile phones on the bus and so on. Now 
the cyborg is mundane, the microethologist needs to be careful not to miss the 
marvellous within everyday technoculture. 
 Sandy Bay, in both its virtual and actual aspects, should also remind us that 
systems, whether ludic or machinic, are never closed. As Gregory Bateson 
explains, whilst systems such as steam engines, societies and computers can 
be studied or described as closed circuits, formed from internal ‘chains of 
causation’, they are never completely closed off  from their wider environments. 
Th is ‘second order cybernetics’ insists that systems are always open. In physical 
terms, and the laws of thermodynamics, systems must be energized from an 
external source and lose heat to the outside; but also, and more importantly 
for understanding the cultural-ecological operations of systems, ‘events within 
the circuit may be infl uenced from the outside or may infl uence outside events’ 
(Bateson 1972, 404). Th e next chapter will explore further the eccentric loops 
between play, imagination, technologies, media images and bodies, moving out 
from the virtual gameworld, but still concentrating on the play between the 
material and the immaterial. 
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 Notes
 1  University of Edinburgh research project on unsupervised computer joke 
generation. ‘Natalie Haynes’s Brave New Algo-World’, BBC Radio 4, Wednesday 8th 
January 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03nt9vk. 
 2  In their multimedia fl exibility and ludic aff ordances, smart phones and mobile 
devices are toys for older children and adults too (see  Lister et al. 2009 , 252–253). 
 3  Th ough probably not an issue for most WoW players in the age group covered by 
this book, there have been legal challenges by Blizzard, the game’s designers, to 
the external production of soft ware bots that automate key aspects of the game 
for players, such as resource-gathering and fi ghting. Th ese are games that can play 
themselves, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7314353.stm. 
 4  Championship Manager is not the only game that aestheticizes the spreadsheet. 
‘ SimCity 4 was literally prototyped in Excel. Th ere were no graphics – it was just a 
bunch of numbers – but you could type a code that represented a particular type of 
building and the formulae built into the spreadsheet would then decide how much 
power it had and how many people would live there’. Interview with  SimCity lead 
designer Stone Librande,  http://v-e-n-u-e.com/Sim-City-An-Interview-with-Stone-
Librande . Accessed 12 February 2014. 
 5  Oft en written into the game code to allow the designers to be able to test the game 
whilst under construction, ‘cheats’ have been a fundamental aspect of game culture 
since the fi rst home computers ( Haddon 1994 ,  Consalvo 2007 ,  Kücklich 2008 ). 
 6  Th e animation of toys, objects and environments seems intrinsic to the psychic 
dimensions of children’s culture from the magical living objects of fairy stories 
and the animation of toys in play to game avatars and virtual pets. Th ere must be a 
connection with D.W. Winnicott’s theories of transitional objects, ‘which must seem 
to give warmth, or to move, or to have texture, or to do something that seems to 
show it has vitality or reality of its own’ ( Winnicott 1974 , 7). 
 7  Or until the entropy that such games have designed into them (precisely to 
necessitate and prompt human input) brings about the crash of the simulated city, 
country or ants’ nest in a virtual economic and/or environmental catastrophe. 
 8  For further description of the machinic and aesthetic articulations of Lego video 
games (in this case,  Lego Star Wars ), see  Giddings and Kennedy 2008 . 

 Playground games and computer games are structurally similar, then. 
Th ey both feature rule-governed structures, quantifi ed assets, obstacles and 
challenges, dynamic ‘engines’ of play. Th ey can vary from loose improvisation 
to tight rule structures. Like drama, and indeed any kind of fi ction, they 
involve an imagined world of some kind whose governing principles are 
understood to be diff erent from those of the ‘real’ world […] Both kinds of 
game provide complex, oft en impenetrable forms of pleasure which range from 
the purely ludic – beating the rules of the game – to the representational – the 
pleasures of mimicry and role-play. ( Burn 2013 , 124) 
 25 February 2007. It’s the last Sunday of the school half-term holiday, and we’re 
at the Adventure Play Ground (APG) at Windmill Hill City Farm in Bristol. Th e 
sky is overcast, and the players and playworkers are chased in and out of the 
APG building or under play structures by the occasional shower of rain. Th ere 
are only a handful of other kids there, a few drift  in and out, the other diehards 
are two girls of around 10 and two boys of around twelve. Th ere are three or four 
playworkers. 
 Jo, Alex and Sam (aged between seven and nine) are playing  Star Wars . Th e 
game is primarily conducted through light sabre battles with sticks. Th e sticks are 
broken from branches lying around the edge of the APG. At fi rst glance the game 
would be familiar across generations of boys’ play: boisterous free-wheeling arms 
and sticks, bodies leaping from play equipment and the negotiation of acceptable 
and unacceptable behaviour. Occasionally details of the  Star Wars diegesis or 
narrative infl ect the boys’ dramatic pronouncements and performative gestures 
and actions – evident throughout the play is a fl ickering of point of reference 
from the  Star Wars fi lms to the  Lego Star Wars video games. 
 6
 Play Grounds : Th e Material 
and Immaterial in Play
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 Th e interpenetration of the actual and the virtual, the material and the 
intangible, is a central concern throughout this book. Th is chapter stops to 
address the actual and the material in play and games through a microethological 
study of a play event that took place without the immediate presence of any 
sophisticated technology. Outdoor play with sticks, climbing frames, friends and 
action and characters inspired by children’s media is both  pre-digital , in that – 
broadly – the materials and activities of the gameworld are the same as children’s 
gameworlds long before the widespread availability of computer entertainment 
media, and – as we have seen throughout this book –  post-digital in that the 
game itself is suff used with images and characters from computer games, and 
is shaped and directed at least in part by the peculiar spaces, conventions and 
repetitious temporalities of computer games. So, fi rstly, this chapter develops 
an ethological attention to the materiality of play and bodies in play (including 
natural objects, play technologies, human bodies); secondly, it extends this 
concern for the material to ask how we might conceptualize the very real, but 
 immaterial play elements or bodies (such as mental imagery, media images, 
conversation and collective or intersubjective imagination) as they come 
together with the material; and thirdly, it will refl ect on how this gameworld 
can be understood as actual in the era of virtual media – both in terms of its 
transductions of video games and in the rethinking of play in general, pre- and 
post-digital, in the light of virtual media. It will pick up on the suggestion at the 
end of the last chapter – that imagination in play might itself be transducted and 
distributed across the material and the immaterial. 
 Th e microethology of this event of ‘free play’ will explore the nature of these 
worlds within worlds, the kinds of spaces or timespaces they generate, their 
patterns and dynamics and the phantasmagorical realities they are constituted 
by, or bring into being. Th e game – or games – was populated by characters, 
scenarios and technologies from the media universe of  Star Wars (and others) 
in a imaginative engagement with transmedial ecology of children’s popular 
culture. Th ey were also formed from the material environment of the playground 
and its buildings (play equipment, sticks, offi  ce stationery), as these artefacts 
both initiated play events and were transformed by them. 
 Talking into being
 Th e game began with talk, the boys standing on a play structure, a house-like 
wooden construction with a ramp leading up to it ( Figure 6.1 ). Sam decided he 
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 Figure 6.1 Prelude: Talking  Star Wars 
will be Luke Skywalker, Jo claimed Anakin as his alter ego. Th e talk continued for 
some minutes, sometimes the children seemed to be talking just to themselves, 
conjuring up the world they want to inhabit, sketching in the environment and 
agonistic motive for the action to come. Th e brothers Jo and Alex argued. Th ey 
have had occasional arguments in the past over Alex’s refusal to conform to 
the accuracy and continuity of the  Star Wars transmedia universe of fi lms, and 
games and television series, and the particular scenarios Jo wishes to inhabit. Th e 
controversy was not so intractable as to stop the emergence of the game, though 
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over the next half an hour or so it fl ared up from time to time, temporarily 
stopping play. I – from my position as interested observer from the sidelines – 
was asked to arbitrate. One such interruption was caused by Alex’s dissatisfaction 
with ‘Episode 6’, the starting point, and most consistently inhabited scenario in 
this particular game. Th e reference here is to  Th e Return of the Jedi , the third 
fi lm to be produced (in 1983), but with the subsequent ‘prequels’ becomes in 
narrative terms the last in a series of six. Interestingly, the children made little 
distinction in their talk or games between the fi lm itself and its remediation in 
the  Lego Star Wars games that they had also recently been playing. Th e ending to 
‘Episode 6’ in particular off ended Alex: 
 A (rhetorically): 
  ‘What happens to Luke?’ 
 ‘What happens to the ghosts?’ 
 Alex announces that he is instead going to play ‘Episode 7’, a storyworld of his 
own invention. Episode 7 is conjured into existence there and then, but its central 
protagonist – Starjumper – is a well-established creation of his. Starjumper fi rst 
made an appearance in our house two or three years before, but had not been 
heard of for quite some time until this game. Th is did not settle the dispute over 
diegesis, however: Jo is very annoyed about this multiplication of playworlds, 
and loudly accuses Alex of ‘cheating’. 
 Despite the momentary vehemence of this argument the game quickly sprang 
back to life and circulated around the playground, gathering its forces at key 
landmarks and particularly useful play structures. It appeared that the imaginary 
scaff olding of play such as this shift s or mutates according to the shift ing modes 
of play itself: rules, settings, characters, quests must be clearly established as 
the gameworld is talked and negotiated into being, but once the swirling and 
fl ailing game itself is under way the details are superceded by bodily actions 
and performances that sweep up semiotic and gestural material from other fi lms 
and games and the play is much more forgiving of continuity errors. Th e close 
agreement required in the talking prelude diverged into a kind of imaginative 
parallelism as the boys held in their imaginations individual iterations of the 
gameworld, and their dynamic role within it, with the others’ actions generically 
appropriate enough to sustain and develop a looser but more exciting collective 
imaginative world. 
 A little later they argued about whether they are on Hoth or another planet, the 
name of which I didn’t catch. Alex is a wampa, a yeti-like creature indigenous to 
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the icy planet Hoth in  Th e Empire Strikes Back . Th is sudden attention to location 
was triggered, I thought on refl ection, by the coincidence of two factors. Up until 
this point whilst the narrative positioning of the game was of great importance, 
its geography hadn’t been signifi cant, but when Alex took the role of the wampa 
the distinct climatic character of this monster came to the fore, its white fur 
inseparable from its snowy environment. At around this time in the game a 
shower of light rain started. In a simple but powerful procedure of semiotic 
synthesis, the fi ctional world and the actual environment were fused to create 
a novel material-semiotic environment: a new (un-named) planet analogous to 
Hoth but characterized by rain rather than snow. Alex soon joined in with the 
energetic wielding of sticks in a game of light sabre combat. Th ese stick-wielding 
performances are kinaesthetically sophisticated, but their symbolic consistency 
less so, and wampadom was forgotten, and the new planet disappeared as if it 
had never existed. 
 Th e younger  Star Wars boys paid little attention, as they were engrossed in 
their light sabre driven play ( Figure 6.2 ). Th ey broke off  now and then, the talk 
oft en returning to the  Lego Star Wars game. 
 Figure 6.2 Sticks, swords and sabres 
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 J:  ‘in one of them if you get a full minikit you get a ghost – an Obi Wan or Yoda 
ghost’. 
 Sam had decided that an adult should be included in the stick battles, and 
while he waited for a reluctant playworker to join them, handed me a stick and I 
too became a light sabre wielding character. Sam, who had a marked taste for the 
nonsensical and had aff ected to have forgotten my name (he has known me most 
of his life), had already named me George Washington, so I was not allocated a 
proper character (perhaps because I was merely a stand-in). Th is shift  in number 
of players from three to four suggested a team-based dynamic as Jo and I take 
on Sam and Alex. Th ere was some narrative logic to this pairing though in the 
resulting melee of both bodies and identifi cations I did not grasp it. I think at 
one point both Anakin Skywalker and Darth Vader were involved which should 
have off ended Jo’s sense of diegetic accuracy but which seemed to pass unnoticed 
in the swirling action of this particular game-mode. 
 Apart from this brief involvement in the main drive of the play event I kept to 
the sidelines, or more precisely a small wooden shelter where I could sit and read 
out of the rain. My kids had been inside a lot over the preceding week’s holiday 
and had seen a great deal of me so were not as enthusiastic about my involvement 
as Sam was. I did play some roles, though, mainly referee between my two sons’ 
periodic sulks and fallings-out, but I was also an intermittent audience for Sam’s 
nonsense performance, including an accomplished rendition of the theme to 
the Mel Brooks’ fi lm  Robin Hood: Men in Tights . I also helped to make new 
light sabres, breaking off  lengths of branch from the pile of branches near my 
shelter. Th e wood was new and green so took some bending and splitting before 
it could be separated. My stronger fi ngernails helped to strip bark from one end 
to accentuate a bright (green) light sabre appearance. 
 Th e environment of the playground
 Game spaces are fashioned from the material characteristics and features of the 
environment, as well as from imaginative and cognitive operations. As described 
in the last chapter, video game worlds suggest ways of rethinking actual 
environments (and vice versa) – as space and time, as lawful or rule-bound, as 
aff ordances and constraints, as material and immaterial. Th ere is a persistent 
view, evident from Romantic poetry and painting to today’s dire predictions for 
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children’s technoculture, that the child is truly at play (only truly a child) when 
he or she is immersed in the natural world. ‘Natural’ here means the countryside, 
plant and animal life, the weather: 
 In the creative perceptions of poet and child we are close to the biology of thought 
itself – close, in fact, to the ecology of imagination, in which the energies of the 
body and mind as a unit, and ecosystem, and the energies of nature combine in 
a mutual endeavour to adapt to nature, to culture, and to the societies devised by 
man to everybody culture. ( Cobb 1977 , 109) 
 Edith Cobb’s ecological thinking, infl uenced by her friends Margaret Mead and 
Gregory Bateson, does not rule out the artifi cial objects of children’s culture. 
Her notion of the child’s ‘cosmo-poetic exploration of the environment’ includes 
plastic play with blocks, paint, ‘any amorphous or semi-structured material 
(e.g. sand, twigs, and stones)’ ( Cobb 1977 , 30). However, the amorphous 
and semi-structured material is signifi cant here: there is a strong tradition of 
thought, from the education pioneer Friedrich Froebel in the early nineteenth 
century to Margaret Lowenfeld’s therapeutic gameworlds of sand and water in 
the twentieth, through to everyday and popular discourses on toys, that toys or 
other playable fragments of the child’s environment should be as semiotically 
and formally indistinct or open as possible ( Lowenfeld 2008 [1935]). Th e 
young child’s imagination, it is oft en felt, should not be scaff olded or guided 
by inbuilt and prescribed stories, characters or shapes (an attitude clearly 
echoed in critiques of children’s media culture outlined in earlier chapters). 
Just as ethnographic work on children’s play with media resources reveals 
much more fl uid and creative events than predicted, though, close studies of 
play with physical objects and environments, both indoors and outdoors, trace 
similar complex interrelationships between resources and events. School and 
park playgrounds off er a wide variety of armatures for play and games. Some of 
these are intentional – climbing frames, painted courts or hopscotch matrices 
and so on, others are either improvized for moments of play or established as 
persistent cultural sites and technologies in their own right, oft en reproducing 
games down generations and for decades: 
 Every feature of the playground is used: the corners and walls of the buildings; 
the fences (as ‘home’, or for tying one end of a skipping rope); the ledge outside 
the largest temporary classroom (for walking along, or as a vantage point, or for 
a game of King of the Castle); the fl at drain covers (as sanctuaries or as marble 
boards); the small cavities at the foot of ‘the marbles fence’, where the asphalt 
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meets the grit surface of the lane; the dust-bowl at the edge of the grass, used 
for fl inging toy cars. ( Opie 1993 , 11) 
 June Factor describes a remarkably persistent material-semiotic culture built 
into and from the micro-topography of a school playground: 
 Its inhabitants – children – have developed, sometimes over generations, a map 
of the school grounds which designates functions and attributes values to every 
major feature: open space, treed space, benches, shelter-shed, toilets, grass, 
asphalt, tree roots, secluded corners, verandahs, rubbish bins. ( Factor 2004 , 143) 
 A fallen tree becomes a spaceship for generations of boys, its control panels and 
components shaped from ‘the intricate crevices, lumps and nodes caused by the 
decaying wood’ (Russell 1994, 93, in  Factor 2004 , 147). Whilst two girls, on a 
public thoroughfare with trees, leaves, log fences played ‘princesses and fl ying 
unicorns’: 
 Th e girls used the physical and natural features of their chosen play-site to 
represent their home and other far-away lands they travelled to … [one girl’s] 
bed was a low pine fence, her shop was a pile of stones, and the kitchen a clump 
of bushes with a strategically located sawed-off  branch which served as the 
controls for the oven. (Russell 1994, in  Factor 2004 , 147–148) 
 Th ere is a two-way fl ow between environment and children. Th rough an 
ecological feedback loop, the former seems animated, like a video game world, 
attracting children to its playful aff ordances: 
 Objects oft en call out for the young child’s attention and exploration: the grass 
must be run through and rolled in, the sand and earth should be dug up, beakers 
need to be fi lled with water and then emptied again although, curiously, the 
toilet does not necessarily call out to be peed in. Th is engagement with the world 
is an interlocution, a dialogue – an object calls out to the child and the child 
answers. ( Aitken and Herman 1997 , 83) 
 An object can call out to the child, and that call can triangulate with a fantastical 
idea from the imagination or media source in play. For example, a skipping rope 
in a superheroes game discussed in the next chapter was picked up and used by 
one of the boys, Henry, for just ‘skipping’, a long-established and fl exible play 
practice with its own physical demands and expertise. Yet this familiarity itself 
seemed to form the nucleus of new games, attracting the thematic symbolic 
elements fl oating around from other recent and potential games. It quickly 
became ‘really fast skipping’ for Henry, a superpower inspired by Dash from  Th e 
Incredibles ( Richards 2013 , 77). 
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 Experience in childhood is never formal or abstract. Even the world of nature is 
not a ‘scene’, or even a landscape […] the child’s world, his surroundings, are not 
separated into nature and artefact. Th is environment consists of the information 
fed back to his own body by environmental stimuli. Th is responsiveness includes 
all levels of the child as a functioning organism. ( Cobb 1977 , 28–29) 
 The bulk of Cobb’s observations of play predate children’s media culture, 
but her conceptualization of play as environmental, informational and 
responsive offers a suggestive model for describing the artificial as well 
natural domains of the child’s world (though I’m not sure she would have 
seen it this way). 
 Here is an example of the way in which the material gameworld, and 
particularly the embodied behaviours of the players, can be shaped by the 
immaterial forms of video games in particular. As we saw in the last chapter, 
video games insist that certain cognitive functions and imaginative processes are 
delegated to their subroutines. Th ey keep score, note location and orientation 
and enforce death. If a Lego man is submerged or a soldier is shot the gameworld 
notes it, and responds accordingly – the avatar disappears and respawns 
elsewhere. When transducted into the less precise material bodies and spaces of 
an actual playground, new negotiations must be made, and new ways of playing 
devised: 
 Andrew:  What would happen if you shot someone else and they got killed, then, in 
that game, what would they do, would they fall over? 
 Martin:  No, they’d have to bob down like that ( crouches down ) but none of my 
friends agree that they’d got shot, so you go round prrrrtttt ( mimes shooting 
again ). 
 Andrew:  So no one would agree to be dead? 
 Martin:  No, but in the [computer] game, you fall down, the person falls down 
when they do it, and then has fi ve seconds, and then gets back up. ( Burn 2013 , 
130–131) 
 Th e children have to devise a performative surrogation of the non-negotiable 
registration of game death. Free from soft ware control, other players refuse to 
imagine their own fatality and the rhythm of the game breaks down. I don’t 
remember this problem in the shooting games in my own childhood; it seems 
that having been delegated to the computer game’s functional imagination, the 
return of this gestural-semiotic game mechanic to the actual playground and 
human imagination is something of a disappointment: 
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 Because physical play cannot reproduce the programmed certainty of this 
ludic system, it falls back on mimicry (bobbing the head), ineff ectually 
supported by an agreement that this will be the consequence of being shot. 
( Burn 2013 , 131) 
 Th e delegation of game rules, frames and other aspects to soft ware is a 
complicated but signifi cant shift ing of the circuits of agency in play. As I have 
argued, the  actual environments and objects of play, from the manhole cover 
in the playground to the articulate and articulated smart toy, have always 
suggested, triggered, shaped and sustained games and imaginative behaviour. 
In the previous chapter, I noted the idea that the rules of a game are oft en 
embedded in the gameworld as ‘laws’, analogous to the physical laws of actual 
play. Gravity imposes the law that ‘fl ying’ players must stay on the ground, or 
leave it only briefl y in a jump or with assistance from the simple technics of a 
swing or climbing frame. A player, in the intensity of the moment of  as-if fl ight, 
may feel themselves almost fl ying – virtually fl ying – and this must be the game 
as embodied experience as well as aesthetic or performative form. 
 Caillois observes that many actual games do not imply rules. Th e performance 
of cops and robbers, for instance, or the technically enhanced make-believe of 
dolls houses ‘presuppose free improvisation’. Th ey involve playing roles, ‘ as if 
one were someone or something else’. Th is fi ction – the  as if itself – replaces 
rules: 
 Rules themselves create fi ctions by the very fact of complying with their 
respective rules, is separated from real life where there is no activity that literally 
corresponds to any of these games [they] are played  for real .  As if is not necessary. 
( Caillois 1962 , 8) 
 Replace cops and robbers and dolls houses with their digital descendants 
 Grand Th eft  Auto and  Th e Sims , and the complex circuits between rules, laws 
and the as-if are unplugged and reconnected. Jo and Alex recently showed me a 
carnivalesque little mini-game they had devised in a break from the hard work 
of conducting crime in  Grand Th eft  Auto . Th rough game settings or a cheat, 
they turned down the virtual gravity as one might turn down the volume on a 
television. Rather than trotting through the virtual city as normal, the gangster 
avatar now leapt ludicrously high above the streets, twisting and writhing, 
before crashing down and leaping up again. He looked to me like an animated 
version of Robert Longo’s life-size drawings of business men and women 
suspended, ecstatic, in mid air. Th e virtuality of as-if fl ight is transducted into 
the technological virtuality of the game system; the imaginative operation is 
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transformed and split – partly into the playful manipulation of the soft ware 
(the tweaking of virtual gravity) and partly delegated to the soft ware itself 
(its machinic enactment of a fl ight that is no longer impossible, just not 
the gameworld’s default option). A similar logic can be applied to  Th e Sims : 
the child no longer directly animates the dolls in their as-if aliveness, the 
soft ware does that. A degree of imaginative control is ceded to the prosthetic 
imagination. Th us the intangibility of children’s imagination is not only laid 
over inert but compelling material, it is also delegated to machinic analogues. 
Th is process by no means replaces human imagination, as the critics of digital 
play might have it; it extends and augments it – rendering it poorer in some 
aspects but opening all sorts of new games and meta-games (as we’ll see in the 
next chapter, ‘Real Worlds’). 
 Th e space-time of play
 Like video games, time is a key dimension in actual play. Th e simple fact of 
duration, child psychologist Donald Winnicott argued, renders it real: ‘playing is 
an experience, always a creative experience, and it is an experience in the space-
time continuum, a basic form of living’ ( Winnicott 1974 , 67). Th e stopwatch 
punches the intense and formalized activity of competitive sport into precise 
periods. Imaginative play warps time and space into polyrhythms of frenetic 
and languid activity, and is characterized by repetitions and circularities as 
much as by the linear continuities of quests and stories. Th ese rhythms are set 
by immaterial factors such as degrees of agreement, resonance of imaginary 
framings between players and by material factors from the regulation by school 
bells of playtimes to the energy levels of the children themselves. Lili Peller 
explains that in dramatic play 
 there are frequent interludes in which the ideational content runs low or gets 
confused and hazy and only the pleasure in some kind of manipulation or 
repetition keeps the children going. ( Peller 1971 [1952], 122) 
 Moreover, adult attention – whether family or academic – tends to notice play as 
a sequence of more or less coherent imaginative or competitive games, and not 
the fl ows between games nor their repetitions and returns: 
 Written records of children’s family and households play have a tendency to 
gloss over its incoherences and sudden shift s […] Yet the play of children under 
fi ve usually resembles less a stage play more a dream. Th ere are duplications 
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of persons and episodes, sudden changes of locality – all of which just don’t 
make sense, not even to the observer who knows the players well. It’s amazing 
how children can apparently enjoy playing ‘together’ for a long time, their ideas 
clicking for a while – then go far apart. ( Peller 1971 [1952], 122) 
 For all its shift s of rhythm and mutating media frame of reference, there was 
a certain continuity and fl ow to the  Star Wars game. At moments, though, 
it was punctuated by what I can only refer to as equivalent to a video game 
‘mini-game’. At some subtle signal or cue the three boys ran across the APG 
to the far corner and an arrangement of green netting strung between some 
small trees. Once climbed-into, the webbing took on a hammock-like form 
and the children seemed at fi rst to be having a rest from the frenetic activity 
of the game-event. Yet these interludes (this activity was repeated three or 
four times), these gaps in play, are themselves games, suggested by the 
characteristics of the assemblage of boys, webbing, the shapes and dimensions 
of movement the boys-in-webbing formed, and generating their own symbolic 
points of reference. Initially they were in hammocks. Alex was particularly 
enthusiastic about this as he was always excited by pirates, and he rocked 
from side to side contentedly. Th e others climbed in and the hammockness 
diminished as the tangle of bodies disrupted both the rhythm and the form. 
To me on the outside it had mutated into a bean pod — an idea which amused 
the boys who adopted bean-ness enthusiastically. However, probably due to 
the kinaesthetic and dramatic limitations of this as a game, it lasted only a few 
seconds. It quickly became clear that the green webbing/tree assemblage is not 
an optimum play mechanism for three children. Muddy shoes are too close to 
other’s heads and the combined weight results in the middle bean bumping 
on the ground. With two boys in the pod, however, the hammock and pirates 
returned, this time driven by the third boy’s rocking of the webbing, a motion 
loudly interpreted by the general assemblage as analogous to pirates trying to 
sleep in hammocks in a stormy sea ( Figure 6.3 ). 
 Th e Adventure Play Ground is a space set aside and designed for play. 
Th e children present had their own temporal boundaries, set by parental 
expectations, meal times and so on. Within this encompassing space and time, 
though, the playing itself demonstrated a resistance to any simple mapping 
or schedule. In spatial terms, the games seem to coalesce around particular 
locations or structures rather than draw a touchline or magic circle around 
themselves. 
 Th ere were delimited zones within the APG within which the sabreplay 
was manifested, areas with enough elbow room for the fl ailing sticks. Material 
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 Figure 6.3 Hammocks and bean pods 
structures with particularly rich symbolic possibilities (the webbing), but which 
also set in train temporal and kinaesthetic rhythms of iterative games and 
swaying hammocks. Th e players’ bodies themselves were zoned according to 
which parts (including their stick extensions) were acceptable to strike. Th ere 
was a temporal dimension to this zoning in which initially tacitly (though 
clearly) demarcated zones are progressively approached and breached: a giddy 
transgression. 
 Th e games had no spatio-temporal boundaries, then, but rather a gravitational 
pull – either a physical structure (a wooden boat, a webbing hammock) or an 
intensity of imaginative or kinaesthetic activity (the talking of the game, the 
swirling of the sabre fi ghts). Th ere were no centres of gravity as such, the games 
shift ed and overlapped too much, but there was a kind of centripetal force that 
gave some durational and symbolic cohesion – eccentric orbits around an idea 
or an action. Th e best analogy I can come up with is that of a skateboarder or 
BMX rider in a skate park. Th e circling up and around a bowl is formed by the 
interaction of momentum, skill, concrete topography and gravity. Movement is 
fl uid and improvized but contained and tropic, always looping back towards, 
but not necessarily reaching, the centre of the bowl. However, when skaters – by 
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accident or design – achieve a trajectory or velocity that ejects them from the 
bowl they don’t exit playspace, they take fl ight into the neighbouring bowl – 
another centre-less centre of gravity. Th e boys’ sudden arcs out of the  Star Wars 
battles and over to the webbing hammocks, and back again was for me the result 
of this interplay between the pull of a game (around a particularly compelling 
fantasy or exciting physical activity) and a centrifugal force (of a competing idea, 
boredom, distraction) that eff ects a phase transition. 
 Just as there are no spatial boundaries, the start and end of these loose 
games, then, are not signalled by a whistle or even the clear formality of the 
long-established counting-out techniques of playground games (‘eeny meeny 
miney mo’) or the winning state. Observers of children’s play and games have 
noted the transitions into and between games in space-time as well as their 
structures, rules and rhymes. Th is account by Iona Opie beautifully captures the 
rolling individuation of a game from inchoate behaviour: 
 We strolled over to where a game was brewing. Six or seven children were 
concentrating on each other, becoming active, becoming a self-reacting entity. 
Th eir faces were animated, they communicated with quick smiles. Th ey started 
running in diff erent directions. One of them shouted, ‘Who’s on it?’ and another 
replied, ‘Helen’s on it.’ ‘I’m no-ot,’ shouted Helen. Th e confusion about who 
was chaser made the game more fun: muddle is in itself intoxicating, and they 
laughed immoderately. A boy, meeting them head-on, was brought into the 
game. He ran away; then realizing he had run beyond the boundaries of the 
game, ran back towards the others. ‘Who’s supposed to be on it now?’ they called 
to each other, giggling. ‘I think it’s Nicky’. ( Opie 1993 , 84–85) 1  
 Th e game swept up the boy, but his own momentum nearly ejected him from 
it immediately before he realized the boundary – relative to the movement and 
intensity and not to actual space – and looped back in. 
 Actual play spaces (and times) may be ‘pure’ as Caillois asserts, but they 
are not homogenous, nor topographic. Finite but without boundaries, they 
spread their map over the heterogeneous territories of the physical and media 
environments from Hoth to the Spanish Main. 
 Bodies
 Back in the stick-fi ghting arena, a playworker braved the drizzle and joined 
the fray. She decided to be Darth Maul, a choice that was no doubt suggested 
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by a strange little mini-game that will be detailed below. As has been noted, 
the early insistence on diegetic accuracy and concomitant close identifi cation 
with specifi c characters that may characterize the beginning of a game will 
oft en evaporate as it shift s more into the material realm of the environment, 
bodies and kinaesthetic action. Th e main motive and activity was now the 
stick battles. Th ese were conducted in the form of sword fi ghts in fi lms in 
which the alternate angled blocking of the other’s sword is performed rather 
than any serious attempt to make body contact through thrusting or stabbing 
motions. My slip here from ‘light sabre’ to ‘sword’ is intentional as it follows 
the children’s own performances (much more swashbuckling than the martial 
arts-infl uenced  Star Wars fi ghts) and speech (they slip into talking about sword 
fi ghts too). Th e material characteristics and aff ordances of physical sticks lend 
themselves much more to cinematic sword-fi ghting than they do to the fantasy 
technologies and techniques of the light sabre. No doubt this is another example 
of playful collapsing of time and space as the momentary pirate world of the 
green webbing was looped into the overdetermined swordplay. And as I wrote 
up my notes I realized that Sam’s rendition of  Robin Hood: Men in Tights must 
of course have been triggered by that fi lm’s scenes of sword-fi ghting. So much 
of children’s knowledge of literary, cinematic and other cultural narratives, 
themes and characters comes to them fi ltered and ludically transducted through 
parodies and comedy, from Halloween’s festive fl attening of the gothic to the 
voracious parodic machine of  Th e Simpsons . 
 Th e patterns of play emerged from this risky coming together of bodies 
and weapons. A distinct rhythm was established: an initial and tentative 
clicking of sticks by opponents, carefully angled and alternating in a pattern 
familiar from action fi lm swordfi ghts. Th is careful alternation would increase 
in tempo as the fi ghters’ confi dence grew, faster and faster until the respectful 
turn-taking degenerated into fl ailing arms and sticks, and – inevitably – the 
contact of stick and body. Knuckles and faces struck accidentally, and backs 
and bottoms deliberately; these collisions punctuate the full-on battles as the 
injured player withdraws and the overexcited assailant stops briefl y, ‘calming 
down’ (a little). Th e duration of the interlude would depend on the severity of 
the injury and the degree of outrage of the injured player. Th en, the fi ght would 
resume, slowly, carefully … Th e gradual positive feedback as the clashing 
sticks are wielded more and more frenziedly is sharply regulated by the event 
of the minor injury, before the fi ghts begin their spiral from simulated to 
actual pain again. Players’ bodies – as borderline accidental targets for stick 
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blows, and as demonstrative, media-choreographed, dramatic dimensions or 
vectors in the game’s manifold – are more or less precisely, diff erentially and 
emergently, mapped and hierarchized. Lines are drawn in space and across 
bodies to be – momentarily, intentionally, tentatively, deliciously even – 
transgressed. 
 Aft er some time, the cluster and clatter of sticks ran low on energy. It 
seemed that there had been little elbow room for diegetic drama and that 
this was needed to re-energize play. With no apparent sign, instruction or 
individual initiative, the pairs split apart in the central arena of the APG, 
one heading towards a tower supporting a zip wire, the other towards a 
small wooden boat in its incongruous dry dock. Immediately this generated 
a geodramatic structure of opposing bases to be stormed and defended. Jo 
mapped this new time-space onto another of his  Star Wars video games,  Star 
Wars Battlefront II , which is based on a well-established videogame motive in 
which play is driven by the capture and defence of an opposing team/army’s 
command posts. 
 A micro-carnival
 Two older boys who have been maintaining an aloof distance from the 
younger children’s frenetic activities have found a roll of red circular sticky 
labels in the play centre offi  ce. Th ey are absent-mindedly sticking them onto 
their hooded tops, fi rst one or two on their chests like badges, then down 
their sleeves in a regular polka dot pattern, on their hands and faces, and 
then a playworker and the two girls join in to completely cover the boys’ 
faces with labels. Th roughout, the key participants remain serious looking, 
refusing to acknowledge verbally or performatively what is clearly a ludicrous 
activity. I hear the phrase ‘phantom of the opera’ from the playworker as she 
fashions this stationery mask, though I am sure that the boys’ frightening 
bright-red faces under their hoods resonate with the surrounding  Star Wars 
worlds – they gather to themselves the fearsome and other-worldly gravitas of 
Darth Maul, without stooping to childish role play ( Figure 6.4 ). For all their 
studied cool, however, this is for them a signifi cant event as, still deadpan and 
mute, they wander off  out of the APG, no doubt to alarm with their freakish 
transformation elsewhere in the City Farm and surrounding streets. Th is 
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 Figure 6.4 Darth Maul stickers 
was on the one hand an improvized, liminoid and tiny instantiation of the 
carnivalesque, and on the other fully part of the logic of children’s role play: 
 It is not enough only to establish an identity for one’s self; it must be established 
for others at the same time. Identities are  announced by those who appropriate 
them and  placed by others. Identities must always be validated in this manner 
to have reality in social interaction. Usually such announcements are silent, 
accomplished by clothing, the posturing of the body, painting of the face, 
sculpting of the hair, the manipulation of props, or the physical location of the 
self on the scene of action. For these reasons, child’s play demands costume and 
body control, and it is facilitated by props and equipment (toys) appropriate to 
the drama. ( Herron and Sutton-Smith 1971 , 12) 
 Th e phantasmagorical nature of play, evident in all of the overlapping and 
nested gameworlds described here, will be examined in detail in the next 
chapter. 
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 Flux of games
 Th e fl owing of play through negotiated storyworlds, kinetic and risky stick 
fi ghts, periodic and iterative retreats and spin-off  performances would later be 
summarized as ‘playing  Star Wars ’. My notes and photographs traced a web of 
material-semiotic metamorphic micro-events – the slippage between  Star Wars 
light sabres and more generic sword fi ght echoed in a song to a fi lm that includes 
swordplay, as do any number of the pirate-related artefacts from children’s culture 
that captured Alex’s imagination from cartoons and dressing up clothes/toys, to 
a stage production of  Treasure Island he had been taken to a few months before. 
Th e peapod/pirate game was both an iterative gameworld and one that emerged, 
as if through some hyperspace or ghostly visitation, in the sabre/sword melee, 
the swords/sabres summoned pirates and the wider media trope of spectacular 
cinematic swordplay. Th is non-linear dynamic of aff ect across time and space 
no doubt ran through the stickered-up double Darth Maul performance and 
the playworker-Darth Maul’s spirited engagement. Darth Maul himself was 
distributed over a pair of boys with stickers and a playworker with a stick. 
Swords, sabres and light sabres, or perhaps more accurately, the performance 
and kinaesthesia of dramatic swordplay, twisted and swung like the webbing 
throughout the general fi eld of play that aft ernoon. 
 Against the formalist notion of games as clearly delineated structures 
and activities, defi ned by in part by their end points and winning states, this 
aft ernoon reminded me of Deleuze and Guattari’s adoption of Bateson’s notion 
of the ‘plateau’ as a 
 Vibrant and continuous area of intensities that develops by avoiding every 
orientation towards a culminating point or external end. ( Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987 , 24) 
 Where is the  Star Wars universe on these plateaus? Th e ‘as if ’ framing of the 
collective pretend games sketched out a fl uid symbolic and physical assemblage, 
and not a coherent and consistent imaginary world. Th e game and its mini-games, 
eff ortlessly mutated, was abandoned, and returned to. Th rough the process 
of being talked into existence, and then in the very diff erent dynamic of free-
wheeling physical play, the adherence to particular video game or fi lm episodes 
and characters were condensed and transposed, at times cycled through like a 
video game player fl icking through the inventory for the appropriate weapon 
or tool for the challenge at hand.  Star Wars itself at times fades from the talk 
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and gestures, the stick light sabres become swords, pirates come and go and two 
Darth Mauls manifest in three bodies. 
 Th is was no paracosm – if I hadn’t had a pencil and paper there would be 
no trace of its vibrant intensities apart from the stripped sticks and the empty 
reels of stickers. Th e kids would have forgotten it by the next day. In the event 
itself, it was never only in one child’s head. Collective imaginative play is real but 
intangible and immaterial – it couldn’t even be said to exist as neuroelectrical 
activity, as we might speak of the materiality of virtual space in the magnetic 
particles of memory storage because it wasn’t formed in only one child’s mind but 
across three. It was constituted in the space between them and the playground, 
fi nding material form here and there in a stick, a gesture, an exclamation and a 
plastic net. 
 Note
 1  See also a video recording in the British Library of a child’s explanation of the three 
games they are playing: ‘ Star Wars , “the tree one”, and Tigers – all at once’, and the 
researchers’ description of the play environment: 
 Th e area is contoured with mounds resembling low hills and is covered with a 
slightly shock absorbing material – in this case coloured in greens with blue to 
represent a river running through the landscape. Th ere are also tree stumps dotted 
throughout this area. Th e kind of play shown here involves imaginary confl icts and 
belongs to a broad spectrum of play involving agonistic scenarios – play exploring 
confl ict, contest, challenge and resolution and including family feuds and disputes, 
military manoeuvres, superhero battles and even football. Th e sources for some of 
the play here include Tae Kwon Do lessons at a local college (and advertised in the 
school’s reception area), stories about big cats (from the classroom),  Star Wars … and 
a mix of additional generic media sources. In these examples, physical contact is 




 My daughter knew that Brownie was only a ‘pretend mouse’ – this was how 
she used to refer to him. One day she spilt a glass of milk and accused Brownie. 
To my ‘but I thought he was pretend!’, she told me earnestly that ‘he’s getting 
realer and realer’. He was her companion for about four years. 1  
 Make-believe is ‘accompanied by a special awareness of a second reality or 
of a free unreality, as against real life’. ( Caillois 1962 , 9) 
 Play has always prompted refl ection on the tissue boundary between reality and 
fantasy, and virtual media bring new technological realms and animate entities 
to the layering or multiplication of everyday realities. Th is chapter will pick up 
the theme of virtual and actual realities that have been addressed in diff erent 
ways in the earlier chapters. Th roughout this book, I have preferred to use the 
term  as-if , to refer to the generation of moments and events of imaginative play, 
rather than the ostensibly synonymous ‘let’s pretend’ or ‘make-believe’. I want to 
keep hold of the sense of play and games as  real that runs through the most astute 
and productive theories and descriptions of children’s play and culture that I 
have drawn on here. Whether material or immaterial, embodied in equipment 
and machines or imagined, mundane reality is transformed or multiplied in play. 
Th e opening gambit of the  as-if , the approaching or becoming real of the  virtual , 
Caillois’s ‘second reality’ are all – like VR – accessed through technologies and 
techniques and experienced in bodies (not only human) as real. Th is chapter 
will off er approaches to describing the signifi cance of the multiple and shift ing 
realities of everyday play for understanding children’s culture today. It is 
particularly interested in the  immaterial or intangible in play and everyday life: 
the operations, eff ects, aff ects and behaviours of soft ware code and entities, and 
virtual physics, but also dreams, fantasies, collective and individual imaginations. 
 7
 Real Worlds: Realities, Virtualities 
and the Protopolitics of Play 
138 Gameworlds
 My concern throughout is with imaginative play events, particularly those in 
and around video games and other playful virtual media. Th ese are a signifi cant 
aspect of contemporary childhood in the developed world, but they are only one 
part. Th ese gameworlds come into being in the networks of commercial children’s 
media and Internet media, within domestic and educational environments and 
discourses that are themselves shaped by the power relationships of families, 
schools, and cut across by social stratifi cations of gender, class and ethnicity. 
Th ere is an ongoing, if intermittent, politics of children’s culture that addresses 
the representational and material resources for play available to children, 
generally concerned about the rigid gendering of toys and popular media, and 
concomitant questions of the resources for identity formation and aspiration 
as children move towards adult life. In recent years, for instance, there have 
been widespread concerns that consumer capitalism has been encroaching on 
childhood by thrusting adult, and hyper-gendered, behaviours into children’s 
lives and play, with the marketing of make-up and sexualized clothing for ‘tween’ 
girls or the violent, military themes of video games with adult ratings but played 
extensively by younger boys. 
 Children’s play today worms its way through the rigid gendering of toys and 
narrative media and the commercial imagineering of transmedia and online 
spaces. However, as I argued in  Chapter 4 , research that assumes or reads off  
playful behaviour from these powerful political and economic realities and 
their materials, media and environments may miss the peculiar imaginative and 
physical inversions and fantastical operations of children in play. If a critical 
concern with children’s culture begins and ends with a critique of the mimetic 
dimension of the media and toy resources available, then the concern could be 
counterproductive. In this book, I have tried to work from the momentary events 
of gameworlds and playgrounds (virtual and actual) up. Th e dervish circuits of 
imaginative play whip up physical and semiotic material, invert the natural and 
cultural order so that torture is a delight, objects come to life and individuals 
become multiple. Th e profound ambiguities of play seem to subvert and parody, 
but games are also played by the rules. 
 Gameworlds are heterotopian, not utopian. Rules are played with and 
broken as well as obeyed. Children test the roles they see ahead of them, the 
sexualities they are beginning to be aware of. Th e hyper-gendered bodies of 
muscular superheroes and wrestlers or Barbie and the Bratz are compelling 
in an intensity that cannot be explained simply by the power of marketing 
and peer pressure. Th e rigid binaries of male and female, reality and fantasy, 
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child and adult, individual and collective, human and non-human are 
simultaneously exaggerated and dismantled in play. Moreover, attention to the 
events in which media play takes place highlights constraints and aff ordances 
of the material environment from playground furniture to more complicated 
technologies. Th ese connect with and articulate symbolic and narrative 
material but have their own politics designed in or emergent in particular 
moments of use. To oversimplify, it is more important that boys and girls have 
a space that is safe (but not too safe) and open (but with interesting corners) 
in which to play together or around each other and with useful materials to 
mobilize and transform than it is to police the semiotic characteristics of these 
materials. 
 I will tentatively sketch out what I call a protopolitics of play, in which 
realities, agencies, activities and passivities and meta-games seem not only to 
reproduce cultural and social forms, but also to generate new times, spaces 
and assemblages – new realities. I will explore this protopolitics through fi ve 
main overlapping concepts, picking up themes and concepts already discussed 
in this book. Firstly – and briefl y – a note resisting the unqualifi ed celebration 
of children’s imaginative play, and the ambiguities of power and transgression 
in ‘bad play’. Secondly, the ‘multiplication’ of realities, from the real eff ects of 
fantasy to the actualization of the virtual, has been a theme throughout, but 
is essential to an understanding of how intangible phenomena such as the 
imagination and virtual worlds, and play itself, operate within and transform 
everyday life. Th irdly, the peculiar tendency of play to render hierarchies, 
rules and meanings ambiguous or even to invert them – from the momentary 
nonsense of a joke or song to the medieval carnival’s turning of the world upside 
down. Fourth, but closely linked to the third, I will pick up and apply Brian 
Sutton-Smith’s eighth rhetoric of play:  phantasmagoria , and will argue that 
without attention to it we can know little of the nature of imaginative play, with 
or without technology, and nothing of play’s monstrous potential to reinforce 
or undermine social norms. And fi nally, I will address the phenomenon of 
playful events that are mediated by an implicit or explicit recognition of their 
own (real) artifi ce. Th e ‘as-if ’, ‘let’s pretend’, ‘suspension of disbelief ’ and so on 
of play and playful media in and of themselves trouble simple models of media 
ideology. Players may feel their play to be more real than everyday reality, but 
they also know and feel (perhaps because of this hyperreality) that it  is play. I 
will explore some examples of meta-play and meta-games, which also suggest 
ways of thinking about play, culture and communication in more general terms. 
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 Bad play
 Perhaps the type of (gendered) imaginative play that has generated the most 
anxiety, argument and debate is boys’ war play, play with toy guns, knives or 
other forms of fi ghting and combat. War toys and war play have been scrutinized 
and agonized over for decades, and toy guns, or any object or gesture intended to 
act as a toy gun, have been banned in many schools (see  Smith 1994 ). Research 
by Burn, Willett and Richards in English playgrounds in the past few years 
found that even playful gestures indicating an imaginary gun or knife were 
forbidden. However, boys improvized their own work-around by adopting 
gestures from the amalgam of martial arts and magic powers that characterize 
many contemporary animated television programmes. 
 Th is policing of playground gestures and actions, of course, cannot be 
separated from ongoing debates on the eff ects on children of war fi lms, violent 
videos and of course military/action video games. Th ese discussions have been 
particularly fraught in the United States in the aft ermath of a number of mass 
killings in schools. In all these play forms, in diff erent ways, the anxiety or 
assumption is that children (or some children) cannot tell the diff erence between 
play and reality, or may be more likely to adopt violent behaviour in later life. 
 Critiques of these ‘media eff ects’ assumptions are well set out and argued 
elsewhere. 2  What a close descriptive attention to play can contribute, I would 
suggest, is a sense of the complex interplay of fantasy, imagination and fear – or 
excitement – about real violence in the world. 
 We are camping, soon aft er the riots that swept through English cities 
following a police shooting in August 2011. Jo, Alex, and Alex’s friend Niko are 
playing with some Lego in the tent. I record their talk, and later take photographs 
of the aft ermath of the game ( Figure 7.1 ). 
 J:  I only have two people, but they have sticks! 
 A & N:  fi ghting/shooting/impact noises 
 N:  Is my guy ever going to die? 
 A:  No! 
 J:  Th is guy dies. 
 A:  Th is guy’s my last rioter… 
 N:  No! No! Not yet, he doesn’t die yet! 
 N:  I’ll tell you when he can die. 
 J:  Th ere’s a fake policeman … Alex, I killed him with his own neon riot stick 
141Realities, Virtualities, Protopolitics of Play
 Figure 7.1 Lego riot 
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 J:  You know riot shields? Th is is what they do… 
 J:  Alex, I’m just beating this guy to death with his own stick! 
 N:  Th e police have got a robot! 
 A:  Err! Err! Err! Err! 
 J:  It’s a bomb disposal…. I’ve beaten him so hard his legs fell off . 
 J:  Grr! Th e last rioter alive! 
 Whilst it seems to be generally understood that children know the diff erence 
between playing violence and actual violence – a fi ght is an utterly diff erent 
experience to make-believe combat – for some parents and teachers, the noise 
and aggression of war play appears to leave no space for boys in particular to 
exercise their imaginations or develop verbal and emotional relationships. 3  
Hence teachers or playworkers may intervene to channel play into more 
constructive patterns (see  Smith 1994 for a study of the war games and toys 
debates). 
 Imaginative, ‘free’ play isn’t necessarily always creative, fulfi lling 
and joyful. It can be repetitive, boring or bullying. Jo’s mini-game with 
the Lego Racers in which he drove the little car repeatedly over a cliff , 
drowned and respawned shed any obvious imaginative or even pleasurable 
aspects along with the virtual Lego bricks and seemed to be driven by 
thanatological feedback between the computer game’s cybernetic grip and 
his own encroaching sleepiness. Iona Opie documents numerous desultory 
moments of mild cruelty among the playground’s exuberance and collusions 
( Opie 1993 ). Brian Sutton-Smith notes games between siblings that seem to 
be shaped by the attractive force of younger children’s desire to be involved 
and the repulsive forces of ludic humiliation, and even harm, from their 
older brothers and sisters. Oft en, ‘for the younger sibling, the price of fun is 
getting hurt’ ( Sutton-Smith 1971 , 104). 
 Scarlett et al. draw attention to what they call ‘bad play’. Acknowledging 
the contentiousness of the term, they are careful to point out that it is not the 
symbolic material in play that they consider ‘bad’ (in the sense of contemporary 
anxieties about make-believe war or sexualized toys), nor rough physical play, 
but rather play that 
 does not allow for the socialization process to take place in positive ways for all 
children involved. Play that excludes or ridicules other children and play that is 
destructive qualify as bad play. (Scarlett et al. 2005, 80) 
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 We might note that as with all play boundaries, that between good and bad 
is shift ing and permeable. Other playground ethnographers have observed 
that the techniques and gestures that signal the start of a game and the 
constitution of its players may also, more or less subtly, exclude children on 
the periphery ( Richards 2013 , 75–76). Th e younger sibling must balance pain 
and pleasure; ridicule is a dominant mode of friendly communication for 
boys well into teenage years and early adulthood; and the borderline between 
playful destruction and vandalism is one drawn as much by social context as by 
individual motivation. 
 Th roughout Jo and Alex’s childhood in video game culture, the moments 
of anger, tears and aggression (mainly against the game technology itself) 
were triggered not by violent scenarios, characters and action in the digital 
gameworlds, but by frustration with the game on the structural, ludic level. 
Losing online at FIFA has resulted in Xbox controllers and even mobile 
phones being broken, whereas the frenetic and ultra-violent online combat 
of  Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 seems to generate nothing but hilarity. 
Th is topsy-turvy generation of frustration in the breakdown of ‘violent’ play, 
rather than in its fantastical performance, is well-illustrated in this account of 
a play event: 
 A respected and popular boy in the group is sitting bound to a chair and is 
being whipped – about 30 times with relatively hard blows – by two other 
boys with a leather strap. The roles are assigned: He cries out accordingly, 
‘Ah!’ ‘Oh!’ Two girls give the bound boy some blocks as bananas to eat. 
The two boys wielding the whip join in and give the bound boy something 
imaginary to drink. The game thus experiences a resolution through which 
new excitement may be generated: The whipping proceeds. Obviously, all 
the playmates are satisfied, the game is, for all intents and purposes, okay. 
When the teacher intervenes, the children become directly aggressive; chairs 
are thrown around, and everybody is in a bad mood. ( Wegener-Spöhring 
1994 , 97) 
 Th e teacher’s alarm at this simulation of torture is understandable but apparently 
misplaced, for – as the researchers note – the game was relaxed and fun for all 
the participants, not least the ‘victim’. It is the disruption of the game system – 
the intervention of the everyday exercise of benign authority in this case, the 
cybernetic gameplay in the preceding examples – that triggers stress and actual 
violence (against objects at least). 
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 Realities
 A baby doll is not a real baby, but it is not  not a baby. (Gregory Bateson, cited by 
Sutton- Smith 1994 , 144) 
 One of the most dominant rhetorics of play is that of  progress or  development – 
that children and animals prepare themselves for the reality beyond parental 
protection through play-hunting, play-evasion and so on. For human children 
this includes the acting out of the adult world they see ahead of them, playing at 
doctors or dressing up in adult clothing. As Sutton-Smith points out, ‘Th is belief 
in play as progress is something that most Westerners cherish, but its relevance 
to play has been more oft en assumed than demonstrated’ ( Sutton-Smith 
1997 , 9). Th is notion of play as progress is particularly evident in educational 
and psychological discourses, but it shares underlying assumptions about the 
nature of culture and communication, about the mediation of the real with play, 
with critical approaches to media culture touched on in  Chapter 4 . Both assume 
a more or less linear transfer of images and ideas from an exterior world to the 
interior world of imagination. Children’s play is seen as fundamentally imitative 
or mimetic. Any attention to the transductive operations of play, however, 
demonstrates that the ‘transfer’ of non-play elements of reality is rarely if ever so 
straightforward. From the necessary surrealism of play’s magical animation of 
toys to the misunderstanding or embellishment of actual events (as in the Lego 
riot), mimesis at the very least has to project its images onto other textures and 
moving bodies. Th ough play at fi rst glance may seem imitative or mimetic, oft en 
the marvellous is generated as much by the repurposing of available materials 
available as by the child’s imagination. Consider, for example, the scene in the 
fi lm  Toy Story where Hannah, the younger sister of the toy-hacking Sid, comes 
across the space toy Buzz Lightyear and incorporates him into her dolls’ tea 
party, dresses him up with apron and hat and renames him ‘Mrs Nesbit’. Such 
transductions are probably near-universal in play with toys. 4  
 Play may start from a reassuringly imitation of reality (family group, adult 
jobs, etc.), but has a marked tendency to then rapidly move away from these 
realities – and not towards them as one might expect if play were primarily 
‘training’ or practice for adult life. Take this transduction of adult family life, for 
example: 
 Th e researcher asked 3 children what they were playing. Each of them said 
‘families’. In their play, Henry was a brother to a younger sister, Marie. Jack 
was also a brother, though his position in their age order was not immediately 
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specifi ed. Marie commented: ‘We act like normal families, except we don’t do 
what families do, we do diff erent jobs’; Jack added: ‘We sort of shout at each 
other. If it’s time for someone to go to school you just get go to school and shove 
them out of the house’. So, given these comments, it was possible to see the 
bedding down, the restlessness and the brief tussles as enactments of sibling 
relations. But they were more than that. All three were also secret agents.  X-3 
(X-Men), Spy Kids and  Th e Incredibles were off ered as sources. Henry had water 
powers (like Frozone in  Th e Incredibles ). Marie could stretch, ‘like Elastigirl’. Jack 
was the mechanic – ‘I just build all the weapons so I just go into my workshop 
and build something and ten seconds later I come out with a weapon’ and ‘I’m 
sort of half Mr Incredible and half Dash, because I’m really strong and I’m really 
quick’. ( Richards 2013 , 77) 
 Th e children clearly weren’t training to be mummies and daddies and gradually 
edging towards  realizing those adult roles. Here instead a familiar domestic 
setting serves more as a springboard from which to launch into dream-like 
condensations of fi lm characters, powers, with some scraps of the surface 
features of adult behaviour caught up in its semiotic and kinetic dynamism. 
 With its surface familiarity but its animation by more abstract and playful 
systems of signifi cation, this imaginative play resonates with the structure and 
processes of the simulation game. A Sims family and home may be constructed 
along mimetic lines of the player’s aspirations or fantasies for future life, but they 
are driven (as we saw in  Chapter 5 ) by quite diff erent motives and possibilities. 
I would suggest that as well as using the  virtual as a way of rethinking the time 
and space of play in contemporary technoculture, we might view imaginative 
play in particular in terms of simulation, not imitation or representation. A 
simulation, in both its philosophical and computer senses, is a model or copy 
without original, and simulacra are self-moving devices with behaviours that go 
beyond that suggested by their surface appearances ( Giddings 2007b ,  2014c ). 
 Children’s play fantasies are not meant only to replicate the world […] they are 
meant to fabricate another world that lives alongside the fi rst one and carries 
on its own kind of life, a life oft en much more emotionally vivid than mundane 
reality. ( Sutton-Smith 1997 , 158) 
 Poesis
 Th e computer simulation’s predictions, its generation of ‘synthetic histories’, are 
productive of reality, then, not merely or directly refl ective. In his ethnographic 
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research of Huli children’s play in Papua New Guinea, anthropologist L.R. 
Goldman separates imaginative or imaginal processes into two types that 
support these distinctions in the relationship between play and non-play 
realities. In terms that he takes from Coleridge, he distinguishes the catoptric 
and the metoptric (sometimes written as catatropic and metatropic). Th e 
former is a mere mirroring of external reality, the latter a ‘transposing through 
rearrangement’. Th ey correspond with the distinctions made throughout this 
book between media communication as the transmission and reception (more 
or less as intended) of a message and the playful production of culture through 
the collusions of play event. In Goldman’s terms, they mark the diff erence 
between ‘reproduction and recreation, the unadorned and the adorned, fi delity 
and fantasy’, establishing a notion of children’s fantasy play as poetic and poeitic: 
‘a dramatic mimesis of human behaviour; a mimesis in the sense not of bland 
reproduction, but of something transformed’ ( Goldman 1998 , 19). Children’s 
imaginative performances, then, ‘are never intended as veridical representations, 
real-world documentaries. Rather they present as distorted simulacrums, 
not copies but editorialized caricatures incorporating embellishment and 
exaggeration…’ ( Goldman 1998 , 19). 
 Th e simulacral operations of imaginative play open up a diff erent kind 
protopolitics to that of ‘representation’. Beth Cross, for instance, notes the 
implications for the expression of ludic or cultural  power in metroptic play: 
 Metatropic mimicry by its very nature is a process open to variable interpretations, 
and therefore a useful strategy of those in subordinate positions. Th is may be 
one of the reasons it is such an attractive tactic for children. It works within the 
power structures without overtly challenging them. ( Cross 2005 , 128) 
 Phantasmagoria
 With the kraken attack, the already unstable paddling pool/ Age of Mythology 
gameworld described in  Chapter 1  dissolved in a metroptic cloud of noises, 
actions and fantastical allusions – like a decaying subatomic particle ejecting 
exotic new objects: 
 J and A:  Argh! Man overboard! We’re going to use the lobster as [indistinct] 
 J:  But these is related to a crayfi sh 
 J:  Here is an underwater dinosaur 
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 J:  and then they boil him, and eat him! 
 A:  (exaggerated munching noises and gestures) 
 J:  He’s related to … what’s a worm-like thing that lives in the sea? 
 A:  A seasnake? 
 A:  Yum, yum! 
 A:  I’m a robot! 
 A:  He should just malfunction, and explode 
 A:  He’s dead, that guy’s dead for good 
 A:  Th e crayfi sh is dead! Yummy! 
 A:  Th at guy should be malfunctioning… 
 A:  Actually, my robot should malfunction and explode as well 
 Sutton-Smith notes that children’s own stories ‘portray a world of great fl ux, 
anarchy and disaster’ oft en without resolution and with ‘repetitive episodic 
plots’, a ‘preference for rhyme and alliteration’ and characterized by nonsense, 
obscenity and ‘crazy titles, morals, and characters’ ( Sutton-Smith 1997 , 161). He 
cites an energetic story told by a four-year-old boy: 
 Once there was a dragon who went poo poo on a house and the house broke
 then when the house broke the people died
 and when the people died their bones came out and broke and got together 
again and turned into a skeleton
 and then the skeletons came along and scared the people out of the town
 and then when all the people got scared out of town then skeleton babies were 
born
 and then everyone called it skeleton town
 and when they called it skeleton town the people came back and then they got 
scared away again
 and then when they all got scared away again the skeletons died
 no one came to the town
 so there was no people in that town ever again. (in  Sutton-Smith 1997 , 161–162)
 Observations of play oft en reveal either a bricolaged aesthetic, in which 
fragments of songs, gestures, powers, relationships and so on are accreted in a 
fl ow of symbolic and performative activities, or substantially more nonsensical or 
phantasmagorical mixing up of media tropes, playground games, toys, everyday 
concerns, rhythms of sound and activity. As with the less rarifi ed realms of 
cultural expression from medieval carnival to Victorian fairs and freakshows 
to all the grotesqueries of animated fi lm and television, and, of course, video 
games, children’s culture and play are populated with monsters, ghosts, zombies, 
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witches, unicorns, robots and magic ( Caillois 1962 , 134–135,  Klevjer 2006 ) 
( Figure 7.2 ). Like the carnival, children’s oral folklore of jokes and songs is also 
shot through with a fascination for grotesque bodies and bodily functions, in 
part through hyperbolic or euphemized sexual and scatological allusions 5  : 
 Th e bell must have rung because the football came to a halt and the footballers 
gathered by the classroom steps, still full of uproarious energy. ‘Shall I tell you 
my nicest story?’ said Paul, the lanky blond sophisticate. ‘Th ere was this lady and 
a man, and he said, “I’m going to get divorced from you, you don’t half smell. 
You’ve got rubber lips and smelly breath. Th e rubber lips is your bottom and the 
smelly breath’s your fart”. I made that up’. He got his breath back and recited, 
 Figure 7.2 Phantasmagoria 
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 A man’s occupation
 Is to stick ‘is cockeration
 Up a lady’s ventilation
 To increase the population
 Of the younger generation.
 ‘I know one’, said Andrew. 
 Th ere was a young man from Cosham,
 Who took out his balls to wash ‘em.
 His wife said, ‘Jack,
 If you don’t put ‘em back
 I will tread on the buggers and squash ‘em’.
 Th e polite version of that, which I have known since the 1930s, concerns eyeballs. 
I am not sure I don’t prefer the rude one. ( Opie 1993 , 86) 
 In its irruption of the monstrous and the taboo into everyday life, its synthesis 
and condensation of heterogeneous symbolic material into an irrational yet 
integrated pattern, phantasmagorical play has a dream-like quality. Some child 
psychologists have identifi ed a similar psychic-semiotic structure to play as in 
Freud’s dreamwork: 
 a play act – like a dream – is a complicated dynamic product of ‘manifest’ and 
‘latent’ themes, of past experience and present task, of the need to express 
something and the need to suppress something, of clear representation, symbolic 
indirection, and radical disguise. ( Erikson 1971 [1951], 129) 
 It seems evident that to some extent traumatic or libidinal material fi nds 
expression in play, but the degree to which studies of play could aff ord the 
psychoanalysis of players falls outside the scope of this book, and I would also 
suggest that this return of the repressed seems to be at most just one stream in 
the turbulent confl uence of gameworlds. 6  Th e boys playing ‘Lego riot’ were no 
doubt in part responding to the disquiet and excitement driven by their emerging 
awareness of violent events in the wider world into which they are gradually 
moving. But their carnivalesque invocation of lasers and police brutality, and 
the surrealist juxtapositions necessitated by the Lego itself (including bodies, 
technological fragments, robots from  Star Wars , etc.), was driven too by the 
symbolic perversity of play, a depthless orgy of signifi ers and materials. As 
Susan Stewart puts it in her study on the aesthetics of nonsense in literature and 
folklore, 
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 Nonsense involves a transgression of common-sense interpretive procedures, 
a hermeticism in its establishment of another domain of reality, and [ … ] not 
a simple rearrangement of the hierarchies of common-sense discourse, but a 
transgression of such hierarchies. ( Stewart 1989 , 37) 
 Th e aff ectual hold of nonsense’s hermetic domains can be extremely powerful 
in both its aesthetic and behavioural prescriptions. Th e rules of the paracosm, 
for instance, are systematic and absolute ( Cohen and MacKeith 1991 , 53), 
whereas for older children, nicknames, graffi  tti tags, slang, singing and clapping 
games, hairstyles and fashion, are  meaningless in conventional communication, 
and their rules and syntax change constantly – but at any particular moment 
they are absolutely precise and key to the sustenence of the micro-worlds of 
friendship groups and subcultures. 
 Phantasmagoria is oft en the result of a simple symbolic algorithm. For 
example, Jo, Alex and Niko played on an old tractor in the grounds of a 
National Trust house. Th ey took it in turns to sit at the wheel and drive the 
virtually careering vehicle. On the way there they had been talking about 
 Grand Th eft  Auto . Th ey had not been allowed to play the 18 rated game, but 
were excited about it and may have watched Niko’s older brother playing. 
Actual tractor plus imagined video game equalled an energetic and ludicrous 
game of  Grand Th eft  Farmer , complete with ‘gangster farmers’ and drive-by 
shootings (of other visitors walking past the static tractor – here, literally in 
another world). Perhaps the simplest phantasmagorical operation, though, 
is  inversion . Th e medieval carnival turned the world and its hierarchies 
upside down for a day, with donkeys elected pope, idiots crowned king and 
men and women wearing each others’ clothing. Blasphemy, licentiousness, 
promiscuity and gluttony were sanctioned for the brief interlude of the feast 
day. Contemporary Halloween inverts the residual Christian cosmology of the 
West as a liminoid hell opens and well-behaved children become monstrous, 
undead, animal and – again – gluttonous. 7  
 Meta-play
 Children know that they are manipulating their thoughts about reality, not 
reality itself, and they know that their play self is not the same as their everyday 
self. ( Sutton-Smith 1997 , 159) 
 Th e playful nip denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would be 
denoted by the bite. (Bateson 1972, 180) 
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 Josie and Lily: I’m a good dancer, dancer, dancer… 
 I’m the main character, character, character… 
 Th ough phantasmagorical play appears dream-like, there are important 
diff erences between play and dreams. Th e other-wordly realms of the paddling 
pool with its dinosaurs, robots and monsters, or the playground ghosts in a 
hooped transduction of video games, are structured by ludic demands and 
conventions as much as by the polymorphous perversity of any individual 
player. 
 Lily (excitedly):  Th ere’s a ghost! Th ere’s a ghost on Level Th ree! 
 Rebekah:  On Level Th ree there’s a ghost? So now how did you fi nd the ghost? 
 Lily:  Th e thing is, there’s a ghost, and we have to catch it – 
 Sophia:  And then they’re dead! 
 Lily:  Yeah, but then more ghosts joined, so whoever gets caught by a ghost is a 
ghost. 
 Rebekah:  Oh I see, and then what happens, if you’re a ghost? 
 Lily:  If you get caught as a ghost, then you turn into a zombie… 
 Sophia:  Th e hula-hoops is ice, and the gaps are, is the world. 
 Th e design of the game acquires, then, a degree of representational staging, 
with ghost and zombie characters assigned, and imaginary spaces delineated. 
Meanwhile, the ludic structure is expanding into Level Th ree. Th e fi nal extract 
shows, amid even greater excitement, the satisfying mix of ludic structure and 
suitably horror-themed content: 
 Rebekah:  How was Level Th ree? 
 Sophia:  Really scary! 
 Lily:  We’re on Level Four now with a zombie! 
 ( Burn 2013 , 138) 
 Th e girls here are playing a game, not dreaming a dream, however they are 
also playing at playing a game; their game has a (video)game nested within it. 
Gregory Bateson’s insights on meta-communication are useful here. Bateson’s 
observations of animals at play, and his application of these observations to 
human communication, have infl uenced game studies in its theorization of 
the boundaries between playful and non-playful behaviour. However, the full 
implications of Bateson’s ideas are far-reaching. Like Huizinga, he suggests 
that play in a broad sense is generative of human communication and 
civilization, not a by-product or epiphenomenon of culture. Whilst Huizinga 
traces the development of culture as playful through the formalizing and 
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cultural-reproductive performances and architecture of ritual, art and law, 
Bateson’s more speculative thinking suggests to me that communication is 
fundamentally simulational. 
 He watched two monkeys playing in a zoo. He defi ned their playing as 
‘an interactive sequence of which the unit actions or signals were similar to 
but not the same as combat’. It was clear to both the human visitors and the 
monkeys themselves that ‘the sequence as a whole was not combat’ (Bateson 
1972, 179). It is important to understand not only that the monkeys knew 
they weren’t fi ghting, but that they mutually recognized that their activities 
were ‘not fi ghting’, that is what they were doing shared features with fi ghting, 
but without the actual aggression and harm. Th is mutual recognition, Bateson 
argues, can only be initiated and sustained through  meta-communication , that 
is ‘exchanging signals which would carry the message “this is play” ’ (Bateson 
1972, 179). 
 In commentary of Bateson’s ideas, these observations are oft en abbreviated 
to the phrase ‘the nip and the bite’, where the nip is the playful use of the teeth 
in the ‘not fi ghting’ game, and the bite would be a real aggressive use of the 
teeth, drawing blood (e.g.  Salen and Zimmerman 2003 , 371–372). As far as this 
goes it, on the one hand, demonstrates the necessarily communicative nature 
of play – to ensure mutual recognition that this is a social and not an aggressive 
meeting – and, on the other, that there is something representational about play – 
the nip  denotes a bite, ‘signals standing for other events’ (Bateson 1972, 181). 
Yet this theory of meta-communication has further implications. Th e meta-
communication, he explains, is ‘a negative statement containing an implicit 
negative meta-statement’, or to put it in a diff erent way, the statement ‘this is 
play’ can be expanded to ‘[t]hese actions in which we now engage do not denote 
what those actions  for which they stand would denote’ (Bateson 1972, 180). 
A dog might bare its teeth or use them to hold or pin down another dog to 
intimidate it without necessarily fi ghting or causing injury. In this case the ‘nip’ 
would fully denote a bite – it is still  not a bite, but the narrowness of the border 
between representation and actual fi ghting itself acts as a warning or threat. 8  In 
play proper, though, there is an extra remove – the bite itself is absent, it doesn’t 
exist and is understood not to exist (unless the meta-communication breaks 
down and play ends). 
 I also speak of this compound of subjunctivity, belief, action, intensity, and 
commitment as  meta-action , because it is an action that is central and stylized, 
and that creates incongruity through indirect allusion to the mundane 
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world … children are playing with interpreting their own feelings and thoughts, 
not primarily playing with repeating the external world. Playing is on the meta 
level, not the mimicry level. ( Sutton-Smith 1997 , 198) 
 So, play in its very nature operates on a meta-level of communication. It opens 
up a gap between the mundane world and its own everyday realities. With 
children’s play, not least play with media forms and images, this gap itself opens 
up – concertina-like with folded levels of signals and performances. Perceptive 
ethnographies of children’s play pay attention to these levels and mechanisms 
as children  perform media scripts rather than  living within , or fully  identifying 
with their fi ctional world. Th e singers of the playground renditions of  Single 
Ladies (discussed in  Chapter 4 ) are both performing (to themselves, anyone 
in the playground who might be interested and to the researcher and camera) 
and  playing at performing. Th ey are learning the dance but also the dance as a 
media spectacle, inseparable from the aesthetic form of the pop music video. 
Th ey adapt the dance to fi t the demands of playground rather than soundstage 
performance. Anna, the leader of the  Single Ladies performances, for instance, 
practiced the song not as enactment or dramatization of its lyrics, but as play 
with the idea and appeal of performance itself: 
 always I am daydreaming when I listen … when I daydream I think like that 
like I’m at home and lots of people are at my house to watch me on the stage. 
( Willett 2011 , 350) 
 Th rough media culture, then, the framings of meta-play oft en include the 
remediation of music videos, fi lms and television programme. Willett also 
describes a group of boys playing the quiz show  Who Wants to be a Millionaire 
with questions from an offi  cial book, and with performances closely matching 
the overall programme format. Th e game is as much about the conventions 
and iterative structure of the quiz show and the performance of the host and 
contestants as about the competitive answering of questions. Even a playground 
game of football is generally a performative and dramatic event, eliciting the 
gestures and celebrations of professional players seen on television, as well as 
the speech and exclamations of commentators, the invocation of the roar of the 
crowd when a goal is scored. 
 With video game cultures, the layers and overlappings of meta-play are 
particularly complex: 
 A group of four ten year old girls gathers around a video game console in Anna’s 
playroom. Th ey are playing …  Pirates: Th e Legend of Black Kat , which features a 
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female pirate [ … ] Th e girls spend their time in the game searching for treasure, 
navigating the pirate ship from island to island and fi ghting off  pirates and 
giant crabs. Th e game is meant for a single player, but the girls take turns with 
the controller … surfi ng the internet on Anna’s laptop while waiting for their 
turn. Th ey are engaged in multiple forms of play in the same space: instant 
messaging…, listening to music, playing games online while simultaneously 
watching and coaching whichever girl currently has the controller…. Th e game 
has captured their imaginations to such a degree that the play merges as they re-
enact the adventure pretending to be pirates engaging in play sword fi ghts and 
taking turns being Katarina [the pirate protagonist] […] 
 Anna:  ‘Th is went so much faster than the 1 st  time but if I have to redo it again I’m 
gonna be so mad’. 
 Anna hands the controller to Molly who explores the island looking for the 
treasure chest eventually encountering pirates. 
 Molly:  ‘Pirates! Oh no! 
 I’m running through the trees…’ 
 Molly explores the island in the game looking for clues that will lead her to the 
treasure. 
 Molly:  (handing the controller to Virginia) ‘Do you want to try?’ 
 Virginia is … typically shy and timid on the schoolyard. She reluctantly accepts 
the controller. 
 Virginia:  ‘You don’t need to kill the monkeys ‘cause they won’t hurt you’ 
 Anna:  ‘Press 1, 2 right when the lock comes press 1, 2 go thru the door that opened’ 
 Virginia:  (Squealing) ‘Crabs, crabs, crabs, eww!’ (She swipes wildly at the crabs with 
her sword, laughing and screeching) 
 Dixon and Weber’s analysis of this event highlights the fl ow between virtual and 
actual play with which this book started. Like Jo and Alex’s designation of their 
father as the player of their actual Lego Racers across the fl oor, the girls were 
‘both  playing at playing a videogame and playing the game’, and ‘[t]here was a 
multiple layering or multitasking in the casual way they incorporated the pirate 
game into their play, cheering on the person playing, giving suggestions, and 
actually enacting or improvising around it’ ( Dixon and Weber 2011 , 487). 
 Bateson suggests that animal play may have been ‘an important step in the 
evolution of communication’ (Bateson 1972, 182). If my connecting this animal 
meta-communication to the ludic digital media of simulation seems a stretch, 
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consider Bateson’s own application of meta-communication to human culture: 
‘trompe l’oeil painting and conjurers and special eff ects in cinema’, cultural forms 
commonly regarded as precursors of virtual reality technologies, or – for Jean 
Baudrillard – as stages in the precession of the simulacra (Baudrillard 1994). 
With metroptic culture, 
 the idea was introduced that an original achieves its signifi cance only through 
copies; they have their being only in becoming. ( Goldman 1998 , 19) 
 In thinking of play as simulational – from animals to children to 
technoculture – it is important to note that these simulations are not deceitful: 
the playful ‘bite’ is an illusion, but dogs and monkeys know it, and the conjurer 
or  trompe l’oeil painter aim is to impress with the technical virtuosity of their 
trickery, not to trick ( Bateson 1972 , 181). As I argued earlier, simulations and 
virtual realities are real in their technical apparatus and their eff ects on our 
bodies. Play and playful technologies might help us rethink artifi cial realities 
of culture and communication – and the reality of artifi ce. 
 Prosthetic imagination
 Th ere are many ways that technologies and environments, whether designed for 
the purposes of play or not, suggest, scaff old, extend and augment imaginative 
play. Play in this sense is fully machinic, and imagination is extended out into, 
and processed by, the mechanisms of the gameworld. Imaginative play is not 
only the imposition or projection of a child’s fantasies into the animation of dead 
matter or onto the environment as if it were a cinema screen. Th e exercise of 
agency in actual play is analogous to the complicated technologies of simulation 
and virtual worlds. Each can be understood as a set of feedback loops and the 
child is acted on by the machines as well as acting on them. Th e game event is not 
reducible to the actions or locations of either. Th e imaginative motives of play 
cannot be simply located in the child’s mind; just as a collective game between 
children conjures up a real world that does not exist – not even as electrical 
impulses in the nervous system – so too a collective gameworld generated by a 
child and a machine is distributed across and between them. 
 To return to simulation games, 9  computer simulations are artifi cial 
imaginations, modelling systems too complex for the unaugmented human 
mind. We delegate to them the storage and processing of dynamic non-
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linear variables, whether these be market data in the modelling of economic 
predictions or the ratio between the ‘Outgoing’ and ‘Nice’ aspects of a  Sims 
character. In a simulation game, these variables play out through, and feed back 
to the player from, the behaviour of the virtual world and its creatures. Th e 
mechanisms of transmedia systems provide a looser system, the components 
of which are plugged together by individuals and groups in many diff erent 
ways: 
 this is the question of how the imagination as produced by commercial media 
articulates with the imagination, agency, and creativity of diverse children going 
about their daily lives. ( Ito 2011 , 492) 
 Simple machines such as toys or objects co-opted as toys may serve a similar 
function. In the paddling pool event discussed earlier, Jo at one point picked 
up a plastic footpump that was lying around aft er having been used to infl ate 
the pool itself. He wanted to use it to mechanize the ‘tidal wave’ god power 
previously visited on the world through the bucket. By reconnecting the pump’s 
hose, he could get it to suck instead of blow, and he aimed to suck up water and 
direct it at boats and toys in a powerful jet. I wasn’t happy about having a pump 
full of water so stopped him. 
 J:  What are we supposed to use then? 
 S (with a touch of sarcasm):  Your imagination? 
 J:  How are we meant to use our imagination on something that’s meant to be 
real?… 
 J:  We’re meant to try, we’re trying to do it so that it’s real. 
 In retrospect, my irritable response clearly shows I had not grasped the 
multifaceted workings of the boys’ imaginations or the machinic environment 
of their gameworld. Th e exercise of imagination had been eff ected all aft ernoon 
from the spinning into being of the heterotopian and phantasmagorical world 
of Mr Happy in the  Age of Mythology . Th e vivid blue water and red-striped 
sails looped visual and embodied memories of the computer game, whilst the 
other more or less randomly accumulated toys were caught up, triggering new 
associations and possibilities. Th e materiality of this environment suggested 
playful behaviours, and enacted them – submerging and fl oating, exercising 
cataclysmic powers on the tiny fi gures. Similarly, the visitation of god powers 
on the computer game characters is triggered by the player’s decision, but the 
visual animation and destructive eff ects of the process itself is delivered by 
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the machine. Divine intervention fl ows through the player and the machine, 
so it should be no surprise that in the actual game Jo was ‘trying to do it so 
that it’s real’. 
 Th e protopolitics of play
 Th e semiotics of gesture, mimicry, and gameplaying regained their liberty in 
the child’s activities, are disengaged from the ‘trace’, that is, from the dominant 
competence of the school teacher’s language, and a microscopic event disrupts 
the equilibrium of local power. ( Deleuze and Guattari 1983 , 33) 
 Th e microscopic events of children’s imaginative play including those in and 
around video games are phantasmagorical. In describing and opening up 
numerous examples of unexpected and fantastical play around media and video 
games from my own research and that of others, I have hoped to question the 
entrenched and limiting division of reality into nature and artifi ce, human and 
non-human, active and passive, off ering instead an everyday ecology of material 
and immaterial realities, constituted by fl ows of information, imagination and 
love. On one level, I hope I have helped to counter assumptions that play with 
virtual media is unimaginative, commodifi ed, mechanical, antisocial, separate 
from and destructive of social, imaginative, creative outdoor play. However, I 
do not want to perpetuate these binaries. Play with computer games may not 
be ‘mechanical’ in the popular sense of infl exible, pre-scripted and without 
any intelligence, but it is – like all gameworlds –  machinic . Gameworlds have 
always been located in and formed from their environments (sand, lamp posts, 
fi elds and virtual places), have always had their technologies (knuckle bones, 
balls, controllers and screens) and techniques (swinging, building, twitching 
thumbs). For all the events of openness, negotiation and transformations of 
rule sets, games can also be precise systems and for all the emergent behaviours 
they might allow, much play with and in them is by the rules. To play  Snakes 
and Ladders ,  Solitaire or  Modern Warfare 2 by their rules is not to succumb to 
ideology but it is to render oneself passive – though partially, incompletely and 
interestingly. Th e rules of these games are a convenient artifi ce to facilitate and 
structure periods of play with others (including machines), or by oneself. Or at 
the very least we need to rethink the terms ‘active’ and ‘passive’. As discussed in 
 Chapter 5 , in a cybernetic system there is a fl ow of agency: components act and 
are acted upon. 
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 However, this emphasis on describing and theorizing the machinic and non-
human participants in children’s video game play should not lead us to disregard 
concerns about human desires, anxieties, identifi cations and investments as 
players in these media technocultural events. Th ey may not simply initiate or 
dominate a gameworld, but games were spun into being through the tastes, 
personalities, relationships and abilities –  technicities – of children through 
and with the non-human participants ( Dovey and Kennedy 2006 ). If code and 
information must be understood as real, material, of the world, then so too 
can the intangible yet real, embodied yet distributed, monstrous operations 
of human factors – perception, imagination, creativity, anxiety, play – without 
always already reducing these to the reassuring singularity of identity or 
subjectivity, and without assuming that they are unchanged in the processes. 
Th e multiple and varied transductions of the Lego video game both on- and 
off -screen are a reminder of the wide range of possibilities and the complexities 
in children’s play and in the varying networks that facilitate but also shape that 
play. 
 At the molar level of the politics of children’s media and toy culture, it is 
important that adults pay attention to and care about the actual acquisitiveness 
and surveillance required by online spaces for children, the reinforcement of 
social divisions of gender and race in the design of toys and concomitant access 
to digital media and technologies. Campaigns such as Let Toys Be Toys, all-girl 
game jams, and initiatives such as GoldieBlox open up spaces and possibilities 
in adult thought and children’s play. 10  But at the molecular level of moments 
and events of play these divisions are oft en fl uid, and fl ow across each other 
and into other strange and monstrous confi gurations. 
 I would argue that it is equally as important to allow space and time for 
gameworlds to emerge in playgrounds, parks, streets, in and around virtual 
worlds. Th e threat to imaginative play is not ultimately video games or pink and 
blue toys, but decreased access to the open space of streets and parks because of 
traffi  c or fear of strangers, and the shortening of school playtimes. It is also in 
the well-meaning surveillance of children’s play, from the attempts to ban virtual 
guns and knives to the channelling of play into the rhetorics and structures 
of learning and development. Gameworlds need actual time and space (and 
benign neglect) to open up their own second dimensions. Adults need to pay 
less attention in some ways (and the irony of this is not lost on this parent 
ethologist), and more in others: 
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 Children need their play to make the present tolerable to themselves, and to 
do that they need a lot of time to themselves. We should defend that need and 
not intrude upon it for the protection of our own past values under the guise of 
preparing their future. (Sutton- Smith 1994 , 146) 
 We need a politics of opening up symbolic and material resources for boys and 
girls, towards a rendering of diff erence as malleable, insignifi cant, meaningless, 
not a policing or closing down of disapproved types of play. 
 Recent years (not least in our house) have seen the emergence of a household 
politics of time, with parental policies and negotiations, around ‘screen time’, 
injunctions and rewards regulating Internet use and gameplay. As parents our 
concerns over video game play have generally not been to do with digital play 
itself, nor the symbolic content of particular games, but the rapt attention these 
passional circuits engender, the hours they command sometimes at the expense of 
other, less intense, social and gameworlds. Th e temporalities of games discussed 
in  Chapter 5 take on a diff erent character in network culture. Organizing and 
conducting a collaborative  World of Warcraft  raid is not something that can be 
paused, packed away and reopened another day – it must be done  now and to 
be interrupted is catastrophic. Th e timespace of the virtual and the everyday 
collide. Th is engineering of attention at the local level of particular games is 
inseparable from the broader temporal politics of the attention economy in 
which corporations fi ght for our media time and that of our children, and for 
our money through the iterative economies of micro-payments and upgrade 
culture, training our attention for the demands of consumption in a media world 
of proliferating channels and platforms ( Crogan and Kinsley 2012 ). 
 As I complete this book, Jo and Alex are in their mid teens, Lego and 
Playmobil has been consigned to the attic, and imaginative play evident only 
in the occasional eruption in jokes, fl ights of fancy or recollections of their own 
play history. However, the micro-worlds of video games persist into adulthood, 
a bridge alongside the blurred returns and relays of TV and literature for older 
children and adults,  Call of Duty ,  Mario and Th e Sims alongside Harry Potter 
and  Lord of the Rings . 
 Th eir virtual media culture has changed from the stand-alone console and 
computer games, through their early adoption of the MMO  World of Warcraft  , 
to the interwoven playful networks of Xbox Live, Steam and social media. Th ese 
platforms and the connections they form have developed as the children have 
grown up, but they were prefi gured by (and to an extent prepared for by) the 
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local hook-ups of GameBoy cables in  Pokémon swaps, the asynchronous social 
networks of virtual worlds such as  Moshi Monsters and the sharing of tiny sound 
fi les in their fi rst mobile phones. Th ese online gameworlds are also spaces of 
collusion and communion: a friend’s eleven-year-old daughter has learned the 
‘cup game’ (a very skillful, fast and rhythmic clapping game) from YouTube; the 
video channel has revolutionized childlore, allowing songs, dances and crazes 
to spread virally not via the slow and contingent routes from playground to 
playground ( Bishop and Burn 2013 ). 
 Jo at age sixteen can still sing the theme tune to the  Pokémon TV series and 
the two of them still return, from the varied grown-up attractions of online 
culture to the reassuring familiarity of a new iteration of the  Pokémon DS games. 
Particularly in the holidays, when they spend time together again, playing 
 Pokémon in parallel reconnects the brother-machine. 
 Notes
 1  Letter from Virginia Lowe, Ormond, Victoria, Australia, in  New Scientist , issue 
2567, 2 September 2006,  http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19125671.300-
imaginary-friends.html . Accessed 1st April 2013. 
 2  See David Gauntlett’s useful summary of the case against the media eff ects 
model,  http://www.theory.org.uk/david/eff ects.htm , and Henry Jenkins’ 
attempts to intervene in media and policy reactions to the Columbine shootings 
( Jenkins 1999 ). 
 3  Th ough video games in their interactive and refl exive play and vivid images seem to 
some to fatally collapse fantasy and reality, or even to actively train children to aim 
and shoot as a refl ex (see  Lister et al. 2009 , 289). 
 4  As evidenced by home photographs that circulate through social media – for 
instance, toy cars were given to a young girl by parents hoping to resist gender 
stereotyping. Th ey later found the cars on their backs/roofs, tucked up in dolls’ 
beds. To cite an example from children’s literature (acknowledged by Goldman as 
an ethnographic source in its own right –  Goldman 1998 , 1),  My Naughty Little 
Sister , a story in which the toys made by the toddler’s uncle are systematically 
transformed – a horse on wheels into a pram, a dolls’ house into an oven and 
then (with the collusion of her friend, Bad Harry) an actual toy oven into a steam 
locomotive engine ( Edwards 1997 ). 
 5  Rarely so directly or frankly in their popular media resources, however. 
 6  Interestingly, Lilli Peller suggests that the repetitious nature of play may be a 
process for dealing with trauma. 
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 ‘Th e psychoanalytic interpretation so far has stressed the emotional release 
gained through play. Children play in order to mitigate, to deny, or temporarily 
solve a confl ict. In play the child recaptures for a while the omnipotence he once 
believed he possessed. He repeats and gradually assimilates an experience that 
was traumatic or a narcissistic insult. Play may help him overcome a specifi c 
fear. And, of course, play is a source of pleasure … the playing child  repeats an 
experience he has had, or a part of it.  Repeating it, he divests it of its uniqueness . 
[…] Play enables the child to reexperience, to remold past impressions and 
events and their accompanying moods and emotions.  Playful repetition provides 
essential, possibly indispensable steps toward concept formation’ ( Peller 1971 
[1952], 123–124) . 
 7  Th e mingling of bodies on the street, particularly aft er dark, is in itself a practice 
that makes police anxious, more so, of course, with adults than children. Th e 
effi  gies and festive costumes of some political demonstrations (note the recent 
adoption of Guy Fawkes masks in Anonymous protests) overlap with the more 
playful and performative carnivals of recent years. Last year, Bristol’s ‘zombie walk’ 
saw a number of zombie Jimmy Saviles – a symbolic invocation as much of the 
carnivalesque rejection of good taste as of the recently deceased celebrity serial sex 
off ender. Halloween costumes of ‘psycho ward’ mental patients on sale in British 
supermarkets in 2013 generated complaints from mental health charities. Th ese 
inversions have political potential, but they are profoundly ambiguous. 
 8  Th is is my own observation, based on our own dog’s behaviour with puppies. 
 9  All computer and video games are simulations, whether they represent real-world 
systems and environments or not. Here I am referring specifi cally to the genre of 
games, the gameplay of which is driven by the modelling of complex systems – 
such as the domestic lives of  Th e Sims and the urban development of  SimCity 
(see  Giddings 2014c ). 
 10  http://www.lettoysbetoys.org.uk ,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20186937 , 
http://www.goldieblox.com.
 Sarah Grimes’ Prezi keynote for  Intersections/Cross-Sections (March 2013) captures 
many of the issues in a particularly elegant and playful way, http://prezi.com/
v73wy2bp-r-g/politics-of-play-keynote/ 
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